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The formation of a coherent counterinsurgency policy in the United States is often attributed to 
the administration of President John F. Kennedy. Indeed, through his own personal fascination 
and promotion of the subject, Kennedy infused funding and expertise into a steadily expanding 
counterinsurgency apparatus. However, American counterinsurgency doctrine was implanted 
deeply within military and intelligence institutions and government bureaucracy long before 
the Camelot era.  
American conquest by counterinsurgency has a long legacy. The Founding Fathers for Kennedy 
(to whom this tradition belongs) were Andrew Jackson, William Sherman, William McKinley, 
Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. As this study argues, periods of American expansion 
have always been based on the principles of anti-civilian warfare. The history of the United 
States is one of expansion and primitive accumulation – a process facilitated by methods 
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The most basic strategy of any counterintelligence program is to confuse the enemy and have 
them believing what you want them to believe. But also it has another aspect to it, the aspect 
that we know as terrorism – intimidation and violence, making examples of leaders, making 
examples of people who resist. The United States government perfected these techniques in 
Southeast Asia against the people’s movement in Vietnam. Many of the police professionals 
who would later lead the war of suppression against FALN and Black Liberation Army went on 
year-long sabbaticals to Vietnam to be trained in the Phoenix program…the Phoenix program 
was a program carried out by the CIA, and its objective was to root out the infrastructure and 
the cadres and troops of the National Liberation Front, the so-called Viet-Cong. They killed over 
50,000 people in this effort, many of whom were tortured and most of whom were murdered 
in their sleep, much like Fred Hampton. 
 
 









*FALN was Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquena. Fred Hampton was leader of the 





The formulation of Kennedy-era counterinsurgency policy (1961-1963) has been the subject of 
much research, discussion, debate and disagreement. While supporters of the Kennedy 
administration tend to downplay the role of counterinsurgency in foreign policy planning, those 
who do acknowledge Camelot’s preeminent focus on counterrevolution almost unanimously 
describe the effort as either ineffectual or an outright disaster. Other popular narratives have been 
woven out of this mixture of denial on one side, and outright condemnation on the other. 
Foremost among them, is the mythology that John F. Kennedy was the initiator and main 
proponent of American counterinsurgency doctrine. 
     The traditional analysis of the Kennedy counterinsurgency era does not suffice for several 
reasons. Counterinsurgency, by many accounts, appears to be a constant factor throughout 
recorded human history. American counterinsurgency doctrine, despite widely accepted 
misconceptions, did not begin with the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, or the various 
assassination plots against Fidel Castro, or even the secret wars in Laos and clandestine actions 
against North Vietnam. Long before these interventions were counterinsurgency operations in 
Greece, Guatemala and Iran. Even further into the past we find American counterinsurgency in 
the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Panama. Retreat 
into the 19th century, and we find clear examples of counterinsurgency warfare during the 
subjugation of the Lakota Sioux, the defeat of the Southern Confederacy, the hundred-year war 
against the Seminole, and President Andrew Jackson’s Indigenous removal policies. In fact, as 
historian John Grenier argues, Americans practiced counterinsurgency long before they were 
even considered a nation. 
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     The idea that Kennedy’s “foray” into counterinsurgency was a policy disaster is also an 
unfounded belief, a dogma that tends to operate in the service of the American policymakers who 
continue to use counterinsurgency tactics to this day. One should ask: if President Kennedy’s 
counterinsurgency ambitions were foolhardy, misguided, and impossible to implement, then why 
does the American military-intelligence establishment continually promote, advance, fund, and 
deploy these techniques around the world? While many consider the intervention in Laos a 
failure, others may see the success of the clandestine war and the funding scheme centered on 
CIA criminal alliances with Hmong opium traffickers. After all, many of the same CIA agents 
and government personnel who participated in the Air America operation out of Laos and 
Thailand were the same individuals who made similar alliances with Colombian drug lords to 
fund the Contra Wars during the Reagan administration. Were these counterinsurgency 
operations a failure? Today, it is safe to assume there is no threat of insurgency to be found in 
Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras or Guatemala. Yet, by 
all accounts, the American Empire remains. 
     What will be proposed in the following pages is that the distortion of the Kennedy 
counterinsurgency legacy is in fact inherent to the propaganda and value systems of our current 
so-called “post-ideological” world. The illusion of counterinsurgency as an historical aberration, 
unique somehow to the Camelot era, also fits into wider narratives focusing on the nature and 
intent of American imperialism. The mystery of JFK’s assassination also conforms to this 
paradigm, in that his murder is perceived as an unfortunate result of the uncontrollable 
momentum unleashed by Kennedy’s own counterinsurgency obsession. The result of adhering to 
this framework cloaks the ongoing prevalence of counterinsurgency. It also obscures the fact that 
this type of warfare has been a constant throughout human and American history.  
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     Above all else, the subterfuge which is a doctrinal necessity to all counterinsurgency practices 
dictates that the narrative hides the true purpose of counterrevolutionary state-terror. What has 
been largely forgotten or dismissed is the fact that American imperialism is a process of 
(primitive) capital accumulation - one wherein counterinsurgency is deployed with the explicit 
intention of terrorizing and controlling targeted civilian populations. It is for this reason we must 
dispel the traditional narratives, and, in turn, formulate a better explanation of how American 
counterinsurgency fits into our current reality. What needs to be acknowledged is that continued 
use of these practices is damaging not only to wider humanity, but also to the health and well-
being of the American people. 
      
This thesis has been divided into three main sections, each having a series of sub-chapters. The 
first part, Frontiers Old and New, has a wide-ranging historical focus which ties modern 
American counterinsurgency doctrine to the warfare of “New World” settler-colonists. The 
patterns of this method of war are traced to figures such as President Andrew Jackson and 
General William Tecumseh Sherman. Special attention will be given to early displays of 
American counterinsurgency warfare against the Red Stick Creeks, the Seminole, the Southern 
Confederacy, and the Lakota Sioux. Moving forward into the 20th century, the foundations of the 
American counterinsurgency institution were strengthened through the expansionist zeal of past 
presidents like William McKinley, Teddy Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson. It will be argued 
that by the Camelot era, President Kennedy inherited a large, intricate, and international 
counterinsurgency apparatus. Kennedy’s fascination and devotion to counterinsurgency merely 
injected funding and interest into an established imperial bureaucracy.    
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     The second section, America’s Praetorian Guard, charts the rise of organized police in the 
United States from roots in the Barbadian slave patrols that were brought to South Carolina in 
the 17th century. From the outset, American policymakers harnessed the police as the most potent 
weapon of domestic counterinsurgency. This section also describes how U.S. colonial expansion 
into the Philippines, Haiti, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Panama were the beginnings of an 
imperial regime based on rule by militarized proxy political police. This style of 
counterinsurgency policing would come home in the form of the Palmer Raids, and later, the 
FBI’s COINTELPRO. Taking us into the post-World War II era, the Central Intelligence Agency 
became the most vital arm of America’s international police regime. Under the auspices of 
Kennedy-era “security-as-economic-development” programs like the Office of Public Safety, 
police around the world were trained by the CIA. At the same time, the Agency invested in 
strategies of social control and social engineering through Project Camelot, the Human Ecology 
Fund, and MK-ULTRA. Attention is also given to the ultimate expression of these policies: the 
CIA’s Operation Phoenix in Southeast Asia and Operation Condor in Latin America. 
     The third section consists of five case studies of some lesser-known examples of Kennedy-era 
counterinsurgency policy. The traditional narratives, which focus on Cuba, Vietnam, and Laos, 
will be replaced with analysis of Guatemala, Peru, Brazil, Guyana, and Thailand. American 
practice in these instances displayed how powerful and intricate counterinsurgency bureaucracies 
became embedded within various U.S. client states. Far from a policy of failure, Kennedy’s 
counterinsurgency initiatives installed a vast regime of states who were loyal to American 
interests – some for a very long time after the death of JFK. Rather than endorsing the success of 
these operations, the point here is to illustrate the misconception that both Kennedy and U.S. 
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counterinsurgency failed in their respective missions. For propaganda purposes, what has been 
withheld to a wider audience is that quite the opposite of this is true.   
     Undoubtedly, military historians and counterinsurgency theorists will be outraged and 
annoyed with the interchangeable use of terminology to be found in the coming pages. 
Insurgents are people who, organized or not, resist the organized violence of primitive 
accumulation. Over the centuries so-called insurgents have been stigmatized variously as 
barbarians, pirates, bandits, outlaws, revolutionaries, partisans, subversives, witches, radicals, 
terrorists and homo sacer. Superficial alterations in official terminology are meaningless, and 
constant re-categorization of the same phenomena is useful only to the counterinsurgent. After 
all, these terms are dictated by the counterinsurgent himself as obfuscation to the reality of a type 
of warfare which, historically and explicitly, targets civilians and non-combatant populations. 
Employing doublespeak, the counter-revolutionary, counter-terrorist, counter-subversive, or 
practitioner of “low-intensity conflict” mires reality by clouding their own role in vast crimes 













Frontiers Old and New: Counterinsurgency as an American Method of War 
 
Chapter I 
The Roman Empire and Homo Sacer 
 
In two lectures given in 1962, German political and legal theorist Carl Schmitt first proposed his 
now famous origin of the partisan-guerrilla, and relatedly, his rendition on the inception of 
insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare. “The initial situation for our consideration of the 
problem of the partisan is the guerrilla war that the Spanish people waged against the army of a 
foreign conqueror from 1808 until 1813” observed Schmitt, speaking of Napoleon’s invasion. 
“In this war, a people – a pre-bourgeois, pre-industrial, pre-conventional nation” he contends, 
“for the first time confronted a modern, well-organized, regular army.” In the aftermath of this 
development, “new horizons of war opened, new concepts of war developed, and a new theory of 
war and politics emerged.”1  
     In hindsight, it would be an understatement to declare Schmitt, though well respected, less 
than visionary in this instance. Guerrilla warfare, arguably, can be traced back to the earliest 
recorded history of the great ancient empires; where people stigmatized as barbarians staged 
countless insurgencies against the modern, regular armies of the day. Schmitt emphasized “that 
there actually are no old theories of the partisan as distinguished from modern ones. In the 
classical laws of war or European international law, there was no place for the partisan in the 
                                                            
1 Carl Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political (New 
York: Telos Press, 2007), 3. 
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modern sense…he was simply outside the law.” 2 However, as Italian philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben has illustrated more recently, the Roman Empire had constructed laws with a specific 
legal designation – homo sacer – pertaining to those banned from society, including barbarians, 
pirates, bandits, and others who would have been considered the equivalent of the modern-day 
insurgent or guerrilla. Agamben believes this law had widespread ramifications: 
The sovereign and homo sacer are joined in the figure of an action that, excepting itself from both 
human and divine law…nevertheless delimits what is, in a certain sense, the first properly 
political space of the West distinct from both the religious and the profane sphere, from both the 
natural order and the regular juridical order.3  
 
     Roman law placed homo sacer within its domain and jurisdiction, yet as non-citizens, they 
did not possess any rights under those same laws. Therefore, the law could be used to punish the 
insurgent, but it did not afford the insurgent any protections. Agamben sees this as the origin of 
sovereign power, and an early attempt at the institution of organized social control, manifested 
most explicitly in the sovereign’s rule over life and death. With the legal designation “homo 
sacer,” the Romans created a system where, according to Agamben, “life is sacred only insofar 
as it is taken into the sovereign exception,” and wherein this law creates a society in which 
“human life is included in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be 
killed…their [homo sacer] cancellation or negation is the constitutive act.” Agamben deduces 
that this is “the originary political formulation of the imposition of the sovereign bond.”4 
     Certainly, there is no arguing the fact that non-conventional forces and irregular warfare had a 
place in resisting the protracted, centuries-long Roman invasions of northwestern Europe, 
                                                            
2 Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan, 10.  
3 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998), 84. 
4 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 85. 
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Britain, the Balkans and North Africa. Based on years of extensive research, professor Graham 
Webster cites Augustus (27 B.C. – A.D. 14), as the Emperor who “first clearly understood…the 
idea of an area under Roman dominion and control.” As the imperial frontier expanded, Roman 
military forces were preoccupied primarily with the dynamics of, as Webster describes it, 
“containing a conquered people.” The desire to control barbarians resulted in the development of 
new “methods employed in Republican times to deal with an external hostile power” of which, 
“invasion and conquest seemed the most obvious.”5  
     Following the logic of Roman sovereign law and custom, Augustus refused to record the 
names of the barbarians with whom he battled. As historian David Braund recounts “the war 
with Sextus [a pirate] is called a war (bellum), but it is a war with slaves, dignified only by its 
scale: Sextus himself goes unnamed.” Braund further explains that:  
Bandits and pirates are distinct from those who are in a formal state of declared warfare with the 
Roman people. Bandits and pirates are not considered proper enemies of Rome: rather, they are 
common enemies of mankind. They are, at once, the enemies of no one and the enemies of 
everyone.6 
 
This passage echoes Agamben and his assessment of the place of homo sacer in Roman law. 
Braund further exposes the existential subversive threat of piracy, which “did not conform to 
accepted rules: it was inimical to civilization in all its aspects…at its worst, piracy might be so 
threatening as even to offer an alternative to civilization.” For the Republic of Rome, “pirates 
constituted a danger that was not only physical, but also moral and social. Particularly so, since 
                                                            
5 Graham Webster, The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries A.D. (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 28-9. 
6 David Braund, “Piracy Under the Principate and the Ideology of Imperial Eradication” in, War and 
Society in the Roman World (New York: Routledge, 1993), John Rich & Graham Shipley eds., 195-6. 
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the elite defined the rules of civilization and these certainly did not include the exercise of power 
by the lower orders, as pirates or in any other guise.”7   
     Under the rule of Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 161-80) “from the Nile delta to Britain, from 
Armenia to Dacia, there were revolts and incursions.” The solution, for Aurelius, was to 
penetrate “deep into barbarian lands” where “his purpose became clear – he was determined to 
bring to submission all peoples bordering the Danube, and under direct control rather than rely 
on treaties. All tribes were reduced one by one.” With his war of attrition almost complete, the 
“groups of conquered barbarians were settled in frontier districts,” as the final stage of Roman 
counterinsurgency unfolded. The main aim of Aurelius “was to bring the barbarians immediately 
beyond the frontier under Roman control” while “the army he had assembled in Italy to clear the 
tribes out” had performed effectively, and, “the success of this demonstrated the need for a 
permanent mobile force.”8 This reference is an evocative illustration of an ancient prototype, a 
predecessor to the scorched-Earth tactics of American Rangers and Frontiersman, and the forced 
relocations of Indigenous peoples to reservation lands in the 19th century; or by comparison, in 
the 20th century, to the Strategic Hamlets and Special Forces counter-guerrilla operatives 
employed by the United States during counterinsurgency warfare in Southeast Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  
     The type of irregular warfare frequently described by contemporary military theorists as 
“counterinsurgency,” is as old as recorded human history. It was undoubtedly an aspect of the 
architecture of imperial Rome, and, more probably, belonged to civilizations much older. While 
the findings of Agamben and others negate Schmitt’s partisan theory, a lack of insight on behalf 
of Schmitt is excusable. There is certainly more to the history of counterinsurgency than either 
                                                            
7 Braund, “Piracy Under the Principate,” 197-8. 
8 Webster, The Roman Imperial Army, 84-5. 
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Schmitt or Agamben cover in their heavily Eurocentric interpretations. Confounding the issue 
further, Schmitt mentions in Theory of the Partisan, but ignores as relevant, an important theater 
of insurgent and counterinsurgent activity preceding and contemporary to Napoleon: the 























Counterinsurgency Warfare and the Colonization of America 
 
Counterinsurgency was an integral component in the expansion of settler-colonist society in the 
United States. In fact, European colonization of America could not have occurred if not for 
settler society’s constant and unrelenting counterinsurgency warfare. “For the first 200 years of 
our military heritage” comments retired U.S. Air Force officer and professor of history John 
Grenier, “Americans depended on the arts of war that contemporary professional soldiers 
supposedly abhorred: razing and destroying enemy villages and fields; killing enemy women and 
children; raiding settlements for captives; intimidating and brutalizing enemy noncombatants; 
and assassinating enemy leaders.”9 Established long before the War of Independence, these 
practices, based on the principles of counterinsurgency, are a firmly rooted aspect of American 
military doctrine. Grenier’s central argument is that early Americans “used the tactics and 
techniques of petite guerre in shockingly violent campaigns to achieve their goals of conquest” 
creating, in turn, “a military tradition that accepted, legitimized, and encouraged attacks upon 
and the destruction of noncombatants, villages, and agricultural resources.”10 
     The wealth of evidence in support of Grenier’s theories is overwhelming. One of the most 
famous advocates of Indigenous extermination through a variety of counterinsurgency methods, 
President Andrew Jackson, came to dominate the course of politics in the United States in the 
                                                            
9 John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5. 
10 Grenier, The First Way of War, 10. Grenier also: “traces the colonists’ embrace of three practices – 
extirpative war making, the creation of specialized units for Indian fighting (rangers), and the use of 
scalp hunters to motivate privatized, commercialized campaigns through the issuance of scalp 
bounties.”, 13. Special thanks to historian Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz for making the author aware of 
Grenier’s important and ground-breaking work. See also: Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, An Indigenous Peoples’ 
History of the United States (Boston: Beacon Press, 2014).  
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period immediately following Grenier’s study (which is from 1607-1814). Widely regarded, 
alongside Thomas Jefferson, as the father of the Democratic Party, Jackson was the architect of 
the 1830 Indian Removal Act. In her book on what would become known as “The Trail of 
Tears,” Gloria Jahoda said that when “Andrew Jackson ran for the presidency he made Indian 
Removal, which he called frankly by its correct name, a campaign issue. It was no longer 
arguable.” The reasoning behind the policy was spurred by the false and unfounded view that 
“Indians only ‘infested’ the land; they were hunters and did not farm it.”11 For Jackson and many 
other presidents, including his disciple, Martin Van Buren, the presence of Indigenous people on 
coveted lands was perceived as an impediment to progress. Historian Michael Rogin argues that 
for Indigenous people, in the minds of men like Jackson “the market alone could not control 
them, for they could ignore, as self-improving whites could not, its imperatives. They would not, 
to improve their position, sell their land and move west.”12 The removal or eradication of 
Indigenous tribes was justified as the only logical choice to advance civilization on the pathway 
to American modernity.   
     Jackson’s policy of forced Indigenous relocation was enacted during times of heightened 
violence, hatred and suspicion. Prior to gaining the office of the presidency, Jackson had but 
recently led a series of particularly vicious American wars against the Creek (Muskogee) and 
Seminole tribes. In his war against the Creeks, as various factions of the tribe were coerced and 
coopted into submission and collusion, the particularly militant Red Sticks held out through a 
highly successful guerrilla-based strategy. In retaliation, Jackson unleashed the savage tactics of 
counterinsurgency and a war of extermination. On March 27, 1814, he trapped the Red Sticks at 
                                                            
11 Gloria Jahoda, The Trail of Tears (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1975), 39. 
12 Michael Paul Rogin, Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 207. 
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Horseshoe Bend, where the Creek settlement, Tohopeka, sat on an enclosed loop on the 
Tallapoosa River. A policy of scorched-Earth soon prevailed. Author Robert Remini wrote of the 
incident, where he describes “the mass arrival of troops” outside the Creek village: 
The end of the Red Sticks was at hand. The infantry rushed forward while the friendly Indians 
and spies advanced from the rear. The Red Sticks found themselves caught in a crushing pincer. 
They could not escape. They ducked into the thick brush that covered the ground to seek shelter, 
but they were flushed out and shot at close range. The killing became savage.13      
 
In addition to killing all Red Stick warriors, Remini describes American soldiers partaking in the 
indiscriminate murder of children and the elderly. “Once the troops gained the upper hand they 
set the village on fire…the remaining warriors in the compound were systematically 
slaughtered.” Apparently not satisfied with their victory in battle “the next morning the killing 
was resumed,” for Jackson’s troops “the barbarity did not abate with the end of the fighting. 
Tennessee soldiers were observed cutting long strips of skin from the bodies of dead Indians to 
make bridle reins of them.” When Jackson ordered a body count, 850 Red Sticks lay dead, an 
estimated 300 more bodies were taken by the river. By comparison, only 26 American soldiers 
lost their lives.14 
     Soldiers themselves were not spared Jackson’s fury if they chose to oppose his genocidal 
plans. Often, recalcitrant white Americans were just as much the subject of Jackson’s violent 
imposition of order and domination as the people of the Indigenous tribes. In a letter written on 
March 14, at the height of the campaign against the Red Sticks, Jackson wrote: 
A part of my troops are crossing the river to day on their march. They have been detained a little 
this morning – mutiny having again shewn itself in my camp. A private (John Wood) having been 
                                                            
13 Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson & His Indian Wars (Toronto: Viking, 2001), 77-8. 
14 Remini, Andrew Jackson & His Indian Wars, 78-9. 
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sentenced by court martial to suffer death by shooting, that ceremony is now in the act of 
execution. I regret exceedingly that Genl. Doherty.s Brigade is not present to witness it.15  
     
John Wood’s offence, a side from desertion, in Jackson’s words, was “an incorrigible disposition 
of the heart, a rebelious and obstinate temper of mind, which, as it cannot be rectified, ought not 
to be permitted to diffuse its influence amongst others.”16 It is revealing that Jackson’s bloodlust, 
in full motion on March 14, 1814, is coolly reported with no indication of the travesties befallen 
the Red Sticks.17 Instead, Jackson’s megalomaniacal focus is on punishing the member of his 
own who refused to partake in the slaughter.    
     After the destruction of Tohopeka, only a small number of Red Sticks managed to escape and 
find refuge with the Seminoles to the south. Jackson used the incident to contribute to the 
growing acceptance of his expansionist and genocidal vision. Even with their defeat and 
eradication, the militant Red Sticks were invoked by Jackson as symbolic evidence of the endless 
potential for Indigenous insurgency. The example of defiance displayed by the Red Sticks, and 
especially, according to Gloria Jahoda, Creek Chief “Red Eagle’s leadership in war” had 
“angered America. It had also convinced Andrew Jackson that America’s frontiers would always 
be frontiers while there were Indians to annoy the settlers.” The final solution for American 
policymakers, as Jahoda puts bluntly, was “the Indians must go. They couldn’t be exterminated 
                                                            
15 John Spencer Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, Volume I (Washington: Carnegie 
Institution, 1926), 481. 
16 Bassett, Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, Vol I, 480. 
17 Grenier describes the acceleration of the campaigns against the Red Sticks, and the heightening of the 
Creek War starting in November of 1813. A trail of death and destruction followed Jackson’s Tennessee 
militia through Creek territory, culminating in the massacre of March 27, 1814. See: Grenier, The First 
Way of War, 214-20. 
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wholesale because of world opinion. But they could be uprooted and packed off to some remote 
corner of the country where they wouldn’t be in the way.”18       
     With the Indian Removal Act of 1830, a law was imposed which instituted a mass relocation 
program for Indigenous people, dispossessing them of lands east of the Mississippi River and 
removing them to foreign territory in Oklahoma.19 Presaging Malaysia’s “New Villages” and 
Vietnam’s “Strategic Hamlets” by over a century, the “Trail of Tears” was a counterinsurgency 
operation with genocidal intent. In frustrated anticipation of propelling the removal process 
forward, Jackson intimidated the Choctaw and Chickasaw chiefs into agreeing to his terms 
without hesitation. In a letter written in August 1830, barely a month after approval of the Indian 
Removal Act, Jackson warned: 
It was a measure I had much at heart and sought to effect because I was satisfied that the Indians 
could not possibly live under the laws of the States. If now they shall refuse to accept the liberal 
terms offered, they only must be liable for whatever evils and dificulties may arise. I feel 
conscious of having done my duty to my red children and if any failure of my good intention 
arises, it will be attributable to their want of duty to themselves, not me. I have directed the 
Secretary of War to write [the Choctaw]…make it known to my red children, and tell them to 
listen well to it – it comes from a friend and the last time I Shall adress them on the subject 
should the chiefs fail to meet us now.20 
 
     Indigenous people and culture, and not only their warriors, were categorized as subversive. 
Legislated through the Indian Removal Act, the anti-civilian nature of American 
counterinsurgency doctrine once again came to the fore. As Remini noted “Jackson wanted a 
quick ending to the Indian problem, and he achieved it. In his eight years in office some seventy-
                                                            
18 Jahoda, The Trail of Tears, 17. 
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odd treaties were signed and ratified, adding to the public domain approximately 100 million 
acres of Indian land in the east…and 32 million acres of land west of the Mississippi River.” For 
those who did not die on the forced marches, the fates of the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw and 
Creek was permanent internment under the American state. “The cost in human lives and 
suffering” adds Remini, “was incalculable.”21  
     Mirroring Roman objections to the Germanic “barbarian” tribes, the American disregard for 
the Indigenous tribes of North America was rooted not only in spatial strategies of imperial 
expansion, but also in fear of existential, subversive threats to the American order. As Rogin 
explains, the elites who had power in the United States “objected to tribal life not simply because 
it was different from their own, but also because it provided a source of resistance to their aims.” 
Most Indigenous people vehemently “resisted imposition of an externalized ‘false-self system’ 
which would make [them] malleable. White policy-makers sought to break apart the Indians’ 
extended family and ecological ties, and substitute a hierarchal, non-kinship-based paternal 
authority.”22 Perhaps the most blatant assertion of this dominance, and a favoured protocol of 
Andrew Jackson, was the practice of American presidents being referred to as “the Great Father” 
by the various Indigenous tribes relegated to subjugation.  
     The few remaining Red Sticks who had escaped Jackson’s final assault of 1814 ventured 
south towards the Gulf Coast. There, they would join the Seminole tribe, who, in addition to 
being subject to the terms of the Indian Removal Act, were already engaged in a protracted 
resistance to invasion from the United States. Author George Walton, writing in his history of 
the Seminole, asserts “the most important of the Creek migrations into Florida” occurred 
“following the defeat of the Red Stick by General Andrew Jackson and his Tennessee Militia.” 
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While the defeat of the Red Stick “forced the Creek Confederacy to…cede two-thirds of their 
territory,” the Red Stick could not “reconcile themselves to the harsh treaty” and “fled 
southward.” The Creeks would strengthen the Seminole, as, for example, “among these refugees 
was a boy whom the whites later called Osceola,” the famous Seminole chief.23 According to 
anthropologist Brent Weisman, “the Florida Red Sticks, although never great in number, 
contributed a strong undercurrent of anti-American sentiment to the Seminole.” Exposed to 
Jackson’s brutality, “they had experienced firsthand the consequences of American intentions, 
and they knew how the American presence could divide native society. Yet they also knew that 
resistance was possible, at least for a time.”24  
     The Seminole Wars, though spanning a century, continue to be an obscured and 
misunderstood chapter in American history. The accepted narrative of three separate wars 
between the United States and the Seminole, occurring in 1817-1818, 1835-1842, and 1855-58, 
does not accurately portray the extent of the American campaign of counterinsurgency and 
attrition. Broadening the chronology of the Seminole Wars from 1763 to 1858, professor of 
history William Belko writes:  
The traditional American dates provided for this conflict certainly fail miserably in assessing 
accurately the Seminole perspective. For them, the four decades from the War of 1812 to the eve 
of the U.S. Civil War proved to be a continuous fight for survival, an uninterrupted record of 
resistance, with no peace or rest in between – a history of conflict that commenced before 
American independence.25 
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Throughout this time, the Seminole survived, in part, by bolstering their numbers and strength by 
adopting other Indigenous people, like the Creeks, who were fleeing the ravages of American 
expansion. The Seminole also had a long tradition of providing refuge to the many Africans who 
were fortunate enough to escape the slavery of the Southern plantations. 
     The insurgency of the Seminole and their African allies was completely unacceptable to 
officials in Washington. A general fear of slave insurrection, which was an ever-present factor in 
the American South, was fueled by rumours of sympathetic African forces in Haiti and Havana 
who were set to reinforce the Seminole resistance.26 Racist paranoia took hold of white settlers 
who envisioned the spread of Indigenous and African rebellion. The periodic successes of the 
Seminole insurgency were used to rationalize amplified American aggression. Historian Samuel 
Watson describes the Seminole “1836 offensive” which “exceeded anything the United States 
had seen since the Creek War in 1813.” No other war up to that point “remotely approached the 
devastation and panic of the first months of 1836. Indeed, the Seminole, probably unwittingly, 
struck during a moment of great psychic tension in the American South, with controversy over 
the mailing of abolitionist tracts and a slave insurrection panic along the Mississippi in 1835.” 
Watson explains that, as a result, “the Seminole offensive helped unite white policymakers in 
favor of war.” The insurgency “angered and embarrassed military commanders, whose 
immediate reaction was to redeem the institution’s honor and seek revenge for their soldiers’ 
deaths through a counteroffensive…army commanders would not seek peace until they had 
punished the Indians for their temerity.”27            
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     The vindictive and ruthless character of the American counterinsurgency campaign came 
forth as sadistic methods of conquest were tested on the Seminole. Because of the difficult 
terrain of the Florida swamps, and the survival skills of the Seminole, the United States military 
used the opportunity to field-test new weapons and strategy. George Walton writes that Florida’s 
“Governor Call had developed a secret weapon” which was “importing bloodhounds from Cuba 
to use in tracking hostiles. The dogs had been successfully employed by the British against the 
Maroons in Jamaica in 1738, and had brought that eighty-year revolt to an end within a year.” 
Walton adds that “when word of what was being contemplated became known, the Floridians 
were delighted.”28 The deployment of bloodhounds was part of the American military’s ever-
expanding psychological warfare program. Hunting-dogs were merely one aspect of a wider 
initiative, whose main objective was to menace and terrorize the Seminole people, and especially 
non-combatants, into submission.  
     Historian Samuel Watson also considers the heightened use of terror and psychological 
warfare by the United States against Seminole women and children as a decisive factor in 
extinguishing the overall will to resist, “as families were divided and those held captive sought 
reunification by attempting to persuade others to surrender.”29 The Seminole did not go quietly, 
as the American “regular army saw 1,466 deaths, 74 of them officers.” This was in no way a 
glorious victory for the Seminole, when “over seven years of war [1835-1842], 4,420 Seminoles 
had been captured and deported to Indian territory.”30 According to historian Ward Churchill, the 
American commitment to destroying the Seminole example of resistance led to the war of 1835-
1842 being “the most proportionately expensive conflict in American history.”31 Watson notes 
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that “small as the regular army was, the [U.S.] government committed half of it to Florida.” 
Professor Weisman adds “the net result of the war of 1842 was fewer than 300 Seminoles 
remaining in Florida where there had once been nearly five thousand.”32  
     As the war dragged on over decades, many Seminole “felt compelled to adopt a new, 
necessarily more accommodationist strategy for social and cultural survival and cohesion: 
reuniting their families, and whatever Seminole nation they believed to exist, in the [reservation 
lands of the] west.” While some of those captured became guides and interpreters, the Seminole 
imprisoned during American counterinsurgency were most valuable to the United States “above 
all as emotional pressure on their kin” which worked “to draw resisters west” to internment on 
reservation lands.33 Yet, “while the Seminoles suffered extensive casualties and a number of 
them eventually submitted to removal,” Churchill explains, “a sizable segment withdrew into the 
Everglades swamp country, from whence they were never dislodged.”34  
     The sustained ferocity displayed by Americans in their war against the Seminole was 
undeniably motivated by a racist logic and worldview, and a consistent, vindictive aggression for 
any people recalcitrant to imperial rule. American counterinsurgency did not always 
discriminate, or eliminate, based solely on factors related to race or Indigeneity. Undoubtedly, 
the American counterinsurgency campaign against the Seminole was legitimized and fueled by 
the public acceptance of genocidal expansion based on racism. However, as Walton explains, 
more important for the United States military, was the training and experience in irregular 
warfare gained by the men who fought in the Seminole War: 
Only those officers who were seriously interested in a military career – who wanted to be soldiers 
– remained in the army. Having served and learned in combat, under conditions as hard as they 
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could ever know, the officers who continued on duty went on to participate, many of them with 
great distinction, in the Mexican War, the Civil War, and against the Indians on the plains. 
Florida was the training ground for these conflicts.35 
      
     General William Tecumseh Sherman, who was quite possibly the most prolific purveyor of 
counterinsurgency in American history, was one of these officers. During the Civil War, 
“through the experience of fighting guerrilla war and campaigning in the South, culminating in 
the burning of Jackson, Sherman had enlarged the range of his rage to include all Southern 
civilians as legitimate targets.”36 General Sherman demonstrated that the American doctrine of 
counterinsurgency would be imposed upon any population, regardless of race, who were 
perceived as an impediment to progress. 
     After graduating from West Point in June of 1840, Sherman “received orders assigning him to 
Company A, Third Artillery, in Florida.”37 It was here, ensconced in the quagmire of a guerrilla 
war fought in the Everglades, where, as historian Charles Vetter recounts, it became “obvious to 
Sherman that the traditional techniques of warfare taught at West Point and advocated in the 
army manuals were ineffective. He was opposed to parleys and treaties, believing that 
confidence could not be placed in the Indians’ promises.” It was during the Seminole Wars that 
Sherman developed his own vision of counterinsurgency warfare, a doctrine which gained 
infamy after use against the Confederacy in the Civil War. Sherman believed that “to implement 
such a strategy” against the Seminole, required that “the army should establish and maintain a 
system of raiding villages, burning cabins, destroying corn, and killing cattle.” It was thought 
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that “these tactics would eventually break the Indians’ morale and bring strategic success.” 
Vetter insists that the American counterinsurgency experiment in Florida and “the Seminole 
experience remained with Sherman and would influence him in ways different from others who 
fought the Indians. In the future Sherman would…reach back to this experience, and apply the 
same techniques to the whites of the South.”38  
        “During the Civil War, most famously in the siege of Atlanta” recounts historian Roxanne 
Dunbar-Ortiz, “[Sherman] made his mark as a proponent and practitioner of total war, scorched-
earth campaigns against civilians, particularly targeting their food supplies.” Dunbar-Ortiz adds, 
quite suitably, “this had long been the colonial and US American way of war against the 
Indigenous peoples east of the Mississippi.”39 Vetter argues that General Sherman had 
understood Confederate rebellion in terms that:  
These people had, by choice, rejected the laws of the Constitution, and in doing so, provided 
justification for Sherman’s use of military force against the civilian population. Such 
action…would demoralize the noncombatants, and in turn, have a negative effect on the soldiers 
of the Confederate armies…his decision to make war on noncombatants was for the purpose of 
creating social disorganization in the lives of Southerners. Families were to be uprooted, 
communities devastated, institutions made dysfunctional, and local inhabitants set adrift. By his 
actions he intended to disturb the social cohesion of the South in such a way as to destroy the 
Southerners’ will to continue the war.40      
 
Union army terrorism against the civilians of the Confederacy was a continuation of a long 
tradition that Sherman had first acquired during the Seminole Wars, or “Jackson’s War.” As a 
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disciple of Jackson, and in conforming to the psychological profile of the counterinsurgent, 
Sherman blamed the Southern population for resisting the invasion from the North.41  
     Biographer Michael Fellman claims that Sherman manipulated the guerrilla warfare waged by 
the South as a justification for “encouraging his men to campaign boldly against guerrillas and 
their civilian supporters” in doing so “Sherman learned to justify their excesses, in effect 
covering up Union wrongdoing, a key element of the corrupting qualities of counterinsurgent 
warfare.” Tumbling headlong into an abyss of historic proportions, “what remained was for 
Sherman to up the stakes of guerrilla war, and then to generalize from counterinsurgency into a 
policy of carrying the war more and more against the civilian portion of the Confederate 
rebellion.”42   
     A regiment of anti-civilian tactics, including a half-hearted attempt to persuade all non-
combatants to evacuate during the siege of Atlanta, were patterned on earlier counterinsurgency 
measures, notably, Jackson’s Indian Removal Act. Clearly, the blueprint for American 
counterinsurgency which developed under Andrew Jackson during the Creek and Seminole 
Wars, and subsequently through the legal precedent of “Indigenous removal”, had left an 
undeniable imprint on the mind of General William Tecumseh Sherman. 
      The duplicity of General Sherman’s psychological warfare campaigns was especially useful 
in his capture of Atlanta. By his own account, Sherman used deception, threats, and subterfuge to 
confuse, frustrate and weaken his enemy. In correspondence with Confederate General John Bell 
Hood, Sherman ordered Hood to evacuate the citizens of Atlanta, because the removal, being, 
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“satisfactory to the Government of the United States, it makes no difference whether it pleases 
General Hood and his people or not.” Sherman warned that refusal to comply “will make it 
necessary to destroy the very houses used by families as residences.”43  
     In panicked response, General Hood wrote Sherman, pleading:  
Permit me to say that the unprecedented measure you propose transcends, in studied and 
ingenious cruelty, all acts ever before brought to my attention in the dark history of war. In the 
name of God and humanity, I protest, believing that you will find that you are expelling from 
their homes and firesides the wives and children of a brave people.44 
 
     Unmoved, Sherman’s offer to Hood is an unchanged ultimatum, this time insinuating the 
Confederacy would be to blame for any atrocities imposed on the civilian population: 
I say that it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove them now, at once, from scenes that 
women and children should not be exposed to, and the “brave people” should scorn to commit 
their wives and children to the rude barbarians who thus, as you say, violate the laws of war, as 
illustrated in the pages of its dark history. In the name of common-sense, I ask you not to appeal 
to a just God in such a sacrilegious manner…if we must be enemies, let us be men, and fight it 
out as we propose to do, and not deal in such hypocritical appeals to God and humanity. God will 
judge us in due time, and he will pronounce whether it be more humane to fight with a town full 
of women and the families of a brave people at our back, or to remove them in time to places of 
safety among their own friends and people.45 
 
     Having intimate knowledge of Sherman’s scorched-Earth tactics and counterinsurgency 
warfare against the citizens of the South, and offended by Sherman’s trickery, coercion, and 
hypocrisy, General Hood ends his communication by writing: 
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If there was any fault…it was your own, in not giving notice, especially in the case of Atlanta, of 
your purpose to shell the town, which is usual in war among civilized nations…there are a 
hundred thousand witnesses that you fired into the habitations of women and children for weeks, 
firing far above and miles beyond my line of defense. I have too good an opinion, founded both 
upon observation and experience, of the skill of your artillerists, to credit the insinuation that they 
for several weeks unintentionally fired too high for my modest field-works, and slaughtered 
women and children by accident and want of skill.46 
      
     Conceptualized and field-tested in war against the Seminole, and with his pillage and 
destruction of Atlanta, “Sherman had succeeded in bringing sociological warfare [to the 
South]…a sense of hopelessness began to grow in the hearts and minds of those who had 
experienced the horror of Sherman’s army, and to Sherman it was evident everywhere he 
looked.” Vetter observes that “initial anger upon hearing of Sherman’s activities against the 
noncombatants soon turned to anxious concern for the safety and welfare of their [Confederate 
soldiers] families. Depression gripped many as…some soldiers began to slip away from their 
ranks and headed home. Sherman’s method of warfare was having its effect.”47 
     General Sherman’s capture of Atlanta is widely considered the death knell of Confederate 
resistance and the beginning of the end of the American Civil War. Sherman’s brand of warfare, 
inspired by Andrew Jackson’s counterinsurgency doctrine, had won the war. As the United 
States expanded westward after the Civil War, counterinsurgency techniques were modified, 
specialized, and deployed in a war of extermination against the Indigenous tribes of the Great 
Plains, the deserts of the Southwest, and the rainforests of the Pacific Northwest. In many ways, 
the tragic story of Crazy Horse of the Oglala Sioux indicates the direction of counterinsurgency 
on the cusp of America’s consolidation of a global empire.  
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     Crazy Horse, defender of the Black Hills in Dakota territory, had resisted surrender to the 
U.S. Army as the leadership of various factions of Sioux, Arapaho, and Cheyenne capitulated 
under a brutal and inhumane war of attrition. The government of the United States prioritized 
Crazy Horse as an especially dangerous adversary; his defeat of Lieutenant Colonel George 
Armstrong Custer in June 1876 at the Battle of the Little Bighorn solidified his status as a target 
for elimination. The refusal of Crazy Horse to cede the Black Hills to the United States angered 
government officials who had relative success in coopting other members of the Lakota 
leadership, like the highly respected and influential Red Cloud. “In Washington” explains 
professor of history Kingsley Bray:  
Opinions were hardening. Within a week of the breakdown of the Black Hills summit, President 
Grant telegraphed General Sheridan to attend a White House emergency session…General Crook, 
as Sheridan’s field commander on the ground, completed the roll of top brass and high 
officialdom. In conditions of high secrecy, the summit meeting projected a strategy to neutralize 
the Lakota threat and seize the Black Hills.48 
      
     For Generals “Sheridan and Sherman,” the resistance of the Oglala under Crazy Horse was 
unacceptable, “the military chiefs had agreed on a strategy of ensuring total surrenders followed 
by agency relocations to the Missouri River.”49 This began as a “directive from Washington 
proposed to start reducing the power of the Indian chiefs by taking away their right to distribute 
rations and supplies to their own bands.”50 This policy was accelerated with the government 
decision to “turn the administration of the [Indigenous] agencies over to the military.”51 
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     For the Lakota, the American strategy of land acquisition, while heavily reliant on the threat 
and use of force, was also based on coercion and cooptation. The attempt to divide Indigenous 
people and turn them against Crazy Horse was a main tactic. According to a compilation of 
interviews with participants in these events, “when General Crook came to Camp Robinson, he 
called for a council with the chiefs, and again all came except Crazy Horse. Crook explained that 
it was their duty to control Crazy Horse.” The government of the United States and “the military 
leaders believed that if Crazy Horse were taken away, his followers would be controlled and the 
move to the Missouri could be effectively carried out.” To facilitate his surrender “in addition to 
telling the chiefs to capture Crazy Horse, the officers ordered the scouts to bring him in. The 
scouts and a large number of other armed Indians and a large force of white soldiers set out to 
take Crazy Horse.”52 
     Through its war against Crazy Horse, the American invasion of Lakota territory became a 
space for the U.S. military to engineer networks of Indigenous spies, informers and saboteurs. 
The development of a surveillance apparatus reliant on “turned” Indigenous proxies, a practice 
finding global prevalence in the 20th century, would be instrumental in the defeat of Crazy Horse. 
Professor Bray insists General Crook had infiltrated the Sioux council with informers. “Crook 
had arrived at the Oglala agency…to enlist scouts. He also privately recruited a number of spies 
to infiltrate Crazy Horse’s village. The informers’ instructions were to talk up surrender, subtly 
undermine northern [Lakota] morale, and report on village movements.”53 In the end, American 
tactics of psychological warfare would compromise Crazy Horse and his followers, as suspicion, 
paranoia, and distrust led to the ultimate disintegration of cohesion among the Lakota people. 
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     “Crazy Horse eventually brought in his people late in the spring of 1877” wrote historians 
Edward and Mabell Kadlecek. “When other bands had succumbed to the lure of army gifts and 
treaties, Crazy Horse had led his band away into the prairies and mountains where they could 
live and worship in the traditions of their forefathers.” As his people faced starvation and 
freezing temperatures, Crazy Horse was finally convinced by a former “turned” ally, Red Cloud, 
to bring his people to Fort Robinson with a promise from the United States of a territory in 
Powder River country. “At last there was nothing more he could do. His people needed food 
because the killing of the buffalo had destroyed their food source.”54 Slaughtering the buffalo 
herds, of course, was yet another aspect of American counterinsurgency doctrine.  
     Once at Fort Robinson, Crazy Horse became disgusted that his young men were immediately 
enlisted by the Americans to fight the Nez Perces, and “told the young men not to go against 
those other Indians far away, but some would not listen, and allowed themselves to be bought by 
the soldiers.”55 Very soon, Crazy Horse would learn that Red Cloud had tricked him on behalf of 
the Americans. “Orders from Washington had been received at Camp Robinson directing that 
Crazy Horse be taken into custody. Although some Indians knew it, no one had told Crazy Horse 
that he was actually under arrest.” According to many witnesses at the scene, “from the manner 
in which he walked, it was apparent that he did not know he was to be imprisoned.” Of course, 
the promise of a reservation for Crazy Horse’s followers was a complete fabrication, while, 
“according to the army’s plans, Crazy Horse was to be removed from the camp at midnight and 
taken by rail to the Dry Tortugas, a group of islands off the coast of Florida.”56      
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     Betrayed and lied to by the Americans and their “turned” Indigenous allies, Crazy Horse was 
assassinated trying to escape captivity, sadly, while being escorted to a cage by Little Big Man, 
another former ally “the white men had bought…and made…into an agency policeman.”57 Lured 
by the temptations of personal power and privilege promised to him by the American invaders, 
Little Big Man was involved directly in the assassination of Crazy Horse. While American 
soldiers stabbed Crazy Horse with their bayonets, Little Big Man prevented his escape, holding 
him tightly by the arms. Like Red Cloud, “Little Big Man had also become envious. He wanted 
Crazy Horse out of the way.”58   
     A cursory examination of the legacies of Andrew Jackson and William Sherman reveal an 
historically habitual tendency for aggressive anti-subversive policy in the United States. The 
Creek War, Seminole War, Civil War, and Plains War provided a diagram for the operating 
characteristics which defined American counterinsurgency during continental westward 
expansion. As Ward Churchill writes “techniques of domination have been consistently field-
tested in Native North America, a matter allowing their refinement before they are introduced 
into other settings at home and abroad.”59 Eventually, these techniques became the guiding 
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Global Empire in the American Century  
 
During the administration of President Benjamin Harrison, his secretary of state, James Blaine, 
“agitated constantly for expansion.” Historian John Tone informs us that Blaine advised Harrison 
“in 1891 simply to take Hawaii, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.” Hawaii would become the first of 
America’s extra-continental territories, when, “in 1893, during the second Cleveland 
administration, white planters and American troops deposed Queen Liliuokalani to prevent the 
adoption of a new democratic constitution that would have given power to the native Hawaiian 
majority.” Not completely satisfied with rule by proxy, “the United States annexed Hawaii 
directly in 1898.”60 That same year, the McKinley administration successfully obtained several 
more colonial assets through war with Spain. Following an American military victory and a 
peace treaty in December 1898, “Spain surrendered Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and 
Guam”61 to the United States.  
     In 1902, the administration of Theodore Roosevelt intervened in support of Panamanian 
secession from Colombia. While “U.S. warships kept the Colombian Navy at bay,” Roosevelt 
“ordered the Navy to prevent Colombia from landing troops against an uprising.” With the 
construction and ownership of the Panama Canal being the prize, the highly-coveted zone was 
ceded to the United States by a 1903 agreement “infamously known as the treaty that no 
Panamanian signed.”62    
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     The American military immediately harvested these newly acquired spaces as laboratories of 
subjugation and control. In Cuba, Puerto Rico, and to an even greater extent the Philippines, 
increasingly sophisticated and technical programs of anti-subversive suppression were pre-
emptively employed in any area of American strategic interest. Historian Alfred McCoy, in his 
expansive study of US-Filipino relations, best illustrates this development in modern American 
counterinsurgency warfare:  
Through a prolonged pacification after 1898, the U.S. Army plunged into a crucible of 
counterinsurgency, forging a security apparatus that helped form the Philippine polity and 
transform the American state…armed with cutting-edge technology from its antecedent 
information revolution, America’s colonial regime created the most modern police and 
intelligence units found anywhere under the U.S. flag. This imperial panopticon slowly 
suffocated the Filipino revolutionary movement with a combination of firepower, surveillance, 
and incriminating information…the United States realized the coercive potential of its new 
information technologies from its colonization of the Philippines.63 
 
     At the same time, McCoy emphasizes that “the impact of colonial pacification was not 
contained at this remote periphery” but migrated “homeward through both personnel and 
policies…as an omnipresent, sub rosa matrix that honeycombed U.S. society with active 
informers, secretive civilian organizations, and government counterintelligence agencies.” 64 For 
America, the pattern of exporting and re-importing techniques and technologies of repression 
would come to repeat itself over the course of the 20th century.  
     From the outset of its imperial aspirations, American trained-and-equipped proxy police were 
the primary component in the installation of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine abroad. In his 
exhaustively researched account, professor Ethan Nadelmann documents the roots of this 
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practice, where “in Cuba, the first country to receive U.S. police assistance, the U.S. Marines 
created, trained, and equipped a constabulary following the 1898 occupation, and retired New 
York City police officers helped organize the Havana police system.” In addition to parallel 
projects in the Philippines and Puerto Rico, “the U.S. War Department established additional 
constabularies in Haiti in 1915, the Dominican Republic in 1916, and Panama in 1918, and the 
State Department arranged a private contract whereby a former U.S. officer in the Philippine 
Constabulary was hired to organize the Nicaragua Constabulary.”65 
     Thus, a revolving-door of experienced veterans of wars of colonization, and members of the 
police services within the United States, contributed to the growth of a rapidly expanding 
economy based on the proliferation of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice. Undoubtedly, 
another significant engine in this development was, as professor Gabriel Kolko describes, “the 
relationship between the objectives of [US] foreign economic policy and direct political and 
military intervention” which, according to Kolko, “has been a continuous and intimate one.” 
Indeed, they are “very often identical.”66 Professor Peter Dale Scott points to companies like 
Lockheed, Boeing, General Dynamics, and Brown & Root as but a few examples of “the forces 
lobbying permanently for increased militarization” whose number “are too many to be 
enumerated.”67 In sum, there were many incentives for private investors and state actors 
encouraged by the enormous economic potential of the ongoing legislative, financial and 
material support of counterinsurgency abroad, and increasingly, within the United States itself.  
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     The two World Wars made an unmistakable contribution to solidifying the psychological 
acceptance and normalcy of constant war-time expenditures, measures and preparations during 
peacetime. As C. Wright Mills correctly deduced: 
What the main drift of the twentieth century has revealed is that as the economy has become 
concentrated and incorporated into great hierarchies, the military has become enlarged and 
decisive to the shape of the entire economic structure; and, moreover, the economic and the 
military have become structurally and deeply interrelated, as the economy has become a 
seemingly permanent war economy; and military men and policies have increasingly penetrated 
the corporate economy.68 
 
Mills, ominously, made the point that “if the military metaphysics, to which the civilian elite 
now clings, are accepted, then by definition warfare is the only reality, that is to say, the 
necessity, of our time.”69 The Cold War became symptomatic of this psychology of perpetual 
warfare; and spawned further paradigms like the building of ridiculously large and destructive 
nuclear arsenals. Because of the almost guaranteed mutual annihilation of a nuclear conflict, the 
two World Wars also inadvertently opened another gateway to a future economy invested in the 
type of low-intensity, internal warfare characteristic of counterinsurgency.70  
     With the coming to office of President John F. Kennedy, professor Kolko writes that:  
By August 1962, when the NSC approved national policy on a grand strategy toward the Third 
World, virtually everyone of importance agreed that confronting internal disorder and insurgency 
in the Third World – or Sino-Soviet ‘conquest from within’, as opposed to conventional warfare – 
was essential. The NSC favored a greater readiness to act even when there was no direct Russian 
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or Chinese involvement but where they might gain objectively from ‘other types of subversion’ 
inimical to U.S. interests.71 
 
     As we have seen, counterinsurgency was not a foreign concept in past American experience 
of war, or to administrations prior to that of JFK. As Mills, Kolko, Scott, and many others have 
pointed out, the rapid growth and expansion of the military-industrial political economy during 
and after World War II had a direct and undeniably singular effect on American policy. In 
addition, certainly, a faith in modern technology and liberal notions of free enterprise played an 
important role in the focus and formulation of Kennedy-era counterinsurgency doctrine. More 
significant, however, was JFK’s conformity to a pattern that had been established by men like 
Andrew Jackson and William Sherman. Like Kennedy, the hallmark of their brand of warfare 
was that it was directed exclusively inward, and the main target of violence was not an opposing 
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Camelot, Modernization Theory & the Special Group on Counterinsurgency 
 
Despite the popularity of revisionist histories which paint the Kennedy administration as a 
gathering of progressive “peaceniks”, the historical record confirms, from its beginnings, an 
expansionist and interventionist Camelot.72 Kennedy was firm in his conviction to capitalize on 
the wave of anti-communist sentiment following the perceived loss of China to Mao, the bloody 
stalemate in Korea, and the successful overthrow of dictator Fulgencio Batista by guerrilla forces 
in Cuba. In the run-up to the 1960 presidential election, historian David Schmitz writes 
“Kennedy spoke so often during the campaign about Cuba and Castro that those who did not 
follow politics could be forgiven if they came to think he was running against Fidel Castro and 
not Richard Nixon.” Schmitz adds that Kennedy was determined to “take the initiative once 
again in the Cold War struggles in the Third World” and that he “devoted his entire inaugural 
address to foreign policy and made it clear that his would be an activist administration.”73 Far 
from a peace-seeking isolationist, Kennedy embraced and touted expansion and intervention as 
the noblest of pathways. Under JFK, American aggression was rationalized not only as a 
strategic necessity, but also as a moral imperative.   
     According to the Kennedy administration, somehow, U.S. imperialism would differ from the 
European version, a system of empire and wealth which the United States was eager to see both 
dismantled and appropriated. Under the guise of supporting decolonization, the self-serving 
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cynicism of the Kennedy administration was barely concealed beneath a façade of helpful 
American paternalism throughout the Third World.74 To create and propagate the false-image of 
benevolent, non-imperial U.S. global expansion and domination, JFK surrounded himself with a 
stable of arrogant, pragmatic, and brash thinkers. Kolko describes these “articulate intellectuals 
who comprised his advisers” as possessing “unlimited self-esteem [which] convinced virtually 
all of them that with a proper application of their thought and U.S. resources they could 
accomplish far more and far better, not just in the Third World but everywhere.” 75   
     For JFK’s inner-circle, an integral aspect of this logic was figuring out how to halt the 
momentum of popular guerrilla movements led by charismatic leaders like Mao, Che Guevara, 
and Ho Chi Minh. President Kennedy was no stranger to policy guided by conceit, as biographer 
David Talbot writes: “with his youth, Catholicism, movie-star looks, and progressive appeal, 
JFK thought he could out-market even the dashing Fidel and Che in the war of ideas, selling 
democratic reform as an alternative to armed revolution.”76 Through the dispersal of foreign aid 
packages, this strategy came across through programs for democratic reform and economic 
development like the Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps.77 For the recipients of 
American foreign aid, the other side, or underside, of this arrangement was the mandatory 
embedment of counterinsurgency operations within any promise of assistance; in addition to 
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military hardware, usually in the form of police training facilitated through U.S. intelligence 
advisers.  
     On January 18, 1962, John F. Kennedy would solidify his implementation of American 
counterrevolution in the Third World with National Security Action Memorandum 124, where 
the president’s “Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)” was first established. NSAM 124 spelled 
out that the Special Group, composed of many of the highest ranking individuals in government, 
would: “insure proper recognition throughout the U.S. Government that subversive insurgency 
(‘wars of liberation’) is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to 
conventional warfare”, and that “such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, 
equipment and doctrine of the U.S. Armed Forces and other U.S. agencies abroad and in 
political, economic, intelligence, military aid and informational programs conducted abroad by 
State, Defense, AID, USIA and CIA.”78 
     The Special Group (C.I.) consisted of president Kennedy’s personal representative on the 
committee, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyman 
Lemnitzer, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, National Security Advisor McGeorge 
Bundy, USIA head Edward R. Murrow, and General Maxwell Taylor, among others. The 
executive branch was quick to seek outside input from both theorists and practitioners of 
counterinsurgency. The order of the day was to meld the liberal sensibilities of Ivy League 
academics with the experience of professional insurgents and counterinsurgents. Political 
scientist D. Michael Schafer strongly endorses the view that one of the: 
…most striking aspects of the Kennedy administration’s assault on the problem of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency was its effort to understand both. Counterinsurgency doctrine put academic 
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specialists to work marrying the most up-to-date theories of Third World development to a 
government doctrine for coping with its consequences. To supplement such efforts, the president 
read – and ordered his advisers to read – Mao, Giap and other architects of revolutionary 
theory…to develop it [counterinsurgency], the government turned to outside research 
organizations and the academic community.79  
 
The course of action taken by Kennedy and his Special Group on Counterinsurgency would lead 
directly to the embrace of “modernization theory,” a doctrine perceived as a palpable antidote to 
the populism of Marxist guerrilla movements and revolutionary wars.  
     A combination of economists, sociologists, and historians were employed with the task of 
creating the ultimate remedy to “wars of liberation”. In his study devoted to the subject, Michael 
Latham argues that during JFK’s time in office “modernization theorists seeking financial 
support, personal prestige, and an opportunity to contribute to their nation’s fight against the 
Communist specter found an eager audience for their work among the architects of U.S. foreign 
policy.” Latham adds that “the creation…of the Center for International Studies (CIS) at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology provides a striking example of this attempt to couple 
objective theories of modernization with the Cold War struggle.”80 Director of CIS Max 
Millikan, a professor of economics at MIT, “urged the diverse faculty he assembled at the Center 
to become ‘social science entrepreneurs.’”81  
     The Special Group on Counterinsurgency harnessed the talents of a cohort of like-minded 
free-market capitalists, many of whom had prior experience in a similar capacity as operatives 
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and analysts during World War II. Some of the more famous and influential among them were: 
Millikan, who was the ex-assistant director of the CIA, and the main advocate for the formation 
of the Peace Corps; John Kenneth Galbraith, famed liberal economist and Harvard professor, 
who was appointed ambassador to India under Kennedy; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., an 
intelligence analyst for OSS during World War II, a professor of history at Harvard, and a speech 
writer and biographer of the Kennedy brothers; and Walt Rostow, a former OSS operative 
involved in Allied bomb-target coordination and the development of the Marshall Plan, a 
professor of economic history at MIT, director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff 
under Kennedy, and eventually, National Security Adviser for Lyndon Johnson.82 
     Most prevalent among this group in his relationship to Kennedy’s counterinsurgency policy 
was Walt Rostow. Due primarily to wide recognition of his book, The Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Rostow became the main theoretician and spokesperson 
for modernization ideology. In his biography devoted to the Cold War architect, David Milne 
describes how under Kennedy:   
Rostow worked diligently at the task to which he had devoted the bulk of his academic career: 
creating institutional machinery through which the United States could disperse foreign aid to the 
developing world. One day Rostow would advocate military steps that held the potential to 
precipitate nuclear war, the next he worked on establishing an expansive U.S. aid policy to 
combat world poverty.83 
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The paradox of balancing threats of annihilation with the promise of assisting people, an artform 
practiced, if not perfected, by Rostow, encapsulates the cynical hypocrisy governing the ethos of 
the modernization theorists.   
     Central to the tenets of modernization theory was Rostow’s idea that communism was a 
destructive aberration of development, occurring when so-called “traditional” societies stumble 
in their conversion to “technological” or mass-consumption societies. “It is one particular form 
of modern society to which a nation may fall prey during the transitional process,” wrote 
Rostow, “Communism is best understood as a disease of the transition to modernization.”84  
      Underpinning the logic and rhetoric of modernization theory was a refusal to acknowledge 
the sources of social injustice and inequity behind most revolutions. Communists were always 
portrayed as irrational, base opportunists, who understood only the diplomacy of violence. 
Rostow encouraged others “to read the learned works of Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara on 
guerrilla warfare…without passion into the minds of one’s enemies” and to “confront in guerrilla 
warfare in the underdeveloped areas a systematic attempt by the Communists to impose a serious 
disease on those societies attempting to transition to modernization.” Peace or compromise, it 
appeared, was not an option. “I salute in particular” Rostow beamed to the hypothetical 
American counter-guerrilla “those among you whose duty it is…to prevent that disease if 
possible, and to eliminate it where it is imposed.” Alongside the eradication of communist 
subversion, the job of the counterinsurgent “is not merely to accept the risks of war and to master 
its skills. Your job is to work with understanding, with your fellow citizens, in the whole creative 
process of modernization.”85   
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     In Rostow’s opinion “the most important analytic assertion in Marx’s writings is the assertion 
in the Communist Manifesto that capitalism ‘left no other nexus between man and man than 
naked self-interest, than callous cash payment.’” Incorporating more humanistic tones, by 
Rostow’s logic the practitioners of modernization theory envisioned the world differently:  
The stages-of-growth sequence man [anti-Marxist] is viewed as a more complex unit. He seeks, 
not merely economic advantage, but also power, leisure, adventure, continuity of experience and 
security; he is concerned with his family, the familiar values of his regional and national culture, 
and a bit of fun down at the local.”86  
 
For this optimal American state-of-being to occur, according to Rostow, “Billions of human 
beings must live in the world, if we preserve it, over the century or so until the age of high mass-
consumption becomes universal.” And further, to avoid a future of Communism where “there 
may not be much civilization left to save,” the “democratic north [must] face and deal with the 
challenge implicit in stages-of growth…at the full stretch of our commitment, our energy, and 
our resources.”87 Always implicit in Rostow’s message was that the people of the so-called Third 
World were being tricked and manipulated by communists, and therefore could not think or plan 
for themselves. The solution to Third World ignorance, of course, was the helpful and steady 
hand of the United States, a model and mentor willing to guide others to modernity through free 
enterprise and unbridled consumption. 
     Modernization theory gained traction within the executive branch and came to control the 
overall direction and outlook of the Special Group on Counterinsurgency. As professor Michael 
Latham explains, eventually: 
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The president…called for a “national level school” to educate senior U.S. officials…Kennedy, 
national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, and Maxwell Taylor solicited 
proposals for an official “Modernization Institute” from the State and Defense departments before 
finally deciding that social scientific theory and counterinsurgency doctrine could be most 
effectively disseminated through a series of…seminars…taught at the State Department’s Foreign 
Service Institute.88 
 
The courses were taught by American instructors like Walt Rostow, Max Millikan and Lucian 
Pye from MIT’s Center for International Studies. There was also an effort to include other 
professionals with more field experience in counterinsurgency, most notably Ed Lansdale. “To 
the incoming Kennedy administration” writes historian Michael McClintock “there were few 
Americans more eminently qualified to advise on unconventional warfare and the American role 
in Indochina than Edward Geary Lansdale.”89 A career in government began when Lansdale “left 
a lucrative career in a San Francisco advertising agency to serve in the Pacific with military 
intelligence and the OSS during World War II.” After the war, he was used in “the Philippines as 
a psychological warfare and counterinsurgency expert”90 during the Huk rebellion. 
     Lansdale mystified Camelot’s modernization theorists. Fictionalized portrayals of his 
character in Graham Greene’s novel The Quiet American, and the Marlon Brando film The Ugly 
American, added to Lansdale’s legendary status. In his book on the General, professor Jonathan 
Nashel claims Walt Rostow was so taken with the celebrated spook that he “used language 
suggesting that Lansdale’s understanding of the Third World bordered on the omniscient.”91 
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President Kennedy was also impressed by the aura surrounding the CIA officer and psywar 
specialist, and in August 1962 “had specifically instructed Lansdale to testify before Congress on 
behalf of counterinsurgency in waging the Cold War” at a top-secret hearing.92 Having played a 
role in policy planning in Indochina during the Eisenhower administration “Lansdale was almost 
unique in pressing for the development of unconventional warfare capabilities” in Vietnam. 
According to McClintock, Lansdale was indispensable early in the formation of Kennedy’s 
counterinsurgency strategy precisely because “he differed from the military establishment…in 
recognizing that there was indeed a problem of insurgency in Vietnam, and not only the threat of 
a conventional invasion from the North.” Lansdale, in turn “was considered deeply profound by 
the incoming [Kennedy] administration.”93 
     Indeed, as a proactive agent of change, John F. Kennedy had approved a counterinsurgency 
plan for Vietnam only eight days into his presidency; while at that same moment Lansdale, 
following a trip to see his close personal friends Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu, was 
formulating the first of many reports for JFK on the necessity of counterinsurgency in supporting 
the Diem regime in South Vietnam.94 Despite a reputation for outlandish methods, Lansdale 
would create an undeniable mark on the world of American counterinsurgency: 
His tactics included everything from rigging elections to using “black operations”, starting a 
rumor campaign based on local vampire legends, overseeing Philippine presidential campaign 
songs, using slush funds to buy off political opponents, and orchestrating a fraudulent second 
coming of Christ. They ranged from creating civic action programs to organizing 
counterinsurgent hit squads.95 
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Of all the tactics to be carried forward in future U.S. counterinsurgency operations, Lansdale was 
perhaps the most outspoken advocate of assassination.   
     Operation Mongoose, the top-secret plan to eliminate Fidel Castro, was also put under 
Lansdale’s direction. “William Harvey, head of Task Force W, the CIA’s end of Operation 
Mongoose” writes Pulitzer Prize winning author Thomas Powers, “[was astonished] on August 
13 [1962], when he got an official memo from Edward G. Lansdale, the Kennedy brothers’ 
personal choice to run Mongoose, which explicitly requested Harvey to prepare papers on 
various anti-Castro programs ‘including liquidation of leaders.’”96 Lansdale was an influential 
proponent during this period in the process of normalizing the acceptability of assassination as an 
unfortunate, but mandatory, aspect of successful counterinsurgency operations. In the 1970s, the 
reputation of the American intelligence apparatus would be irreparably tarnished by revelations 
uncovered during the Church, Pike and House Assassination Committees, on the use of 
assassination as a tool of U.S. diplomacy in both foreign and domestic capacities.97  
     Edward Lansdale was but one of many practitioners of the new school of counterinsurgency. 
Over time, his stock within the Kennedy administration fell through a combination of distrust 
and the eventual realization that his ideas were far from original.98 Nevertheless, General 
Lansdale was a “natural pole of attraction for the counterinsurgency dignitaries of allied nations” 
writes McClintock “and an intermediary through which counterinsurgency innovations were 
considered and disseminated through the American establishment.”99 Perhaps more importantly, 
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at that time, was the fact that widespread American interest and funding drew the talents and 
knowledge of Lansdale’s peers and colleagues from Europe. The ideas and theories of field-
tested and hardened counterrevolutionaries such as Robert Thompson and Frank Kitson of 
Britain, and Roger Trinquier and David Galula of France, would have an immediate impact on 






















Hidden Figures of U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
 
During the Kennedy-era, counterinsurgency enthusiasts enjoyed unprecedented attention, 
funding, and support from the United States government. Taking a page from their communist 
rivals, counterinsurgency theorists embraced internationalism and collaboration as the only 
effective means to defeat the Sino-Soviet threat of “war from within.” British counterinsurgency 
specialist Frank Kitson recalled “at the time there was an immense surge of interest in anti-
terrorist operations because of the Vietnam campaign and the emphasis laid by President 
Kennedy on the study of the subject.” Kitson said “in 1962 I was sent on a six months’ course to 
the Armed Forces Staff College [in Norfolk, Virginia]” and, as a result, “was invited to give a 
number of lectures at service establishments outside the college” where, “attendance was not 
limited to junior officers and once no less than seven generals sat through the performance.”100  
     In April 1962, Kitson was recruited to help organize a counterinsurgency symposium held in 
Washington under the auspices of the Rand corporation. “The basic rationale in undertaking the 
Symposium” according to mediator Stephen Hosmer, “was that, rather than approach the 
problems of guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare theoretically and academically, it might be 
useful to draw on the knowledge of men of recent and direct experience in counterinsurgency. 101   
The symposium brought together the greatest counterinsurgency theorists of the time: Edward 
Lansdale, Charles Bohannan, Wendell Fertig, and Napoleon Valeriano, optimistic after crushing 
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the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, were joined by other notables like Kitson, Samuel Wilson, 
and David Galula of France.  
     Bohannan, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, and Colonel Valeriano, a decorated 
graduate of the Philippine Military Academy and U.S. Cavalry School, and military assistant to 
President Magsaysay, had co-authored the well-received Counterguerrilla Operations: Lessons 
from the Philippines.102 Colonel Wendell Fertig was the Deputy Chief of Psychological War for 
the United States in the Philippines. Special Forces operative Lieutenant Samuel Wilson had 
taught guerrilla tactics at Fort Benning; and was director of the U.S. Special Warfare School at 
Fort Bragg. As Kitson remembered it “President Kennedy asked the Vice President to set up a 
symposium to study in detail every known aspect of counter-insurgency operations.” Once 
engaged with his fellow theorists, Kitson found “although we came from such widely divergent 
backgrounds, it was as if we had all been brought up together from youth. We all spoke the same 
language.” In Kitson’s mind, the only problem was: 
We had another thing in common. Although we had no difficulty in making our views understood 
to each other, we had mostly been unable to get our respective armies to hoist in the message. 
Only the Americans seemed to be prepared to spend money and use up men to find the right 
answer [to counterinsurgency].103    
      
     Kitson, a highly influential counterrevolutionary, master of psychological warfare, and 
eventual Commander-in-Chief of the British army, was a pioneer of urban counter-guerrilla 
warfare. Kitson put a preeminent focus on police and the integral role of their intricate networks 
of “turned” insurgents. Gangs and Counter-gangs, his first work, is believed to be an important 
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foundational premise for the informant and agent provocateur networks used during America’s 
domestic COINTELPRO and MH/CHAOS programs.104 Kitson’s use of “pseudo-gangs,” or 
what would later become known popularly as “death squads,” were tested during the Mau Mau 
insurgency in Kenya: 
Kitson established a Special Methods Training Centre with the express purpose of 
professionalizing the ‘turned’ insurgents and making them capable and reliable allies in the COIN 
fight. This Centre…attempted to increase the use of pseudo-gangs by establishing five Special 
Forces Teams, each consisting of 10 ex-insurgents and commanded by a European – a 
manifestation of his belief that pseudo-gangs were ‘the most effective weapon against the 
terrorists’…the pseudo-gang technique crystallized the paramilitary nature of police’s modus 
operandi.105 
 
Compulsory to these tactics was the centrality of Kitson’s heightened use of militarized police 
and their informants and provocateurs, and not the army, in fulfilling the role of the 
counterinsurgent. The use of pseudo-gangs in counterinsurgency also created an excellent 
platform for denial of culpability for the imperial directors of the illegal and clandestine activities 
of “turned” insurgents.  
     The eventual outgrowth of this strategy, as Kitson displayed in Northern Ireland, was the 
formal institutionalization of the “death squad” among the NATO allies. During Ireland’s 
“Troubles” of 1969-73, Kitson led “an influential group of army commanders [who] argued in 
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favor of the military security approach.” Kitson and his advocates “denied the popularity of 
republicanism as a solidarity-building ideology and asserted that the IRA had intimidated the 
ghettos into acquiescence. They also highlighted the importance of demonstrating a clear 
determination to prevail.”106 The end result of this position, writes Ward Churchill, was that: 
Kitson created a special “Mobile Reaction Force” within the Special Branch of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary to target the IRA. This quickly evolved into…the more sophisticated “E Units” 
which interfaced not only with British military intelligence, but also MI5 and MI6…as was 
revealed in the 2006 Barron Report, the “counterterrorists” were themselves terrorists, a prime 
example being that of a group comprised of E Unit and British military personnel who, together 
with select recruits from “loyalist” paramilitary organizations, carried out at least 31 
assassinations during “The Troubles.”107 
 
Death squads, called in various global conflicts anything from “Hunter-Killer Teams” to 
“Provincial Reconnaissance Units”, were an integral component to Kitson’s technique. As 
anthropologist Jeffrey Sluka notes of the British counterinsurgency in Ireland “from the 
beginning the Loyalist paramilitaries were closely associated with Kitson’s strategy.”108 
     Sluka’s research confirms and reinforces the views expressed by Churchill. In citing an 
observation by the Clergy of Justice, Sluka reveals that during British counterinsurgency in 
Northern Ireland: 
Different types of pseudo gangs have been identified. We have Kitson’s Military Reconnaissance 
Force units, made up of SAS personnel or ‘Special Duties Teams,’ trained to carry out SAS style 
covert operations. There are mixed gangs of security personnel and ‘turned around insurgents.’ 
There are paramilitary groups carrying out operations inspired by military agents provocateurs 
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who have penetrated their ranks. And there are paramilitary groups actually controlled by security 
personnel.109 
      
     Recounting his work with death squads in Kenya, Kitson described a group of trainees who 
had successfully adapted his approach in infiltrating the insurgency’s headquarters: 
Once there he would find out as much as possible about the communist District Committee and 
the insurgent platoon. He would then choose a favourable moment to turn on his hosts and kill as 
many of them as he could, making sure the leaders did not escape. He and his men…would not 
only have developed background information into contact information but by acting on it 
themselves at the most favourable possible moment they would reduce to a minimum the chances 
of the enemy escaping.110 
 
Beginning with the Kennedy administration’s amplified focus on counterinsurgency, the proxy 
death squad would become a notoriously common refrain of U.S. foreign policy in the decades to 
come, from Guatemala and Haiti, to Indonesia, Brazil and Vietnam. 
     Kitson was also an advocate of adapting democratic legal systems to work in tandem with 
counterinsurgency efforts. He believed “the Law should be used as just another weapon in the 
government’s arsenal” where, in the case of counterinsurgency, “it becomes little more than a 
propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public.” To facilitate this 
effectively “the activities of the legal services have to be tied into the war effort in as discreet a 
way as possible.”111 Coincidentally, these types of activities were also popular with Americans 
like James Jesus Angleton and J. Edgar Hoover; and became synonymous with the FBI’s 
COINTELPRO and CIA’s MH/CHAOS programs in the United States. 
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     In his most highly regarded book, Low Intensity Operations, Kitson frequently drew from and 
directly referenced the theories of his contemporaries and associates. In addition to influencing 
Kitson, counterinsurgents Sir Robert Thompson of Britain, and Roger Trinquier of France also 
had a significant impact on American military theorists.  
     Trinquier, like many French officers, was a loyalist of the fascist Vichy-regime, and gained 
extensive experience as a counterinsurgent during wars of decolonization in French Indochina 
and Algeria. Acquiring a notoriety in France comparable to that of Edward Lansdale in America, 
Trinquier became popularized through fictional portrayals of his character in the film The Battle 
of Algiers, and the novel The Centurions.112 He was an international intelligence asset with 
connections to SDECE (French intelligence), the CIA, and OAS (known as the Secret Army 
Organization), a terrorist organization composed of fascist French officers gone rogue. OAS, 
which was behind a wave of domestic bombings and assassinations in France and Algeria, and 
several coups attempts against Charles de Gaulle, was one of many CIA-protected fascist 
terrorist groups, or “stay-behind armies” in Cold War Europe.113 Conspicuously absent from 
France when de Gaulle purged their ranks, Trinquier avoided jail and execution for his role in the 
OAS by selling his services as a mercenary to Moise Tshombe of the Congo.114 In bolstering and 
training the forces of secession in mineral-rich Katanga province, Trinquier made a significant 
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contribution to the multifaceted, international effort to eliminate Patrice Lumumba, who was 
ousted by the CIA’s favoured puppet, Joseph Mobutu.115   
     Trinquier is also credited with coordinating the Hmong of Laos into a clandestine mercenary 
army of opium traffickers, a trade which he organized personally with Corsican and Binh Xuyen 
gangsters in Vietnam.116 With the departure of the French and arrival of Americans, the 
international opium networks and the Hmong army which Trinquier helped to establish were 
eagerly absorbed by the CIA, to fund their own covert activity in Southeast Asia. In a very direct 
way, Trinquier is an integral part of the story of criminal CIA-proprietary fronts like Civil Air 
Transport and Air America - and consequently the detrimental effects of the surge of heroin into 
urban America and Europe in the 1970s.117 He was in fact a pioneer in the use of the drug trade 
to fund and propel counterinsurgency, a practice which has since become a standard form of 
clandestine enrichment during wars in Colombia, Bolivia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the 
former Yugoslavia, and countless other nations.     
     Trinquier’s most enduring legacy to counterrevolutionary doctrine were his views on torture. 
In Modern Warfare, which is considered a classic text on counterinsurgency, Trinquier used a 
twisted logic of combating terror with terror to outline the justifications for the use of torture on 
those who dissent: 
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No lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner gives the information requested, the 
examination is quickly terminated; if not, specialists must force his secret from him…he must 
face the suffering, and perhaps death, he has heretofore managed to avoid. The terrorist must 
accept this as a condition inherent in his trade and in the methods of warfare that, with full 
knowledge, his superiors have chosen.118 
 
Abduction, detention, interrogation, and torture came to be key weaponry in the arsenal of the 
counterinsurgent. In the mind of Trinquier, and inline with the modernists, the technological 
society achieved in the Western world would somehow remove the barbarism from torture: 
Interrogation in modern warfare should be conducted by specialists perfectly versed in the 
techniques to be employed…the interrogators must always strive not to injure the physical and 
mental integrity of individuals. Science can easily place at the army’s disposition the means for 
obtaining what is sought.119  
 
Trinquier further lamented the choice “to refuse interrogation specialists the right to seize the truly 
guilty terrorist and spare the innocent.”120 The question is, how would one know if someone was 
guilty or innocent until interrogation? In this scenario, all civilians are potential subjects of an 
institutionalized regime of torture. 
     This mentality was akin to policies being formulated by the Kennedy administration and the 
Special Group on Counterinsurgency. The adoption of these philosophies by American military 
and intelligence institutions was reflected in the CIA’s Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation 
manual of July 1963. Implemented two years after Trinquier’s highly acclaimed Modern 
Warfare was originally published, the Kubark manual used the same logic and language: 
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The Interrogator needs all the help he can get. And a principle source of aid today is scientific 
findings. The intelligence service which is able to bring pertinent, modern knowledge to bear 
upon its problems enjoys huge advantages over a service which conducts its clandestine business 
in eighteenth century fashion.121 
 
For the CIA, in the modern form of torture “coercive procedures are designed not only to exploit 
the resistant source’s internal conflicts and induce him to wrestle with himself but also to bring a 
superior outside force to bear upon the subject’s resistance.”122 This mentality, as much Camelot 
as it was French fascist, was dictated by an arrogance which justified the barbarity of torture and 
repression, and the trauma of invasion and conquest, through a religious adherence to the modern 
scientific methods of western society. 
     Beyond his obvious hypocrisy, like all members of this school of counterinsurgency, 
Trinquier did not believe people in Third World countries had a right to resist the domination of 
their foreign occupiers. Western state terror, dispensed liberally and with shocking regularity, 
was rationalized as a natural reaction to the ignorance of primitive people. The condescending 
and distrustful outlook which governed Trinquier’s theories of the insurgent also caused him to 
develop an intricate system of surveillance during the war in Algeria. This would, of course, feed 
the French psychological warfare system of interrogation and torture. As colleague General Paul 
Aussaresses recounted, Trinquier “noticed that when Napoleon proceeded to administer the cities 
he had just captured in the Rhine valley, he began by numbering each house and counting and 
identifying its inhabitants. Trinquier used the same method in Algiers.” In turn, this allowed 
Aussaresses “to draw up lists of suspects and to proceed with massive arrests. Interrogations of 
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suspects led us to new names and with my files growing through sources mainly provided by 
Colonel Roger Trinquier, whose personal passion for the history of Napoleon’s saga was to be 
extremely helpful in his new mission.”123     
     While there is no doubting Roger Trinquier’s impact on America’s new counterinsurgency 
doctrine, Sir Robert Thompson of Britain was as important in the formulation of Kennedy-era 
counterinsurgency initiatives. Like Trinquier, Thompson created modern systems of census, 
surveillance, and population control. Thompson, an indelible veteran of British counterinsurgency 
efforts in Malaya, was instrumental in the development of the American “Strategic Hamlet” 
program in South Vietnam, a cornerstone of Camelot’s experimentation in Southeast Asia.124 Like 
Frank Kitson, Thompson was also a strong advocate of police as the frontline force of any anti-
subversive program. Douglas Blaufarb, CIA Chief of Station for Laos, observed “most theorists 
of counterinsurgency view the police as a critical suppression arm, and some, such as Sir Robert 
Thompson, believe that it rather than the military should be the principle reliance of suppression 
activities.”125 
     Thompson’s experience in implementing “New Villages” during British pacification efforts in 
Malaya would gain the attention and direct personal interest of President Kennedy.126 Historian 
Michael Latham recounts that William Colby, CIA Chief of Station in Saigon, encouraged South 
Vietnamese leaders “Diem and Nhu to step up their own strategic, village-level efforts and also 
advised them to meet with Robert G.K. Thompson.” After their meeting, and apparently “attracted 
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to Thompson’s ideas, Diem and Nhu became increasingly interested in combining military 
operations with a nationwide program of ‘strategic hamlets.’”127 
     For Thompson, the purpose of the Strategic Hamlet was not one of relocation and protection 
of the civilian population. Quite the opposite, Thompson advocated for instrumentalizing 
civilians and drawing them directly into war. “I think it is a mistake to establish strong points, 
particularly concrete posts, outside the perimeter of strategic hamlets,” Thompson commented 
insightfully, “psychologically this allows the Viet Cong to attack the armed defenders without 
attacking the hamlet or involving the people in any way in battle.”128 In repudiating the “one 
criticism frequently levelled at the strategic-hamlet concept by military officers – that it is 
defensive”, Thompson assured:  
The concept as a whole is designed to secure a firm base and then to expand from that into 
disputed, and finally enemy-controlled territory…it becomes an offensive advance which will 
wrest the military initiative from the insurgent. This is far more aggressive, because it is effective, 
than launching thousands of operations with hundreds of troops in each, all wading through the 
paddy fields with their rifles cocked to no purpose.129   
 
Here, it is clear Thompson sees civilians as pawns and hostages to the imperial agenda, to be 
used as human shields against the insurgency. It is also apparent that Thompson recognizes the 
apprehension of the revolutionary to directly involve or harm civilians in combat; yet for 
Thompson, using non-combatants in this manner psychologically drains the insurgency and 
causes inevitable contradictions in the rebellion. In this scenario, the population is forced by 
extreme violence to join the counterinsurgents.     
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     The Strategic Hamlet program, with eventual direction from U.S. pacification chief (CORDS) 
and Special Group (C.I.) member Bob “Blowtorch” Komer, was an unmitigated disaster for all 
participants.130 Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) and USAID 
Agency for International Development (USAID) officer John Paul Vann found “his experience 
with the Strategic Hamlet Program in 1962 and 1963 had taught him that forced relocation was a 
cruel folly.”131 After all, the Strategic Hamlet program never purported any semblance of a 
permanent solution. It was instead a transitional space for forcibly dispossessed Vietnamese 
refugees to be psychologically broken down and reconditioned to their fate in a modern urban 
setting. 
     The speculative and exploratory nature of JFK’s counterinsurgency was bound to produce 
human catastrophes. As historian Gabriel Kolko commented of Kennedy and his advisers “one 
can make too much of their hubris, but in the milieu where ideas counted for much it remains a 
fact that their self-confidence was a spur to experimentation unlike any known in the period until 
then.”132 Of course, Kennedy’s Special Group was drawing direct inspiration from men like 
Lansdale, Kitson, Thompson and Trinquier, who were at best the closest thing to intellectual 
mercenaries. The ensuing result of this marriage-of-minds translated into the dispossession, 
terrorization, and annihilation of millions of people in the so-called Third World. 
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     David Galula, the French officer who would eventually become the most highly regarded of 
all counterinsurgency theorists, once quipped, “better a bad plan than no plan at all.” In a very 
real sense, Galula saw Third World suffering as a necessary sacrificial lamb for development: 
“the best way to assess a plan is to test it in the field. Its imperfections will then appear. It is only 
thereafter, when the plan has been revised, that one has the right to apply it everywhere.”133 A 
deeply cynical attitude pervades this approach. Galula had an awareness of “the enormous 
psychological superiority of the rebels”134 but insisted “a counterinsurgency is never lost a priori 
because of a supposedly unpopular regime,” due to the fact: 
As the war lasts, the war itself becomes the central issue and the ideological advantage of the 
insurgent decreases considerably. The population’s attitude is dictated not by the intrinsic merits 
of the contending causes, but by the answer to these two simple questions: Which side is going to 
win? Which side threatens the most, and which offers the most protection?135 
 
     For Galula, the testing phase for strategy, which appears from his writings to be a permanent 
state for the counterinsurgent, is marked by the procedural distrust of civilians and the use of 
violence to sway their opinion in favour of counterrevolution. According to Galula: 
The battle happens because the population, which was until recently under the insurgent’s open 
control and probably still is under his hidden control through existing political cells, cannot 
cooperate spontaneously even if there is every reason to believe that a majority is sympathetic to 
the counterinsurgent. The inhabitants will usually avoid contact with him. There is a barrier 
between them and the counterinsurgent that has to be broken and can be broken only by force. 
Whatever the counterinsurgent wants the population to do will have to be imposed.136 
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     In many ways, Kennedy’s modernization theorists and Galula had a compatible vision. 
Historian Michael McClintock describes the counterinsurgency doctrine of the Kennedy 
administration as “assign[ing] little importance to the sociopolitical forces driving a people to 
insurrection”, and where “in practice, the purely military tactics of counterinsurgency 
overshadowed the United States’ myriad programs of economic development.” Accordingly, 
McClintock adds “the net result was an assortment of military tactics largely divorced from the 
political context of the insurgency, with many of them prohibited by rules of war.”137 
     Like fellow French officer Roger Trinquier, Galula insisted upon a well-developed regime of 
surveillance, mass interrogation, and torture. “Control of the population begins obviously with a 
thorough census. Every inhabitant must be registered and given a foolproof identity card.” For 
Galula, “a census, if properly made and exploited, is a basic source of intelligence.” Within 
Galula’s system of containment, we witness the anti-civilian priorities of the counterinsurgent, as 
the census “would show, for instance, who is related to whom, an important piece of information 
in counterinsurgency warfare because insurgent recruiting at the village level is generally based 
initially on family ties.”138 In Algeria, the census was not a benevolent tool of government used 
to assist the civilian population; for Galula, Trinquier, and the French, the census was a method 
of psychological terror and social control.              
     Galula, while relatively unknown in France, had, and continues to have, a wide audience 
among United States military and intelligence circles. His manifesto, Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: Theory and Practice, was written while on fellowship at Harvard’s Center for 
International Affairs in the early 1960s. At that time, Henry Kissinger, National Security Adviser 
for Richard Nixon, was a research supervisor at the Center for International Affairs. Galula was 
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undoubtedly influenced by, and had an influence upon, his American benefactors. There is an 
undeniable synchronicity between Galula’s theories and those of Kennedy’s advocates of 
modernization. In fact, American advocates of counterinsurgency since the Vietnam War have 
followed Galula religiously. In 2007, Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl emphasized in his forward to 
the US Counterinsurgency Manual, “of the many books that were influential in the writing of the 
Field Manual 3-24, perhaps none was as important as David Galula’s Counterinsurgency 
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Modernization as Counterinsurgency 
 
Modernization theory as counterinsurgency required that movements for agrarian land  
reform, the central cause behind most uprisings in the Third World, be harshly and resolutely 
eliminated and replaced with forcible, violent, dislocation of civilian populations into urban 
areas. Peasant farmers and communal lands, of course, did not coincide properly with the goals 
of either modernization theory or the American corporations for whom it was designed. Citizens 
in this context were viewed as subversives.  
     Forever finding the profit margin, and in accordance with the principles of the modernization 
theorists, American chemical companies like Monsanto and Dow capitalized on the act of 
dispossession itself - as Operation Ranch Hand sprayed deadly, cancerous, dioxin-based 
herbicides over Southeast Asia. This was often just a prelude to what became known as “carpet-
bombing”. Faced with deadly assault from the sky, millions in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, 
chose to abandon their ancestral lands. As historian Peter Sills points out, it wasn’t just the 
communist guerrillas, but the entire population which was affected:  
Ranch Hand was not supposed to spray “friendly” or neutral villages. But this was a war fought 
without boundaries; there was no strict dividing line between enemy and allied territory, and 
approval was routinely given to defoliate populated areas without really knowing who lived there. 
Many defoliation missions sprayed “the area in the vicinity of” or “surrounding” or “living close 
to” a certain village where VC troops were thought to be stationed.140 
 
Dow Chemical saw profits of 35 percent on sales of Agent Orange to the U.S. military for use in 
their war in Vietnam, yet still complained in a memo to the government “it could have gotten at 
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least 10 percent more selling these compounds commercially.”141 In the transition to 
modernization, capitalism had, to use the words of Walt Rostow “left no other nexus between 
man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment.’”142 
     The requisite urbanization inherent to the process of modernization was facilitated by some of 
the most horrific and inhumane actions of the 20th century. Nang, a peasant woman from Laos, 
described her experience with the process of modernization in the 1960s: 
Xieng Khouang has been my family’s home since the time of my ancestors. But now it has been 
my lot to come to Vientiane province, the capital of Laos…there was danger as the war came 
closer [to Xieng Khouang], like the sound of bombs or shells or the airplanes which constantly 
made a terrible noise in the sky and led me to be terribly, terribly afraid of dying. At that time, 
our lives became like those of animals desperately trying to escape their hunters…we didn’t know 
how long we would stay alive. When looking at the faces of my children who were losing the so 
very precious happiness of childhood, as each and every day we would seek escape somewhere in 
the forest, I would grow increasingly miserable because of the war and hate it more and more.143 
 
     In neighbouring South Vietnam, economist Don Ronk wrote of the profound impact of the 
American campaign to bomb people into modernity, as “the peasant population (some 80% of 
the total) under the real and potential threat of death from the sky began trekking into the cities” 
and where “those who won’t move even under this threat can be force-moved. Thus the areas of 
bombardment crept across the Vietnamese countryside driving the population before them into 
the cities…the rush on the urban areas became a stampede of humans.” The result, in Ronk’s 
analysis, was that “architects of ‘special warfare’ in Vietnam got exactly what they asked for, the 
removal of the peasantry from much of the countryside. Everyone left ‘out there’ then is a rebel 
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or ‘aggressor’” to the U.S. military. In turn, this informed and rationalized the genocidal strategy 
of “free-fire zones” and “kill counts,” a situation where American soldiers were instructed to 
view “any movement or sign of life in a free strike zone [as] ‘fair game.’”144  
     The American attack on the civilians of Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s was 
protracted, systematic, and unrelenting. In his book A Bright and Shining Lie, Neil Sheehan 
wrote “the first Vietnamese peasant homes to be burned by U.S. troops were put to the torch by 
the Marines in several hamlets near Da Nang on August 3, 1965. Morley Safer of CBS filmed 
the burnings and shocked millions of Americans who watched the network’s evening news.” A 
year later “‘Zippo jobs’ on Vietnamese hamlets by American soldiers had become so common 
that television audiences in the United States were no longer scandalized by them.”145  
     Indeed, the American public became desensitized to the sociopathic personalities of their 
nation’s counterrevolutionary vanguard. Professor James Tyner states that “for men such as 
Kennedy and Rostow, McNamara and Nixon, Westmoreland and Komer, the annihilation of 
people through ‘attrition,’ or the regulation of people through environmental destruction, were 
seen as ‘just’ practices.” Adding to this perspective, Tyner forces meditation on the “insane 
logic” of these counterinsurgency practitioners: 
We see in Vietnam a panoply of spatial strategies – aerial bombardment and cluster bombs, 
chemical defoliants and ecowarfare, confinement and enclosure – that were used to subjugate the 
Vietnamese population. We see also the downward spiral of policy pronouncements, the 
increased willingness to subject “other” bodies to more and more violence. We see…the “insane 
logic” that condoned the repeated attempts to annihilate people, their livelihoods, and their 
homes.146 
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      Over time, the engineers and inheritors of Camelot’s counterinsurgency doctrine displayed an 
unrestrained willingness to put into practice anything they put their minds to, no matter how 
depraved or inhumane. These measures included carpet-bombing civilians to shape behaviour; 
defoliating pristine tropical biospheres to intentionally create an unlivable, toxic environment; 
and field-testing an array of insidiously brutal new weapons with clear civilian applications, like 
daisy-cutters, cluster-bombs, flechette bombs and napalm. 
     The vast arsenal of weaponry designed for experimentation and use in Southeast Asia best 
illustrates the core anti-civilian principles of American counterinsurgency warfare. In Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos, ordnance dropped from above was meant to cause maximum damage, with 
no consideration given to the destruction of the environment or the murder of civilian 
populations. If anything, the weapons deployed by the United States during their wars in 
Southeast Asia were specifically designed to cause widespread ecological devastation and the 
annihilation of non-combatant populations. In 1971, the “Air War Study Group” at Cornell 
University described the advantages of the cluster-bomb as a weapon of war, with advanced 
applications suited to counterinsurgent, anti-civilian, warfare:  
Single, large bombs do not achieve a uniform coverage over large areas…the cluster-bomb 
unit…solves the problem by packaging many smaller bomblets in a single container. The casing 
is blown open (by compressed gas) above ground level (typically 500-foot altitude), distributing 
the bomblets over an area several hundred feet on a side. The CBU-24 [cluster-bomb] contains 
about 600 bomblets, each of which…carries in its casing some 300 steel pellets – which become 
the effective weapons (180,000 projectiles in all)…the CBU is essentially an area weapon and 
does not need to be delivered with great accuracy. 147 
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     The widespread adoption and habitual use of cluster-bombs as a weapon of war in Vietnam 
indicates the Pentagon paid little attention to specifically targeting insurgents. Instead, the 
opposite appears true, where the end goal was decimating whatever got in the way of American 
firepower. This strategy can be attributed directly to the original philosophy of the Kennedy 
administration and his Special Group, who, inspired by Mao, believed that the guerrilla “fish” 
could be defeated if the peasant “sea” in which they swam were drained.148 
     Another weapon which caused immense suffering for Vietnamese non-combatants was the 
“daisy cutter,” a bomb which the Cornell group said “is intended to work mostly by blast effect. 
It is delivered from slow-flying cargo planes by parachute” exploding, like the cluster-bomb, just 
above ground level. “The intensive blast zone is about 300 feet in diameter, clearing trees and 
other obstructions (instant helicopter landing zone).”149 The flechette bomb, which upon 
detonation sprayed thousands of steel, razor-like “flechettes” engineered to maim and butcher, 
was “redesigned to contain sharp shreds of plastic, undetectable by X-rays.”150 As for napalm, an 
incendiary “gasoline jellied by mixing it with a soap powder,” was observed by the Cornell 
group to be “sticky and cannot be readily removed from surfaces against which it has been 
splattered; attempts to brush it off result in further spreading.” The Cornell study also noted “a 
canister of napalm achieves excellent area coverage. Napalm is extremely effective as an 
antipersonnel weapon. It inflicts deep burns which, if not fatal, heal slowly and leave 
characteristic disfigurement.”151 In this scenario, the pain inflicted by physical violence is 
matched only by the psychological terror caused by such menacing weapons. The regular and 
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extensive use of cluster bombs, daisy cutters, flechette bombs, and napalm by the United States 
in Southeast Asia clearly demonstrates the nature of American counterinsurgency as a doctrine 
which, historically, explicitly, and purposely targets civilians.   
     In their assessment of November 1971, the Cornell University Air War Study Group 
identified American counterinsurgency as a strategy of attrition aimed primarily at non-
combatant populations. Invoking World War II, the Cornell group recounted: 
In the air war against Japan when the U.S. forces had complete control of the air and could have 
been highly selective, 80 percent of the high-explosive and fire bombs dropped by B-29s were 
directed against urban areas, with devastating effect on the populations of Tokyo and other 
central cities. The two nuclear bombs were dropped on cities at least one of which (Nagasaki) 
was of such limited economic and military significance that previously it had remained virtually 
unscathed.152 
 
Taking note of the continued emphasis on bombing missions in “subsequent major conflicts” in 
“Korea and in Indochina,” the Cornell group found that “particularly in counterinsurgency 
warfare, such strategic missions tend to be lacking in discrimination and to be directed against 
civilian populations and the structure of society at large.” Additionally, “in counterinsurgency 
operations…targets are small and generally elusive, and most are highly mobile. Specific strikes 
on such targets are usually beyond the technical capabilities of air warfare; the category of 
strategic targets is then broadened to justify the more indiscriminate patterns of bombing.” In the 
end, “shattering the enemy’s morale and breaking his will to resist become military objectives, 
and damage or terror against civilians within enemy territory, whether intentional or not, is 
considered acceptable.”153 
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     Questioning whether the American intervention in Vietnam constituted genocide, French 
philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre asked “can we say that the armed forces of the United States are 
killing Vietnamese in Vietnam for the simple reason that they are Vietnamese?”154 Sartre 
proposed that the United States targeted the Vietnamese people as a whole because “since it was 
the unity of an entire people which held the conventional army at bay, the only anti-guerrilla 
strategy which could work was the destruction of this people, in other words, of civilians, of 
women and children.”155 The logic governing these actions was dispensed by Americans who: 
Want to show others that guerrilla war does not pay: they want to show all the oppressed and 
exploited nations that might be tempted to shake off the American yoke by launching a people’s 
war, at first against their own pseudo-governments, the compradors of the army, then against the 
U.S. “Special Forces,” and finally against the GIs. In short, they want to show Latin America first 
of all, and more generally, all of the Third World.156 
 
Sartre, in an ominous but truthful admission, concluded his thoughts on the subject by stating 
“the group which the United States wants to intimidate and terrorize by way of the Vietnamese 
nation is the human group in its entirety.”157 
     John F. Kennedy immediately focused on Latin America and Southeast Asia as laboratories 
for testing the effectiveness of American counterinsurgency doctrine.  Intervention into the 
internal affairs of Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand was guided by JFK’s initial Special Group 
memorandum - these countries became theaters for countersubversion as “critical areas initially 
assigned to the Special Group (C.I.)” in President Kennedy’s January 1962 NSAM 124.158 The 
legacy of JFK’s counterinsurgency was not shaped by a desire for American withdrawal from 
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Southeast Asia, despite the notorious NSAM 263; it resulted in a long-term commitment to 
covert, undeclared war, genocidal practices of mass relocation, and a perpetual state of anti-
subversive psychological warfare.159 We must remember that for Kennedy, Laos was as 
important, in a geostrategic sense, as South Vietnam. In 1963 the secret war in Laos was still a 
secret, in fact, it was Laos that defined the desired projection of American power through 
clandestine activity under Kennedy. JFK’s commitment to irregular warfare in Southeast Asia 
provided the foundation for all that followed during the Johnson and Nixon administrations.       
     Kennedy’s counterinsurgency policy, while exceptional, was neither new nor especially 
unique. Counterinsurgency became a heightened priority under Kennedy, and it acquired official 
institutional recognition through the lobbying efforts of the modernization theorists. However, 
counterinsurgency was a tradition long-ingrained in American military practice. From Andrew 
Jackson to William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, American presidents had a long history 
of endorsing counterinsurgency warfare as the central weapon of conquest. President Kennedy 
was no different.  
     Unfortunately, for millions of civilians in Southeast Asia and Latin America, their lives and 
their communities would be violently and traumatically turned upside-down by the trial-and-
error whims of detached and clinical policymakers in Washington. With Kennedy as president, 
in both words and actions, the so-called Third World became more and more a laboratory for the 
preferred tool in the arsenal of this newly packaged and marketed form of American-style 
imperialism. That tool was counterinsurgency warfare.      
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     This section has focused on the history of American counterinsurgency, and how the Kennedy 
administration functioned in developing and advancing this strategy. The following section will 
investigate the operational arm of U.S. counterinsurgency policy implementation. While Green 
Berets and Special Forces are often associated with this role, in truth, militarized political police 






















America’s Praetorian Guard – The Rise of Militarized Political Police 
 
Chapter VII 
Historical Role of Police and Prisons in the United States 
 
There is a tendency among historians to trace the origins of organized police in the United States 
to the establishment of the New York City Police Department in 1845. As author Marilynn 
Johnson describes it: 
A growing metropolitan economy had attracted new immigrants, spurred the development of poor 
tenement districts, and fueled class and ethnic tensions that produced a wave of urban disorder in 
the 1830s and 1840s. Poor neighborhoods such as the predominantly Irish Five Points were 
plagued by high rates of property crime, violence, vice, and a series of street riots that convinced 
city officials to create a full-time professional police force along the lines of London’s 
Metropolitan Police.160 
 
While there is nothing necessarily false in Johnson’s description, there is also legitimate 
contention that formalized policing in the United States began at a much earlier date. Other 
historians, finding the New York City analysis too rigid, see police foundations in the advent of 
South Carolina’s slave codes of 1712.  
     The original police patrols in South Carolina were based on the “Barbados patrols” who 
“were ordered out whenever the government suspected plotting” such as when “militia patrols 
responded to and helped suppress the 1686 rebellion in which slaves and Irish servants conspired 
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together.” According to historian Sally Hadden, the rise of slave patrols in Barbados resulted in 
the creation of “a formal military structure,” which, by the late 1640s, “included all able-bodied 
adult white males, indentured servants, and even free blacks.”161 The transfer of these practices 
to the Carolinas occurred when “a group of Barbadian colonists…established themselves in 
South Carolina in 1670” and subsequently, “by the following year, Barbadians constituted nearly 
half of South Carolina’s population.” Hadden adds “during the colony’s first twenty years, few 
laws restricted slave behavior, primarily because there were not many slaves in obvious need of 
restraint.” Barbadian-style slave patrols were temporarily held in-check because “blacks did not 
outnumber whites until 1708.”162  
     With a relatively small population of slaves, the Barbadians of South Carolina did not 
formally adopt slave patrols until the early 18th century, when, according to historian H.M. 
Henry “the number of slaves increased so rapidly” that “a more comprehensive policy had to be 
sought.”163 Professor Henry charts the course of a “system of indentured servitude” which 
provided “the germ idea of the laws of slave control.” A more aggressive approach prevailed 
when “the regulations which were sufficient for a small number of white servants, indented for a 
limited period of time, were found to be quite inadequate for the large number of blacks owned 
absolutely by the white man.” Henry claimed, “here the differentiation seems to have begun” 
whereas “a few acts were passed before 1712” it was “that year that the first elaborate law for the 
control of the slaves was enacted.”164 
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     The initial growth of the slave patrols in South Carolina was propelled by fear of slave 
insurrection and of a wider insurgency against the planter-class. In her study of the slave patrols, 
professor Hadden illustrates the inner-dynamics of this sentiment:  
In the late seventeenth century, South Carolina’s location made slave control even more 
important than it would be in Virginia and North Carolina. Slaves in South Carolina were close to 
both the Spanish in Florida and the Native American settlements; the relative proximity of both 
groups meant that blacks were more likely to run away or seize the opportunity for rebellion.165 
 
     The loose restrictions on slaves that governed early South Carolinian settlement were quickly 
replaced by a militarized police force tasked, in theory, with defeating insurrection when it arose. 
However, the slave patrols quickly became the primary operating tool within a larger architecture 
of social control. The police patrols developed and relied heavily upon counterinsurgency 
strategies based on psychological warfare and terrorism. In their historical survey of the police in 
America, the Center for Research on Criminal Justice reported that: 
The plantation slave patrols, often consisting of three armed men on horseback…were charged 
with maintaining discipline, catching runaway slaves and preventing slave insurrection. In 
pursuing this duty, they routinely invaded slave quarters and whipped and terrorized 
Blacks…they also helped enforce the laws against slave literacy, trade and gambling.166  
 
     In addition to terrorizing African slaves, the patrol system enabled the growth of a more 
refined infrastructure of spatial surveillance and countersubversion. Henry records that in South 
Carolina “the police patrol came to be a part of the military. The act of 1721 merged the patrol 
service definitely into the militia organization, making it a part of the military system, and 
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devolving upon the military authority its arrangement and maintenance.”167 As professor Hadden 
describes, South Carolina was a place where “whites and blacks in the port of Charleston were 
under surveillance from the town’s inception.”168  
     Perceived by the planter-class as a necessary innovation, soon, other slave-states would adopt 
patrols based on the policing model of South Carolina. In Louisiana, “believing that prevention 
was the greatest protection against servile violence, Louisiana lawmakers desired an early 
warning system to identify revolts that were in their formative stage.” In his dissertation on slave 
revolts in Louisiana, historian Junius Rodriguez states: 
Therefore, besides expanding the state’s militia, officials also developed an internal patrol 
network for preventing slave plots before they ever arose. Police Juries within the respective 
parishes received authorization to establish patrols and individual policies for guarding the 
plantation districts against any form of slave unrest. Members of patrols had the right to visit any 
plantation and investigate all slave cabins for suspicious activities.169       
 
In Louisiana, as in South Carolina, “in rural communities all across the state young men aged 
sixteen and upwards trained at militia musters with uneasy anticipation of the events that might 
require their services.”170 The wealthy, for the most part, avoided service. The slave patrol 
system and the higher title of overseer was used by the plantation owners as a divisive strategy 
designed to elevate slightly the social status of those descended from the indentured servant 
class. Poor, landless whites, who may otherwise have had sympathy for the African slave, would 
be required to purge lingering memories of their own relative subjugation. Now bound by the 
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overseer’s mandate of suspicion and aggression toward all Africans, slave patrols were the 
barrier between master and slave.  
     To understand the contradiction between poor whites and African slaves in the South, we 
“have to look at the overseer as he is related to the master above and the slaves below.” Professor 
H.M. Henry describes the men who made up the slave patrols as coming “from among the non-
slaveholding, non-propertied class of whites who at least sometimes may have been distrustful if 
not jealous of the slaveholder.” Henry adds that “overseeing was a step to nothing. The overseer 
was not often received in the home of the master and certainly not as an equal.” As a manager in 
the slave bureaucracy, the overseer developed “a sense he, like the slave he controlled, found no 
hope or ambition in the system.”171 The analysis of the Center for Research on Criminal Justice 
concurs, stating that the poor, landless overseers of the plantation slave patrols: 
Hated the planters, who controlled the best land and access to markets, almost as much as the 
slaves…policing, then, in its earliest years, developed as a planter-class strategy of race and class 
control, designed both to keep Black slaves in subjugation and to exacerbate the contradictions 
between Black slaves and poor Whites.172 
 
In truth, for the elite class who owned the land, and who had recently turned poor Whites against 
enslaved Africans, “the function of patrols in preventing insurrections from developing,” as 
Rodriguez describes it, was based mainly upon their “ability to ban the liberating idea of freedom 
from the slave’s mind.”173 From the outset, through a successful prioritization of psychological 
warfare and tactics of terror, the slave patrols of the American South were transformed into a 
formidable counterinsurgency asset.       
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     The fear of slave uprisings on the plantations of the South was not the only source of worry 
for the colonial elite during this period. Insurrections in the northern cities also provided an 
impetus for those with power to secure a permanent police force. The northern cities did not have 
the slave patrol; but soldiers and local militia, which in many instances were simply glorified 
lynch mobs, often fulfilled a policing role. Mob justice, as practiced during the New York 
conspiracy trials of 1741, was swift and brutal. Historian Howard Zinn wrote of the 1741 
rebellion plot, where, he recounts, “when mysterious fires broke out, blacks and whites were 
accused of conspiring together.” A paranoid climate prevailed, as stories of South Carolina’s 
Stono River insurrection of 1739 had a lasting influence on public perception. “After a trial full 
of lurid accusations by informers, and forced confessions,” continues Zinn, “two white men and 
two white women were executed, eighteen slaves were hanged, and thirteen slaves were burned 
alive.174 
     According to professor Andy Doolen, who paints a similar portrait of the affair, the 
persecutions of the New York conspiracy trials of 1741 were based on scant evidence. The trials 
were motivated, more so, by an atmosphere of counterinsurgency based on fears of class warfare. 
“In mid-eighteenth-century New York, everyday acts of slave resistance happened along 
Manhattan’s wharfs,” writes Doolen, “many slaves labored alongside soldiers and Irish 
laborers.” Distrust of the “dangerous classes” was growing, as the dockyards in New York were: 
Notorious for criminal activity, the waterfront was also a place of interracial and international 
exchange, since African, Irish, English, West Indian, and Dutch met in taverns to drink drams of 
rum, fraternize, gamble, and fence stolen goods. Not surprisingly, public officials first interpreted 
the fires of 1741 as the deeds of a conspiracy of criminals whose only aim was to steal from the 
rich.175 
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Seizing the opportunity presented by the unknown arsonists to attack the lower-classes, “city 
officials acted quickly, interrogating more than two hundred people, black and white,” in short 
time “they soon uncovered what they believed to be a gang of dispossessed slaves and Irish 
indentured servants, who, it seems, had planned to burn New York City to the ground and kill 
their masters.176 
     The reality of the New York insurrection plot was fueled by propaganda encouraged by the 
white elite, as the public was bombarded with stories of uprisings and foreign intervention. “The 
insurrection story itself organized these perceptions of racial unrest” noted Doolen, “in New 
York in 1741 the presence of Spanish sabotage became part of the emerging plot.”177 As a result, 
“the particular insurrection story that emerged from this context was not regional but 
international in scope, including a scenario in which slaves would rise up when Spain’s ships 
appeared on the horizon.”178 Once again, the distortion of public perception was used by the 
colonial elite to exacerbate inter-racial and inter-class tensions, and to provoke contradictions 
amongst the lower classes. Howard Zinn also places preeminent value on the psychological 
effect of the failed insurrection on the American colonial elite:  
Only one fear was greater than the fear of black rebellion in the new American colonies. That was 
the fear that discontented whites would join black slaves to overthrow the existing order. In the 
early years of slavery, especially, before racism as a way of thinking was firmly ingrained, while 
white indentured servants were often treated as badly as black slaves, there was a possibility of 
cooperation.179 
 
                                                            
176 Doolen, Fugitive Empire, 1. 
177 Doolen, Fugitive Empire, 10. 
178 Doolen, Fugitive Empire, 12. 
179 Zinn, A People’s History of the United States, 37. 
77 
 
As Doolen describes, the New York conspiracy of 1741, and the reactionary measures of the 
colonial elite, “affords us the opportunity to understand how white power transformed an 
inchoate fear of a slave uprising into a narrative that terrified the public.”180  
     The threat of insurgency loomed large in early colonial America, and it was not necessarily 
the possibility of a settler-colonist uprising against the British empire. Along with the constant 
counterinsurgency warfare conducted against various Indigenous tribes, the governments of the 
original American colonies created mechanisms of control, designed expressly with members of 
the lower-classes – peasants, vagrants, servants and slaves – in mind. As we can see, from the 
earliest days, policing in the United States served elite interests and functioned within an overall 
framework of counterinsurgency. Policing also had a clear role in defining and reinforcing 
divisions of class and race in American society.  
     In conjunction with the eventual formalization of localized police forces, the synthesis of the 
prison system was also a key factor in solidifying a nascent bureaucracy of population control. It 
was therefore by no accident that the philosophical and architectural underpinnings of America’s 
emergent penal democracy were formulated by Jeremy Bentham, a personal associate and 
confidant of Andrew Jackson. In a letter written to President Jackson two weeks after passage of 
the Indian Removal Act on May 28, 1830, Bentham gushed: 
I have this moment finished the hearing of your Message…intense is the admiration it has excited 
in me: Correspondent the sentiments all around me. ‘Tis not without a mixture of surprise and 
pleasure that I observe the coincidence between your ideas and my own on the field of 
legislation.181 
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It is not far-fetched to assume Bentham, the inspiration behind the modern penal state, would be 
enthralled with the legislated imprisonment of Indigenous people onto enclosed reservations. 
     Bentham became a main intellectual proponent for the widespread expansion of the 
penitentiary system in the United States. His famous treatise, The Panopticon Writings, is widely 
considered the theoretical foundation for the design, management, and purpose of the modern 
prison system. Although the complicated architecture of the “panopticon” was never fully 
realized, the principle of it remained. “The more constantly the persons to be inspected are under 
the eyes of the persons who should inspect them,” proposed Bentham, “the more perfectly will 
the purpose of the establishment have been attained.”182 Unlike primitive forms of brute physical 
punishment, according to Bentham, “the object of the inspection principle” is to make prisoners 
“not only suspect, but be assured, that whatever they do is known, even though that should not 
be the case.”183 In effect, the prison system became the institutional embodiment of the 
plantation overseer. However, the penal state would focus attention not only on the slave; it 
followed a mandate to correct any member of the “deviant,” meaning poor, population.    
     In his study on the origins of the penitentiary system in the United States, Massimo Pavarini 
derives similar conclusions about the overall motivations for the implementation of the criminal 
justice system. Pavarini describes the “profound economic transformation the United States 
underwent during the first half of the nineteenth century” with the “emergence of a new 
composition of social classes” who then became the center of “a political consideration of the 
problem of control of the marginal classes.”184 In addition to African slaves and Indigenous 
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people, the swelling ranks of the landless, poor, unemployed, vagrants, and paupers became the 
object of policies of law and order.  
     Criminalization of these social classes was justified when “poverty began to be attributed to 
‘vice’ (unwillingness to work).” Pavarini explains that the governing classes concurred “that the 
mass of poor, the idle and vagabonds should be forcibly confined” and, as a result “the 
preference for confinement…was placed at the centre of the whole policy of social control.”185 In 
The Panopticon Writings, Bentham wrote that, in considering “the national establishment of 
penitentiary-houses” their creation was for “the purpose of establishments designed to force 
labour.”186 Outwardly, the stated goal of the penal system was to transform prisoners through 
imposition of a puritanical work ethic. In truth, the expansion of the prison system was motivated 
by the private business interests profiting directly from the hard labour of convicts. In the early 
19th century, “the contract prison labor system, under which the state sold the labor power of 
convicts to private interests, quickly became the fiscal and disciplinary foundation of the new 
system.” In her history of the American penal state, Rebecca McLennan observed “as state after 
state adopted the Auburn [prison] system, the practice of selling the labor of convicts to private 
enterprise gradually became widely and deeply entrenched in penal ideology.”187  
     The convict labour economy was used as a premise to purge rebellious tendencies, impose a 
hierarchical capitalist worldview on the prisoner, and, at the same time, turn a profit for the 
owning class. And while the stated aim of the prison was a mission of reform, as Pavarini noted, 
“institutionalization was transformed into…punishment in which repressive and intimidatory 
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functions triumphed over the original aim of re-education.”188 Professor Dylan Rodriguez takes 
this notion a step further, claiming that the prison, “working within the genealogical lineage of 
the Middle Passage, constantly prototypes technologies premised on a respatialization of bodies 
and coercive reembodiment of spaces.”189 In sum, the American prison quickly became a space 
for restructuring “undesirable” persons under a highly-controlled regiment of social engineering.          
     In the latter-half of the 19th century, as the working-class grew more powerful, organized, and 
concentrated into urban centers, policing and prisons were used to regulate what was perceived 
by the elite class as an increasing threat to their position of dominance. As prominent ACLU 
civil liberties attorney and human rights scholar Frank Donner explains, “in the post-Civil War 
era, the growing cities were viewed as seething centers of unrest, poised on the cusp of riot and 
rebellion and rooted in the fear of the ‘dangerous classes’…these images and fears were 
intensified by mounting class conflict.” Feeding these fears were biased and sensationalized 
reports printed in “the most respectable publications” where editorial writers stoked the public 
attention to a position where “[organized] workers were widely perceived as adherents of foreign 
revolutionary movements, easily inflamed to reckless acts.” As Donner relates it, “complex 
reality was displaced by a scenario in which a crazed, marauding rabble, drawn from the 
‘dangerous classes’, was repulsed and contained by the forceful intervention of the authorities.” 
Seen as employees in the service of the propertied class, “urban elites looked to the police for 
order and property protection.”190 
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     The demonization of immigrants from Spain, Italy, Germany, and Russia, was pre-empted by 
a period of violent state repression against organized workers, and, an associated concomitant 
ascendance of worker militancy. After the Great Railroad Strike of 1877, which brought the 
United States to a virtual standstill, the reaction of the gilded elite, writes historian Robert 
Michael Smith, “was the rise of the national guard. Less than two years after the bloody railroad 
strikes the National Guard Association was founded.”191 Professor David Stowell explains that 
“the violent urban disorders of the strike accelerated the repressive capacities and therefore the 
development of the national state.” In addition to the formation of the National Guard, “National 
Guard armories were built or strengthened” in most major cities.192 “In the years and decades 
after the strikes,” heavily fortified armories “were built to protect America not against invasion 
from abroad but against popular revolt at home. Their erection was a monument to the Great 
Upheaval of 1877.”193  
     In response to the growing monopoly on violence held by the state, by the time of the 
nationwide May Day movement of 1886, “brigades of armed workers had grown up in a number 
of cities” writes historian Jeremy Brecher, “largely in response to the use of police and military 
forces in 1877. By 1886 they existed not only in Cincinnati, but in Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, 
Omaha, Newark, New York, San Francisco, Denver, and other cities, adding to the feeling that a 
bitter conflict was at hand.”194 The May Day movement saw 340,000 workers participating in 
demonstrations, work stoppages, strikes, and sabotage. “Eighty thousand struck in Chicago, 
45,000 in New York, 32,000 in Cincinnati, 9,000 in Baltimore, 7,000 in Milwaukee, 4,700 in 
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Boston, 4,250 in Pittsburgh, 3,000 in Detroit” and, according to Brecher, as a concession from 
the capitalists, 200,000 workers “won shorter hours.”195  
     The insurgent character of the nationwide strikes which shook America during the week of 
May 1, 1886 was quickly overshadowed by the presence of an organized and well-funded 
counterinsurgency force. The Haymarket Square bombing in Chicago on May 3, an incident still 
shrouded by murky details, pre-empted further police and national security state attacks on the 
growing working-class movement of solidarity. The Haymarket incident, which originated as a 
small protest of 1,200 against police brutality, was just concluding “when to everyone’s 
amazement a body of 180 policemen marched in and ordered the meeting to disperse.” Brecher 
describes, then, “a dynamite bomb suddenly flew through the air and exploded among the police, 
killing one and wounding almost seventy. The police reformed ranks and fired into the crowd, 
killing one demonstrator and wounding many others.”196 While a question remains as to whether 
the bomb was thrown by an agent provocateur, what is apparent is the Chicago police were at 
Haymarket Square to provoke violence. Under Captain John Bonfield, the police in Chicago 
were mercenaries of the business community; he installed a notorious regime of terror and 
violence against organized labour.197 
     Across the country, the apparent inadequacies of local policing efforts were supplemented by 
both public and private capital. In the aftermath of Haymarket, the Pinkerton Detective Agency 
“was hired to work with the police” writes Donner, “to track down anarchists and to penetrate 
their meetings. Pinkerton men not only participated jointly with the police in raids, but also 
infiltrated the anarchists’ ranks and reported their doings to police and…the media.”198 Again, 
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the media was helpful in creating a conducive atmosphere for increased state violence, as 
“popular hysteria followed” the Haymarket bombing, “the press throughout the country did 
everything possible to stir up such emotions.”199 The few legal restraints imposed on police were 
seen by elites as an impediment to eradicating the threat posed by the unity of the working class. 
Frank Donner mentions “the official police forces…were not trusted to provide this protection. 
In this setting, the Pinkerton Detective Agency became a vital resource.”200 Robert Michael 
Smith concurs: 
During these strike-laden years, besieged employers also began turning to private policing 
agencies for help. Such services fit easily into an age in which few questioned capital’s right to 
take steps to protect its private property. With the rise of professional societies and the coming of 
the professional manager, this was also an era during which American businessmen began to 
show a preference for expertise and specialization. Undeterred by democratic restraints and 
financial concerns, such agencies operated completely at the business community’s behest. 
Accountable only to their clients, they appeared to furnish an effective and efficient form of labor 
control.201 
 
     However, as evidence of their ruthless and murderous tactics became widespread, the armed 
mercenaries hired to destroy organized labour eventually fell out of favour. “In addition to anti-
Pinkerton laws regulating the shipment of armed guards across state lines” writes Smith “public 
police began to usurp these mercenaries’ function as they began to take on their modern form.” 
In this changing atmosphere, Smith adds “most businessmen were coming to realize that the 
introduction of Pinkerton-like forces, even in isolated rural environments, resulted in bloodshed 
and public outrage.”202 
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     Coming out of the Progressive Era, professionalization of public police departments became 
uniform as the 20th century moved forward. The business model of bureaucratization and 
management of local police, which would become the modern standard of policing, can be 
attributed to the efforts of August Vollmer. The professional model of policing was formulated 
when Vollmer overhauled the Berkeley, California police department starting in 1905. Vollmer 
emphasized crime fighting, evidence gathering, reliance on science and technology, and an 
overall sense of public duty and responsibility. Most divergent in the model, was Vollmer’s de-
emphasis on the stigmatization of the so-called “dangerous classes,” and explicit instructions for 
police officers to remain apolitical. As Gene and Elaine Carte mention in their study on police 
reform in the U.S., Vollmer stressed that the professional policeman “is detached from local 
politics and is able to deal equally with all the social and economic classes, gaining their respect 
and cooperation without recourse to personal identification with any particular class.”203  
     This idealistic approach, which had achieved relative success in Berkeley, would not resonate 
in other, more volatile, areas of California. Vollmer was eventually convinced to take the reins as 
chief of the notoriously corrupt Los Angeles police department, a position he would hold for 
only one year. Gene and Elaine Carte write that: 
It was inevitable that the most durable of Vollmer’s innovations in Los Angeles were the 
techniques and procedures that could bring increased efficiency into a department that had to 
police a large, decentralized city. The other side of his concept of policing – the policeman as a 
“social worker,” the commitment to community involvement – had very limited application in 
that setting.204 
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     Other considerations of a more political nature would also alter Vollmer’s formula for 
professional policing. Indeed, as the end of World War I allowed for an internal focus, paranoia 
surrounding the possibility of a Bolshevik revolution in the United States resulted in the Red 
Scare. With the Palmer Raids and the subsequent flurry of politically motivated mass 
deportations, the police once again exhibited their blatant role as instruments of the capitalist 
class. At this important juncture, police forces abandoned Vollmer’s vision of the politically 
neutral sociologist as the standard of the modern police officer; while at the same time adopting 
and strengthening other aspects of his approach, such as intelligence gathering, the deployment 
and use of scientific methods and technology, and organizational principles based along military 
lines. 
     There is no better example of the incorporation of political regulation into policing duties than 
the formulation of “Red Squads” in most major cities across the United States. Red Squads were 
specialized police units that compiled and acted upon political intelligence. As Donner explains 
it, in the aftermath of World War I: 
Ideology supplemented behavior as a police concern…but the target this time was radicalism or 
subversion rather than “the dangerous classes.” Radical-hunting by urban police was also spurred 
by collaboration with federal forces, first in the storming in 1917 of the IWW [Industrial Workers 
of the World] headquarters in eleven cities and the subsequent arrests of hundreds of union 
leaders, and then as an important operational resource in the 1919 red raids and round-up arrests. 
Bomb explosions in June 1919 that shattered buildings in eight cities and caused a number of 
fatalities were perhaps the most important single spur to the involvement of urban police in 
monitoring radicals.205 
     
     The brunt of this political repression was focused on the Industrial Workers of the World, an 
anarcho-syndicalist union, who, after years under siege from violence and attacks, according to 
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historian Melvyn Dubofsky, “was in no position to take credit for major strikes, let alone lead 
them.”206 In his autobiography, Bill Haywood, leader of the IWW (or Wobblies), spoke of the 
nationwide government raids of September 1917: 
The country was going mad about the war. On the 5th of September, 1917, the secret agents of the 
Department of Justice swooped down on the I.W.W. like a cloud of vultures. The organization 
was raided from coast to coast, from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico. The general 
headquarters, the main offices of the industrial unions, the industrial union branches, and the 
recruiting unions were in the hands of the government. Even the homes of the members were 
invaded. And all of this took place without a search warrant.207 
 
Haywood goes on to explain “the laws that we were charged with violating were all passed after 
the declaration of war.”208 In an atmosphere of paranoia, xenophobia, and jingoism, charges of 
sedition and criminal syndicalism were used to throw hundreds of Wobblies in jail or out of the 
country. Their crime was organizing workers against exploitation. The IWW was intentionally 
destroyed by the government of the United States and would never recover.  
     Despite their relative weakness at the time of the Palmer Raids of 1919, a nationwide 
campaign was once again focused upon the IWW, as a young J. Edgar Hoover “sought to make 
deportation of alien Wobblies an automatic and mandatory procedure, and proposed the selective 
arrest of Wobblies in groups of five hundred in order to cripple the organization permanently.”209  
     Speaking in 1962, Wobbly leader Elizabeth Gurley Flynn recalled in 1919, when “there were 
company [embedded] unions that came into existence and there were criminal syndicalist laws 
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that put temporary war-time sedition laws on the statute books as permanent legislation” there 
were also “deportation laws and all of this came in the wake of what we called the ‘Palmer 
Raids.’” Flynn said that “hundreds of people were scooped up one night from one end of the land 
to the other” as the “foreign born was put on one side for deportation” and “the native born were 
put on the other side for prosecution under the Criminal Syndicalist Laws.”210 Flynn adds that, 
“it was at that time…I am talking about 1919, 1920, that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover first put in his 
appearance. He was put in charge of these raids and all reports of all over the country were to be 
made to him.” According to Flynn, with Hoover at the helm of what would become the FBI, “the 
IWW fought gallantly in its own defense and there was one of its last strikes in Denver in 1926 
but by that time it was pretty well exhausted.”211  
     In all of America, Los Angeles was ground zero for the adoption of militant political policing. 
Following the bombing of The Los Angeles Times building in 1910, the business community in 
the City of Angels entrusted their police function to violent counterrevolutionaries. In their study 
of the LAPD, Marilyn Katz and Bob Duggan found “the early growth of police power in Los 
Angeles was engineered by two imposing personalities, Police Chief James Edgar Davis and the 
Captain of Detectives in Intelligence, in charge of the Radical Bureau, William ‘Red’ Hynes.” 
Hynes, head of what was known as the “Red Squad,” was “associated in the very early stages 
with the establishment and growth of a police intelligence bureau whose sole responsibility 
became the control and surveillance of ideas of social and political movements.” Katz and 
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Duggan claim that ‘Red’ Hynes was instrumental “in creating one of the prototypes of the 
intelligence bureaus that became a model for other police agencies around the country.”212  
     As World War I ended, political intelligence rapidly became the modus operandi for police 
departments across the United States. In his dissertation, Black Panther Party co-founder Huey P. 
Newton observed that: 
Following the Palmer Raids, every major American city police department created intelligence 
divisions. From 1919 until 1925, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) arrested 504 union 
organizers and political activists on charges of “criminal syndicalism.” These arrests resulted in 
124 convictions, most of which were obtained through the perjured testimony of police 
informants. The LAPD “Red Squad” became a model intelligence division whose tactics were 
used by other police agencies across the country.213 
 
Captain Hynes had a long history of experience in countersubversion, dating to when he enlisted 
in the LAPD and “was immediately assigned as an undercover agent on the waterfront. He 
infiltrated the Industrial Workers of the World” and, subsequently, “was credited by the 
Department of Justice with doing more than any other person to help the government in their 
operation against the I.W.W. throughout the nation.”214 
     Of course, “during their reign,” with Chief Davis and Willie Hynes in command of the police, 
“Los Angeles was an open town; open to gambling, vice, prostitution and bootlegging. The 
shops and factories were open too – no unions allowed.”215 In his own assessment of the LAPD, 
Donner extends this description by adding: 
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The extraordinary bias, power, lawlessness, and resistance to reform movements of the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and its red squad are a tribute to a unique support structure in 
the private sector. Virtually from its early beginnings, the red squad served as the operational arm 
of the anti-union crusade of the Merchants and Manufacturers Association (M&M), a 
confederation of over 80 percent of Los Angeles’s business firms, whose stated purpose was to 
“break the back of organized labor” and make the city “a model open shop town” in order to 
ensure its members a supply of cheap labor and to attract new industries…in return for services 
rendered, the M&M actively promoted the [red] squad’s funding and growth.216 
 
     In an ironic twist of fate August Vollmer certainly did not foresee, his two most prodigious 
apprentices, O.W. Wilson and William H. Parker, would eventually take the helm of two of the 
most brutal and politically repressive police departments in the country.217 Parker, who was chief 
of the LAPD from 1950 to 1966, “infused a strong semimilitary spirit and esprit de corps. The 
Los Angeles police were well paid and proud of their ‘professionalism,’” writes professor of law 
Paul Chevigny, “but it was close to the professionalism of an army.”218 William Parker was a 
counterguerrilla in a police uniform. In an address delivered to the National Automatic 
Merchandising Association, in September 1952, Parker said “America faces the kind of attack 
which destroyed the brave civilizations of the past” for whom “the enemy poured through when 
barbarianism within rotted the moral supporting timbers.” The threat to America, according to 
Parker, was “the armed might of Soviet Russia” and “the Communist Fifth Column within our 
borders.”219 While Parker did do much to remove corruption from the LAPD, he also engendered 
a strongly militant structure for counterinsurgency policing to proliferate.  
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     As the worst perpetrators of political policing in the United States, from the Haymarket 
incident to the founding of the red squad, the police departments of Los Angeles and Chicago 
had an undeniable impact on counterinsurgency policing in America. Half a century after the 
Red Scare, the Black Panther Party would be subject to the same apparatus of political control 
that was originally installed to destroy the Industrial Workers of the World. It was not by 
accident that the Panthers met a particularly violent and grim fate at the hands of police in the 
cities of Chicago and Los Angeles.220 
     In truth, the innovations of August Vollmer should not be mistaken as the cause of the 
politicization of police functions in the United States. As we have seen, Vollmer himself was 
adamantly opposed to the idea of police as having a hand in politics. Instead, the aspects of 
Vollmer’s professionalization model which fit in with business models of free enterprise, which 
mimicked military organizational structure, and which relied upon modern technology and 
surveillance survived to be disseminated across America. However, the primary function of 
police in the United States as a regulator of radical politics was born elsewhere, through 
widespread testing in other countries.           
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America’s Colonial Laboratories of Counterinsurgency Experimentation 
 
Techniques of counterinsurgency were honed through the U.S.-trained constabularies 
(gendarmerie), and later, national guard of recently acquired colonial properties. The United 
States created constabularies in Cuba in 1898, the Philippines in 1901, Haiti in 1915, the 
Dominican Republic in 1916, Panama in 1918, and Nicaragua in 1925. In all these instances, 
colonial constabularies were trained by the U.S. Army or Marines. And while the responsibilities 
of indoctrination would eventually shift to OSS, and with Kennedy, to the CIA and Special 
Forces, one thing remained consistent over time: the militarized policing tactics being taught 
overseas always found their way home. The counterintelligence measures and counterinsurgency 
tactics deployed by the police Red Squads to destroy the IWW and the radical left in the U.S. 
had, in fact, been imported from America’s growing list of foreign interventions.          
     The Philippine Constabulary is especially instructive with regards to the practice of the 
continual exportation and re-importation of repressive technologies by the United States. This 
initial tendency, by the 1920s, grew into an unmistakable pattern which continued unabated 
throughout the 20th century. In his study of American imperialism in the Philippines, historian 
Alfred McCoy describes the colonization process as “the site of a protracted social experiment in 
the use of police as an instrument of state power.” He further illustrates that, as the result of 
being “freed of the constraints of constitution, courts, and civil society, the U.S. regime deployed 
its information technologies to form what was arguably the world’s first surveillance state.” In 
observing the direct outcome of American counterinsurgency experimentation, McCoy argues: 
During the first decade of U.S. rule, the colonial security services, particularly the multifaceted 
Philippines Constabulary, succeeded in demobilizing a deeply rooted national revolution and 
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advancing a conservative elite to fill the political void…the creation of sophisticated modern 
policing was crucial to the U.S. pacification of the Philippines. After creating a formidable 
counterinsurgency force, the U.S. regime installed this coercive apparatus within the Philippine 
colonial state, making the constabulary central to both its administration and popular perception. 
With strong links to the executive and minimal checks and balances, the police quickly emerged 
as a major factor in the country’s politics.221 
 
     Naturally, as an effective, field-tested method of pacification, the prolific use of 
counterinsurgency policing would not be limited to the Philippines. These new techniques, 
adapted for domestic application by U.S. authorities during the Red Scare, came about, as 
McCoy sees it, due to the fact, that:  
Not only did colonial policing influence Philippine state formation, but it also helped transform 
the U.S. federal government…security techniques bred in the tropical hothouse of colonial 
governance were not contained at this periphery of American power…these innovations 
percolated homeward to implant both personnel and policies inside the Federal bureaucracy for 
the formation of a new internal security apparatus.222 
 
The potential application of new techniques of political control and social engineering was much 
too tempting for U.S. authorities to deny their use on the recalcitrant members of their own 
“subversive” classes. The ideology of American social control experts and entrepreneurs, 
whether policing abroad or at home, was identical in both nature and intent. 
     Other aspects of American counterinsurgency policing emerged in the period of extra-
continental expansion. The installation of an elite “native” class ideologically sympathetic to 
capitalism was a requisite aspect of the U.S. colonial blueprint. In the Philippines, this took a 
form where elites were encouraged to implement a census through a combination of political 
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advancement and monetary rewards. “In November 1903, provincial governors were notified 
that they had automatically been appointed census supervisors,” writes historian Paul Kramer “at 
a salary increase of $150 per month.” In cooperating with the development of America’s colonial 
surveillance state, “the census as a symbol of future state devolution took hold among Filipino 
elites” says Kramer, “it was in part because census-taking itself followed the boundaries of the 
collaborationist state so closely. This was out of logistical necessity.” Soon, soldiers and scouts 
of the Philippine army were “eligible for appointment as supervisors, special agents, and 
enumerators” of the census. Kramer adds “reliance on emerging networks of collaboration was 
also political.” For the Americans, the census represented a “political litmus test, with the 
absence of resistance – or the strength of Filipino collaboration – standing as evidence of 
consensus.” The census was definitely an issue of contention for the Filipino insurgency, where, 
“in at least some cases, census-takers were nonetheless targets of armed resistance.”223 
     Operating in tandem with the inculcation of a “nativized” elite class was America’s well-
funded effort to train, equip and indoctrinate “nativized” police forces. An immediate and 
unmistakable pattern emerged, as the U.S. Army and Marine trained-police quickly implanted 
themselves as the favoured American-installed political elite. For the American client regimes in 
Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, high-ranking members of the Guardia Nacional used 
their newfound political power to seize absolute control of their countries.  
     In Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, ruthless dictatorships, consolidated and 
backed by American-trained and supported police forces, would last for decades. The regimes of 
Trujillo, Somoza, and Duvalier arose in the wake of US-backed counterinsurgency warfare and 
the violent dissolution of strongly rooted national revolutionary movements. All three dynasties 
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were formed after extended American military occupations and the implementation of imperial 
governance by proxy. Despite the fact Trujillo and Duvalier eventually betrayed their American 
handlers, collectively, as clients of the United States, these dictatorships accumulated some of 
the most appalling human rights records of the 20th century. 
     “The emergence of Haiti as a sovereign nation in the West Indies created fears of a black 
uprising in the United States” writes historian Leon Pamphile. “Slave insurgency and black 
liberation movements were a major threat for Southern plantation owners. American 
slaveholders were both dismayed by the successful revolution and feared the prospect that it 
might be exported to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and their own land.”224 At the dawn of the 20th century 
in Haiti, any incident mildly perceived as “civil strife” then “prompted the United States to send 
warships to Port-au-Prince harbor to protect American lives and property nearly every year from 
1902 until the Marines came to stay in 1915.” According to Pamphile, this was precipitated 
through “invoking the Monroe Doctrine as rationale.”225  
     Professor Mary Renda writes that “by the turn of the century, U.S. marines had landed on 
Haitian soil eight times,” yet, “by 1913 President Wilson and his advisers were searching for a 
way to translate that position into definitive control.” Of course, according to the Wilson 
administration, this impulse had little to do with US capitalist interests in banking and railroads. 
For Wilson, the moment to acquire colonial property for America was justified, due to “the 
instability of the Haitian government” and the “political immaturity on the part of Haitians.” 
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Following a rationale steeped in racism and paternalism, the desire to take Haiti was finalized, 
“culminating in the decision to land marines and sailors on July 28, 1915.”226 
     On the other side of Hispaniola, “warships visited Dominican shores at State Department 
behest on dozens of occasions between 1911 and 1916.” When “the U.S. Navy landed a force in 
Santo Domingo in May 1916,” it was for an extended occupation. Military intervention was 
chosen because of a “nationalist crisis” which was “precipitated by the insistent demands of the 
Wilson administration that the Dominican government turn over control of its budget, public 
works, and armed forces to the United States.” Historian Eric Roorda insists that “as in Haiti, the 
military and diplomatic representatives of the United States pressed the nation’s political leaders 
to accept without compromise Wilson’s demands for control of important government 
functions.”227 Professor Jeremy Kuzmarov adds that “a main purpose” of the American military 
occupation in the Dominican Republic “was to fight the insurgents in the eastern provinces, who 
were a product of the disempowerment of local caudillos.” American sugar interests had 
monopolized land use, and the insurgency drew power from “the uprooting of the peasantry 
caused by economic reorientation toward cash crop exports.”228      
     American military intervention and occupation in Nicaragua had a long-standing and 
pronounced history, more than that of even Haiti or the Dominican Republic. “Between 1853 and 
1933 United States marines invaded Nicaragua twenty times” wrote Colombian diplomat Clara 
Nieto, “in one case, they stayed five years, in another, twenty-one.”229 The United States had 
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long viewed Nicaragua with a sense of strategic preoccupation, where, as early as 1823, “the 
question of a trans-Nicaragua canal was raised” with “several proposals for canal construction 
from British and North American capitalists.”230 During the period of American global 
expansion, “U.S. Marines landed in Nicaragua in 1909 and returned in 1912, with a legation 
guard remaining in the country until 1925.” In addition, writes historian Richard Grossman, 
“when the last U.S. Marine was withdrawn in that year, U.S. officials insisted on the formation 
of a constabulary.”231 Yet, unlike Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the United States “did not 
form an occupation government in Nicaragua,” however, “Nicaragua’s military forces were 
under direct control of the United States, and the Marines commanding the Guardia reported to 
the U.S. secretary of the navy.”232 
     In Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, American counterinsurgency police forces 
and their “native” trainees, commissioned under various titles such as constabularies, 
gendarmerie, or national guard, were in all instances used as a violent bulwark against 
widespread popular resistance to invasion and occupation by the United States. It is in these early 
post-continental colonial pursuits that an unmistakable pattern emerged: the American 
government and military’s expansion and transference of counterinsurgency warfare developed 
in earlier campaigns against dozens of Indigenous tribes and the Southern Confederacy.     
     During the American occupation of 1915, the Cacos insurgency in Haiti grew in strength and 
numbers as they drew support from a population obviously displeased with an invasion by racist 
American marines. Their sovereignty trampled, the Haitians were further degraded by an old 
                                                            
230 Karl Bermann, Under the Big Stick: Nicaragua and the United States Since 1848 (Boston: South End 
Press, 1986), 15. 
231 Richard Grossman, “The Blood of the People: The Guardia Nacional’s Fifty-Year War Against the 
People of Nicaragua, 1927-1979” in, Cecilia Menjivar & Nestor Rodriguez, eds., When States Kill: Latin 
America, the U.S., and Technologies of Terror (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 60. 
232 Grossman, “The Blood of the People,” 64. 
97 
 
corv?́?𝑒e law imposed by US Marines which forced civilians to build roads, bridges, and other 
public works. “The methods employed by Gendarmerie officers to enforce the corv?́?𝑒e were 
fueled by racism and the rank desire for mastery and no doubt were inflamed by Haitian 
resistance” writes professor Mary Renda. “Gendarmes took peasants forcibly from their homes, 
roped them together, and used brutal discipline with the corv?́?𝑒e gangs,” Renda adds “the process 
itself reinforced Haitians’ belief that this was indeed a new form of slavery.”233 A surge in 
civilian rebellion led “to the renewed vigor of the Cacos,” because “simply put, the corv?́?𝑒e drove 
Haitians to the Cacos.” In reaction, “marines themselves fought more viciously,” and a 
counterinsurgency operation ensued where “more than 3,000 Haitians, and possibly thousands 
more, were killed in military campaigns against the Cacos, with even higher numbers 
wounded.”234 Without question, the war fought in Haiti by the U.S. Marines against the Cacos 
insurgency fits into the wider narrative of a historically preeminent American focus on 
counterinsurgency doctrine. 
     The most infamous dictatorship in Haiti, that of the father-son duo of Francois and Jean-
Claude Duvalier, would not reign until some time after the U.S. military occupation. Lasting 
from 1957 to 1986, the Duvalier dynasty relied on the gendarmerie, or “La Garde d’Haiti”, to 
maintain their universally unpopular grip on power. “With American backing, the Haitian army 
exercised tight control over the country’s political process. Throughout the years, military 
officers made and broke presidents.” Pamphile adds “the army consistently used its power to 
attain political objectives for itself and the ruling elite.”235 Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier 
manipulated this structure masterfully, and, in creating his own dreaded secret police, the 
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Tontons Macoutes, he also consolidated his dictatorship by intentionally reducing the power of 
the military. “Duvalier found an alternative to Army power by starting his own High Secret 
Police of the Palace. This militia consisted of several score of armed and masked 
plainsclothesman” who chose to “fulfill their assignments mostly at night.”236 With direct 
lineage to the American inspired counterinsurgency policing of La Garde d’Haiti, the Tontons 
Macoutes were described as “thugs. thieves, and murderers”237 by Kuzmarov; while Pamphile 
adds “the despicable acts of the Tontons Macoutes, Duvalier’s personal police force, included 
sanctioned murder, rape, and torture.”238 As a difficult and embarrassing ally of the United 
States, the Duvaliers nonetheless maintained a ruthless counterinsurgency apparatus conducive 
to foreign capitalist penetration.239   
     In the Dominican Republic, as in Haiti, a popular insurgency was quelled with the landing of 
U.S. Marines and a protracted counterinsurgency campaign. “The Marine occupiers pursued the 
goal of complete civil order in the towns, where an indignant Dominican polity resented the loss 
of sovereignty,” and especially, writes professor Roorda, “in the countryside, where nationalist 
guerrilla resistance persisted.”240 As author Eric Thomas recounts, “in 1916, the Dominican 
Republic was occupied by U.S. troops” yet, although “marine detachments were deployed in the 
larger cities, the United States relied on local troops to suppress the recurring rebellions.”241 
Enacting a regime of social control, the U.S. Marines declared a censorship decree, enforced an 
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order to disarm the population, and, in addition, “Marine guards patrolled the streets of 
Dominican cities, and Marine intelligence officers gathered information about those opposed to 
the occupation.” Professor Eric Roorda also writes of the implementation of an early incarnation 
of the strategic hamlet, where, “in order to isolate the guerrilla fighters in the field, the Marines 
gathered the rural population into ‘concentrations,’” where Marines “also gathered intelligence 
on the membership and movements of the guerrilla forces.”242    
     During this time, the Dominican Guardia Nacional was trained by the Marines to absorb the 
duties of an imperial proxy force. Out of the Guardia came the man who would rule the 
Dominican Republic from 1930 to 1961. Rafael Trujillo’s “rise and extended rule resulted from 
the education he received and the relationships he formed during the Marine occupation.”243 
According to Eric Thomas, Trujillo “ruled the Dominican Republic as his own personal fiefdom, 
plundering, looting, and raping at will.” For over three decades “the Dominican people lived in 
constant terror. Anyone even suspected of disloyalty was subject to the attentions of shadowy 
intelligence agencies, notorious for their frequent use of torture and murder.”244 Roorda agrees 
with this assessment, saying “Trujillo’s rise to power was owing to his personal domination of 
the military, and military intimidation was the foundation of his social and political domination 
of the country”, he aggressively imposed “a reign of terror against actual and potential 
opposition to his authority.”245 Trujillo, who was a human rights and public relations disaster for 
American policymakers, was, for a time, a perfect tool for the extension of U.S. policy objectives 
in the Caribbean.246 
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     The extended history of American intervention in Nicaragua would cease for a time during 
the Somoza dictatorship, a family dynasty lasting from 1937 to 1979. Much like the Dominican 
Republic’s dictator, Raphael Trujillo, Anastasio Somoza rose to power through the ranks, and 
finally leadership of, the Guardia Nacional. With American encouragement and assistance, 
Somoza centered his power around his personal counterinsurgency force after the defeat of the 
popular Sandino revolutionary movement.  
     Finding “the presence of troops in his country and Washington’s interference in its internal 
affairs” to be “intolerable,” Augusto Cesar Sandino, “decided to resort to arms, and he formed an 
army made up of workers, most of them from United States companies. He himself worked for a 
mining company and local campesinos.” According to Nieto, “Sandino wanted social recovery 
and the expulsion of the invaders. He did not aspire to power. He inflamed the people’s 
nationalism, and soon they saw him as their leader and a hero.” Sandino, who began a six-year 
civil war, “aroused admiration all throughout Latin America from students, intellectuals, and 
politicians in solidarity with this struggle against interventionism, imperialism, and Uncle Sam’s 
big stick.”247 The danger he posed to the stability of the American business climate, not just in 
Nicaragua, but in every nation in Latin America and the Caribbean, was met forcefully and 
resolutely. Sandino was ambushed and assassinated in February 1934, during the supposed 
neutrality of a government approved cease-fire, on orders from the commander of the Guardia, 
Anastasio Somoza. 
     The death of Sandino was not the only victory for Somoza and his Guardia Nacional. In their 
six-year war with the Sandinistas, the Guardia and the U.S. Marines obtained valuable 
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experience in fighting insurgencies. “As commander of Company M, which was subsidized by 
rich Segovian merchants and coffee growers” explains professor Kuzmarov, “the Sandinista 
campaign was headed by ‘Chesty’ Puller, by now a veteran of the Caco war in Haiti.”248 As the 
American counterinsurgency lineage moved forward, some unmistakable patterns emerged. 
Evoking Agamben and his theory of homo sacer, historian Richard Grossman writes: 
While Sandino unquestionably organized a nationalist resistance force, U.S. policymakers 
defined Sandino and his soldiers as bandits. This decision helped define the military tactics that 
were to be used. Since the United States was not fighting a legitimate military foe, it was argued, 
the rules of war (such as they were) did not apply. The Marines and the Guardia saw little 
distinction between the Sandinistas and the civilian population; not only combatants but also 
civilians were targeted…almost the entire civilian population was considered a justifiable 
target.249 
 
Karl Bermann wrote that in “the war against Sandino all the elements had appeared…that would 
become so familiar forty years later during Vietnam.” In a war against the people of Nicaragua 
“there were the inevitable barbarities and the difficulties of trying to explain this ‘police action’ 
being conducted against those who were, it was asserted, merely a group of outlaws.”250 
     In Nicaragua, from 1927 to 1933, the counterinsurgency tactics of Jackson and Sherman 
emerged, as Marines and the Guardia “carried out a ‘semi-scorched-earth policy.” According to 
Grossman, “houses, food, animals, and whatever other types of supplies that might be used by 
the ‘bandits’ were to be destroyed.” This was in addition to the “patrols [who] opened fire on 
civilian houses with casualties including men, women, and children.” Worse still, in presaging 
Vietnam once again, “the Marines, and then the Guardia, also tried a policy of ‘concentration,’ 
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where whole areas were supposed to be cleared of civilians, forcibly if necessary, and the areas 
turned into what were later called ‘free fire zones.’”251  
     Indeed, Anastasio Somoza and his son of the same name would uphold their client regime 
with a doctrine of counterinsurgency which can be attributed directly to American influence. 
These counterinsurgency lessons were well-heeded by Somoza and the Guardia Nacional: the 
Somoza dynasty would not end until 1979, after forty-two years in power, toppled this time by a 
successful Sandinista revolution.    
                               The first decades of the 20th century bore witness to the transformation of America into a  
                          formidable empire, one which was installed, maintained, and protected by police. As we have  
                          seen, the most loyal of the American client-regimes were run by hand-picked U.S.-trained  
                          policemen turned dictators. In her study of the Brazilian police, a U.S.-constructed torture and  
                          assassination squad that reigned from 1964 to 1985, professor Martha Huggins concludes that: 
The use of armed force by a modern state against any of its citizens is ordinarily defined  
as the legitimate and exclusive prerogative of the state. But when domestic police forces  
become a tool in international relations, the presumed monopoly becomes  
permeable…[the Brazilian dictatorship is] a situation in which police have been  
transformed into a security force beyond the nation state’s full control, in part by being  
used to promote the interests of another state, and partly by devolution of the state’s  
powers of violence to extralegal forces.252 
 
It is important to emphasize, as did Huggins, the primacy of the supposition of police as 
illegitimate and illegal entities in these situations. Time and again, illegal American intervention 
                                                            
251 Grossman, “The Blood of the People,” 70-2. 
252 Martha K. Huggins, Political Policing: The United States and Latin America (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1998), 197. 
103 
 
into the affairs of other nation-states would be pre-empted and facilitated through the 
deployment of well-funded and highly sophisticated counterinsurgency policing networks. 
     As professor Huggins mentioned, in instances of U.S. expansion “domestic police forces 
become a tool in international relations.” But what if that statement were also true of domestic 
policing within the United States? When examining the Red Scare and the destruction of the 
IWW, it is clear international events had a direct impact on policing strategy and initiatives in 
America. In describing the nature of the America’s imperial policing apparatus, historian Jeremy 
Kuzmarov could just as easily be outlining police structures within the United States: 
The central aim of the police programs was to promote the social stability deemed necessary for 
liberal capitalist development and to strengthen the power of local elites serving 
American…interests. Driven by the Progressive Era emphasis on professionalization and 
modernization, the programs were critical in recruiting local intelligence “assets” and in 
establishing sophisticated surveillance apparatus to monitor and destroy social movements 
deemed threatening to the United States. Police were valued more than the military as the “first 
line of defense” against subversion and were seen as best capable of implementing “civic action” 
programs designed to “win hearts and minds.” They were trained in riot control and 
counterinsurgency and even taught bomb making.253   
 
     The United States subsumed this global imperial policing apparatus from its inception, and, as 
a result, this came to be reflected throughout the political landscape in America. In the early 
decades of the 20th century, American counterinsurgency policing was applied in a self-
perpetuating manner by which foreign and domestic usage were mutually reinforcing. Therefore, 
the purges of the Palmer Raids, a direct result of methods used concurrently in the Philippines, 
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, were a precursor to the more extensive use of 
martial law and police-state tactics imposed during the various urban uprisings and against 
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political radicals in the 1960s and 1970s. 254 It was not accidental that the United States was also 
engaged, at that moment, in some of the most horrific examples of anti-civilian warfare in 
Southeast Asia and Latin America. The mutually reinforcing pattern of domestic and foreign 
counterinsurgency operations, which began long before Kennedy’s time in office, would also be 
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The CIA, the Police & the Campus: Counterinsurgency as Social Engineering 
 
Following a path set out by McKinley, Roosevelt, and Wilson, President Kennedy was by no 
means the man who originally developed America’s international counterinsurgency police. 
After all, Kennedy’s predecessor was a president who in 1954 called for “recognizing the police 
as the first line of defense against subversion and insurgency.” President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
writes political scientist Michael Shafer, funded “the police assistance program [which] began as 
the Civil Police Branch (later named the Overseas Internal Security Program, OISP) of the 
International Cooperation Agency and started training operations in 1955.”255  Yet, while 
Eisenhower merely carried forward a bureaucracy that was already in place, Kennedy invested 
his own personal interest and resolve behind expanding these operations. He was responsible for 
the rapid growth of the infrastructure, and the preeminent focus to formulate policy and fund 
programs which carried forth the gospel of modernization through counterinsurgency warfare. 
     In 1962, Kennedy reorganized Eisenhower’s OISP as OPS, the Office of Public Safety, an 
arm of the Agency for International Development (USAID). Martha Huggins explains “the 
president wanted civil police training administered by a separate branch within AID, with its 
own internal budget, personnel, and logistical autonomy…its police programs were to be 
accorded priority treatment by the rest of the agency.”256 The general mandate of OPS was the 
centralization of all police assistance to foreign countries. More specifically, writes Ethan 
Nadelmann, “it provided aid to police agencies in approximately fifty Third World nations, 
spending more than $300 million on training, weaponry, and telecommunications and other 
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equipment.” By 1971, OPS “had trained over one million police officers in forty-seven nations” 
writes Alfred McCoy, “including 85, 000 in South Vietnam and 100, 000 in Brazil.”257 In his 
analysis, Nadelmann exposes the cycle of exporting and re-importing tactics and technologies of 
repression: 
Hundreds of active and retired American police officers were sent to these countries, where they 
trained tens of thousands of police officials in administration, riot and traffic control, 
interrogation, surveillance, intelligence, and…thousands of mid- and high-level police officials 
from those countries came to Washington to study at the OPS-run International Police 
Academy.258 
 
A variety of international police academies teaching American counterinsurgency methods 
would proliferate in this era; the most famous schools were the previously mentioned 
International Police Academy in Washington, DC, but also, the Inter-American Police Academy 
in the Panama Canal Zone, and the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia (formerly 
located in Panama).259 
     Hidden from public scrutiny, these international police academies, filled with hand-picked 
officers from client-regimes throughout the world, became a conduit for the type of clandestine 
activities typical of counterinsurgency and psychological warfare. Secrecy became entrenched in 
these activities as the CIA and Special Forces took over the primary role of international police 
training. In his book Hidden Terrors, about CIA-trained police in Uruguay, A.J. Langguth wrote: 
“in Washington, the Office of Public Safety had remained immune to public embarrassment as it 
went about two of its chief functions: allowing the CIA to plant men with the local police in 
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sensitive places around the world…[and] bringing to the United States prime candidates for 
enrollment as CIA employees.”260 Thus, the CIA infiltrated “police professionalization” efforts. 
     An effective, professional and modernized police force was assumed to be a compulsory 
condition for enabling a conducive environment for American speculators, investors and 
industrialists in the Third World. Despite evidence to the contrary, wrote Michael Shafer, OPS 
“did assume the legitimacy of governments being aided. Moreover, it assumed that they were the 
managers of the development process.” As a result, for American officials, “public order was 
thus defined as obedience to the laws of whatever regime happened to be in power.”261 As 
historian Michael McClintock commented, “the Public Safety Program did not entirely neglect 
assistance in conventional law enforcement; but its emphasis tended toward counterinsurgency 
doctrine.” As a result, the OPS became known for “CIA training, assistance, and operational 
advice to foreign political police, and for linking the United States to the jailers, torturers, and 
murderers of the most repressive of ‘free world’ regimes.”262  
     Over time, the Central Intelligence Agency would play an increasingly prominent role 
administering the training and advising aspects of U.S. foreign police assistance. “CIA police 
activities necessarily required institutional cover” related professor Huggins, “provided by the 
CIA’s mostly covert relationship with the AID Office of Public Safety.”263 Agreeing, in part, 
professor McCoy states a little more forcefully: 
In effect, the problem was how to expand U.S. AID’s existing police program into an instrument 
for a more aggressive CIA internal-security effort among Third World allies. The solution, 
apparently, was to increase the public safety program within U.S. AID and simultaneously place 
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it under the control of CIA personnel – notably the program’s head, Byron Engle…[who] 
recruited CIA personnel for the program and provided close coordination with the agency’s 
intelligence mission.264  
 
Carrying over from his role as head of Eisenhower’s Civil Police Administration, Byron Engle 
would fill the top position in OPS for its entirety, from 1962 to 1973.  Engle was a former 
Kansas City police officer who began abroad when he trained the Japanese police after World 
War II. Subsequently adapting his trade for the Turkish police, Engle finally joined the CIA in 
1950 to work for the agency in the same capacity. Professor Martha Huggins wrote that under 
Kennedy, “Engle was to report directly to a presidential special assistant for internal defense.”265 
“Engle built a force of eighty police advisors, whom he stationed around the world.” By 1968 
when the OPS “program attained its peak strength” it had “a total of 458 advisors in thirty-four 
countries.”266  In truth, Engle came from a common mould; he was not the first, and would be far 
from the last, to propel the CIA’s control of American foreign police operations. 
     The indoctrination of police officers by the CIA was not contained solely to the periphery of 
empire. As ex-CIA agent Victor Marchetti explained in the early 1970s, the agency regularly 
trained cops in cities like New York and Chicago. Marchetti raised important concerns about the 
accountability of the police programs, saying “the tactics used by the CIA to cover its tracks in 
this instance were typical of the kind of deception that the agency has generally used to conceal 
its numerous activities inside the United States…probably no other program is handled with 
greater secrecy.” Additionally, and more disturbingly, Marchetti also asks “why did the agency 
at first try to cover up and then mislead Congress, the press, and the public about its activities? 
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Why could the same [domestic police] training not have been given by the FBI, which maintains 
facilities and has legal authorization for that purpose?”267 The answer to this, while complex in 
its entirety, points in the direction of the universal dissemination of political policing, with 
counterinsurgency methods as an integral component for not only developing – but maintaining 
– the modernized capitalist nation-state. The CIA, and not the FBI, had the field experience and 
networks to spread counterinsurgency doctrine far and wide. 
     As a matter of practice, a plethora of CIA counterinsurgency and police programs took over 
American academic institutions. As Marchetti described, “Michigan State University had been 
used by the CIA from 1955 to 1959 to run a covert police-training program in South Vietnam. 
The agency had paid $25 million to the university for its service, and five CIA operators were 
concealed in the program’s staff.”268 Adding to this, ex-CIA agent Ralph McGehee recalls the 
same initiative, where “to police the rural areas the CIA, along with teams from Michigan State 
University, created and trained the 50, 000-man Civil Guard whose mission, according to CIA 
National Intelligence Estimate 63-56, was ‘to maintain law and order, collect intelligence, and 
conduct countersubversive operations at the provincial level in areas pacified by the army.’” By 
intertwining the CIA police program into South Vietnam’s civilian bureaucracy, McGehee 
witnessed a situation where:  
The Agency helped Diem develop his political power through creation of the Can Lao 
Party…which required members at all levels to serve as informants for its intelligence-collection 
programs. The party, as with all other CIA programs, became obsessed with detecting disloyalty 
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and concentrated its efforts on the police function…at the core of the intelligence-
countersubversion network was Diem’s dreaded Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation – a CIA-
created security service.269 
 
     The type of indexing systems used by the CIA in South Vietnam to root out subversion had 
been crafted decades earlier in the Philippines. This system was modified for domestic use with 
the initiation of the FBI’s “Security Index” during the Palmer Raids. “At one point in the mid-
1950s,” wrote ex-FBI agent Wesley Swearingen, “the Security Index and the Communist Index 
totaled approximately 50, 000 names in Chicago.” In the case of a national emergency, 
Swearingen questioned whether “it would have been necessary to set up tents in Soldier Field 
[Chicago Bears football stadium] to house all those arrested.”270  
     American University in Washington, DC, was also home to important CIA counterinsurgency 
programs, namely ethnographic studies linked to civilian indexing systems. Working for the 
Pentagon-funded Project Camelot, American University’s Special Operations Research Office 
updated studies started under the auspices of the U.S. Army Handbook Program in the 1950s, 
known as “Human Relations Area Files.” The original funding for what amounted to cultural 
anthropology mixed with census-taking came from sources like the Carnegie Corporation, the 
Ford Foundation, and Standard Oil Company.271  
     Under Project Camelot, cultures were catalogued and analyzed for strict counterinsurgency 
applications. Anthropologist David Price examined the technical aspects of the “M-VICO 
System of Counterinsurgency Taxonomy,” an indexing and intelligence gathering system, which, 
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“organized data relating to specific regional counterinsurgency efforts, and it strove to compile a 
retrievable database for…social scientists formulating theories of counterinsurgency designed to 
aid in suppressing insurgent movements arising in cultures around the globe.” Price sees M-
VICO “as a cultural artifact informing us of resilient institutional ways of viewing culture as a 
counterinsurgency tool”272 and as a “logical extension of…historical military roots merging with 
the deep institutional needs for disarticulated cultural knowledge by a military seeking to 
weaponize culture.”273 
     At Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, Dr. Harold Wolff ran a program for the CIA with 
similar methods and intentions as Project Camelot.  From the early 1950s until the mid-1960s, 
Wolff was director of the Human Ecology Society, later known as the Human Ecology Fund. Dr. 
Wolff, who “offered Agency officials the cooperation of his colleagues at Cornell,” wrote ex-
State Department official John Marks, “taught neurology and psychiatry in the Medical College.” 
Marks explains that Wolff “pressed upon the CIA his idea that to understand human behavior – 
and how governments might manipulate it – one had to study man in relationship to his total 
environment.”274 An advocate of torturous interrogation and sensory deprivation techniques to 
alter the human psyche, Wolff “offered to devise ways to use the broadest cultural and social 
processes in human ecology for covert operations.” According to Marks, Dr. Wolff “understood 
that every country had unique customs for...nearly every…form of human intercourse. From the 
CIA’s point of view…this kind of sociological information could be applied mainly to 
indoctrinating and motivating people.” Overzealous in his duties, to carry forward his mission, 
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Wolff “asked the Agency to give him access to everything in its files on threats, coercion, 
imprisonment, isolation, deprivation, humiliation, torture, ‘brainwashing,’ ‘black psychiatry,’ 
hypnosis, and combinations of these with or without chemical agents.”275 Not surprisingly, the 
Human Ecology Fund was eventually absorbed by Dr. Sidney Gottleib’s much larger MK-
ULTRA mind control project. 
     These programs were by no means isolated to Cornell, Michigan State, and American 
University. Various projects took place at the universities of Illinois, Maryland, Oklahoma, 
California at Berkeley, Harvard, Stanford, and Columbia. On April 13, 1953, newly appointed 
CIA director Allen Dulles “authorized Operation MK-ULTRA,” which “was the brainchild of 
Richard Helms,” himself a future director of the CIA.276 Much like the weaponization of culture, 
these highly-placed men also thought and hoped that hallucinogens and other drugs could be 
utilized as effective weapons in modern warfare. At McGill University in Montreal, extensive 
LSD and sensory deprivation experiments were carried out on unwitting civilians for the CIA by 
Dr. Ewen Cameron, a recurring figure in CIA mind control efforts.277  
     Powerful derivatives of LSD, such as STP and BZ, were synthesized. “More promising than 
LSD is agent BZ,” wrote psychological warfare expert Peter Watson. BZ “is a psychochemical 
that was developed specifically as an incapacitating agent for chemical warfare. In small doses it 
causes sleepiness and decreased alertness; within four to twelve hours there is an inability to 
respond effectively to the environment or to move about. In some ways it is the perfect military 
weapon.”278 In their book, Acid Dreams, Martin Lee and Bruce Shlain also describe BZ, “a drug 
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called quinuclidinyl benzilate,” which the army had learned “inhibits the production of a 
chemical substance that facilitates the transfer of messages along the nerve endings, thereby 
disrupting normal perceptual patterns.” Lee and Shlain add that although “the effects generally 
last about three days,” symptoms, such as, “headaches, giddiness, disorientation, auditory and 
visual hallucinations, and maniacal behavior” were discovered to last for extended periods “as 
long as six weeks.”279  
     Paul Robeson Jr., son of African-American communist Paul Robeson – a highly respected and 
influential activist, artist, athlete and internationalist – believes his father’s life was irreparably 
damaged by a CIA dosing of BZ in March of 1961. After Robeson spent time in Ghana at the 
behest of President Kwame Nkrumah, and immediately before a planned visit to Cuba on 
invitation from Fidel Castro, Robeson Jr. claims his father was dosed during a stay in Moscow. 
Shortly after a suspicious incident at a party hosted by Americans, Robeson suffered 
hallucinations and delusions, and became withdrawn, suicidal, paranoid and depressed. Robeson 
was subsequently committed to the Priory in London, England, and underwent an extreme 
regiment of electro-shock treatments and regular doses of various incapacitating tranquilizers 
and anti-psychotic drugs. “In May 1963 I learned that my father had received fifty-four ECT 
treatments.”280 Robeson Jr. also commented that he “found this combined treatment especially 
troubling, because it resembled the ‘mind de-patterning’ treatment funded by the MKULTRA 
Project, which consisted of ‘intensive electroshocks, usually combined with prolonged, drug-
induced sleep.’” Having been told by a former CIA agent that future DCI Helms had a vendetta 
against his father, Robeson Jr. adds “the similarity is noteworthy because by early 1962 Richard 
Helms, the creator of the MKULTRA Project, had been elevated to the post of deputy director of 
                                                            
279 Lee & Shlain, Acid Dreams, 41. 
280 Paul Robeson Jr., “The Paul Robeson Files,” The Nation (vol.269, no.21, 12/20/1999), 9. 
114 
 
plans and was in direct communication with Hoover concerning Paul’s health.”281 Whatever the 
truth is of his decline, Robeson was immobilized as an effective political force as of March 1961. 
Robeson’s mental health would continue to deteriorate, and he would die a relative recluse in 
1976, a shadow of his former self.       
     How widespread the CIA’s effort to weaponize drugs and devise mind control techniques will 
probably never be fully understood. There exists enough evidence, however, to show that the 
mind control program was a top priority at the highest levels of the CIA. “The decision to 
employ LSD on an operational basis was handled through a special committee that reported 
directly to Richard Helms,” write Lee and Shlain, “who characterized the drug as ‘dynamite’ and 
asked to be ‘advised at all times when it was intended for use.’” While the agency boys dosed 
one another with LSD as a frat-boy hazing ritual, sometimes proving fatal, the deployment of 
weaponized drugs became yet another dimension of counterinsurgency warfare.282 “Fidel Castro 
was among the Third World leaders targeted for surprise acid attacks,” explain Lee and Shlain, 
“Egyptian president Gamal Abdal Nasser also figured high on the CIA’s hallucinogenic hit list.” 
MK-ULTRA’s figurative godfather, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, “carried a stash of acid overseas on a 
number of occasions during the Cold War with the intention of dosing foreign diplomats and 
statesmen.”283 
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     Gottleib’s countersubversive concoctions were not limited to drugs. Patrice Lumumba, first 
leader of an independent Congo, was the target of one of the most bizarre operations of the MK-
ULTRA era. “QJ-WIN [a European assassin] had been supplied with a tube of poison toothpaste, 
which had been delivered to the CIA station in Leopoldville by Sidney Gottleib, the agency’s 
wizard of toxins.” In his book, The Devil’s Chessboard, David Talbot identifies the usual 
suspects, as, “Dr. Ewen Cameron, of the notorious Allan Institute, had analyzed Lumumba at the 
CIA’s request and determined that he must brush his teeth regularly, since they looked gleaming 
white in photos. Therefore, Ewen assured [Alan] Dulles, chemically altered dental products were 
the key to getting rid of Lumumba.”284 As absurd as this scenario seems, it was accepted as a 
legitimate aspect of the new counterinsurgency by DCI Allen Dulles. Patrice Lumumba would 
not die from brushing his teeth. His assassination would result from a coordinated international 
effort following the lead of the CIA. Joseph Mobutu would take power in the Congo at the same 
time as John F. Kennedy in the United States; Lumumba was murdered three days before 
Kennedy’s inauguration. The prolonged public denial of Lumumba’s death was yet another 
aspect of an elaborate American campaign of psychological warfare.285 
     When the CIA decided on a program of mind control, replete with electroshock, drugs, and 
torture, it was drawing its methods from a newfound source of intelligence. As we have seen, in 
the aftermath of World War II, the Americans incorporated British and French theories of 
counterinsurgency into a doctrine of modern warfare. In addition, the United States protected, 
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aided, abetted, harboured, and employed Nazis long after the war. “The Machiavellian attitude 
behind these operations was born when a World War II ally became a new enemy and the world 
axis shifted,” explains author Linda Hunt. “To fight the Russians we turned to the men 
responsible for the horrors committed under Hitler and hired them to work as scientists, 
saboteurs, and spies. Over time these operations took on a life of their own.”286 Known as the 
“rat-line,” Operation Paperclip landed Nazis in America, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, 
and Paraguay. 
     The momentum of U.S. counterinsurgency shifted towards mind control, torture, and 
especially, the deployment of drugs as a weapon, through collaboration with Nazi scientists and 
intelligence. The blowback from these “Machiavellian” acts did not dissuade perpetrators of 
Nazi collusion, but, if anything, rewarded them with further promotion and power. Indeed, as a 
young man “Henry Kissinger served in the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps at the end of 
World War II,” explains political scientist Patrice McSherry, “and after the war he was assigned 
to a unit that was involved in the recruitment of former Nazis.” Professor McSherry also points 
out that in 1950, Kissinger “served as a consultant to another unit that carried out classified 
Defense Department studies on the use of Nazis for CIA covert operations” as he “continued to 
work on intelligence and covert operations in the 1950s through his links to the National Security 
Council.”287 
     The post-Reich life of Klaus Barbie, a Gestapo chief in France, is especially instructive when 
analyzing the consequences of the absorption of Nazi assets by the CIA. Embodying the role of 
the counterinsurgent police-torturer, psywar expert, and death squad leader, Barbie was 
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especially coveted by the CIA and was recruited as a Cold War operative. With American 
intelligence protection, Barbie escaped to Bolivia with his family to start anew. While instructing 
various South American intelligence agencies on the finer points of torture and psychological 
warfare, he also became quite wealthy trafficking cocaine and selling weapons.288 As historian 
Ariel Armony writes, “under the regime of Garcia Meza, Bolivia became a sanctuary for Nazi 
war criminals and Italian neofascist terrorists. Klaus Altmann – better known as Klaus Barbie, 
the Butcher of Lyon – received the honorary rank of lieutenant colonel in the Bolivian army.” 
Armony adds that “Altmann advised the Bolivian security forces on interrogation and torture 
techniques.” At the same time, the former SS-man formed networks with other European fascist 
terrorists throughout the Southern Cone, notably, “Stefano delle Chiaie [who also] operated 
within the Bolivian military intelligence service,” an asset of the CIA’s secret “stay-behind 
armies” in Cold War Europe, “delle Chiaie, a…protégé of the Italian secret lodge Propaganda 
Due (P-2), worked in Bolivian army operations section (G-3), commanding paramilitary 
groups.”289 
     Barbie was also involved in several fascist coups in Bolivia and Argentina from the 1960s to 
the 1980s. The most infamous of these was the Bolivian “cocaine coup,” which, ostensibly, gave 
the country’s drug lords control of the government. “The coup took place in July 1980, toppling 
a short-lived civilian government,” wrote professor Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, 
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“Argentina had infiltrated agents into Bolivia to work with military plotters and with Klaus 
Barbie, the escaped Nazi war criminal and former U.S. intelligence agent who was their close 
ally…the Argentines had as many as two hundred military personnel in Bolivia to coordinate the 
seizure of power.”290 For years, under the umbrella of the CIA’s Operation Condor, the 
governments of Argentina and Bolivia funded their counterinsurgency efforts with cocaine. 
Barbie and other CIA-protected Nazis and assorted European fascists, of course, were 
instrumental to both the cocaine traffic and the continent-wide intelligence coordination and 
collaboration of Operation Condor. 
     Of all his sordid exploits, the hunting of French resistance fighters during World War II 
became a specialty of Butcher of Lyon. It was this morbid skill that eventually found Barbie in 
the jungles outside of Vallegrande, Bolivia, helping to track Che Guevara for the CIA.291 
Accompanying Barbie on this mission was Felix Rodriguez, an anti-Castro Cuban terrorist in the 
employ of the CIA. Earning his stripes as one of the mercenaries on the prowl for Guevara, 
Rodriguez, perhaps more than any individual, including Klaus Barbie, embodies the continuity 
of American counterinsurgency doctrine. Not only did he assist in hunting and assassinating the 
most dangerous revolutionary in Latin America, he also flew cocaine and weapons for the CIA 
and Medellin cartel during the Reagan-era Contra Wars in Central America. Ex-DEA agent 
Celerino Castillo III exposed Rodriguez in his memoirs, Powderburns, where he recalled “in 
Nicaragua, Hasenfus [US adviser to the Salvadoran Air Force] named the two Cuban-Americans 
who helped run the [cocaine and arms] supply operation. One of them was Max Gomez. Vice 
President George Bush immediately hailed Gomez as ‘a patriot,’ and in a slip of the tongue, 
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called him ‘Felix Gomez.’ Gomez, of course, was Felix Rodriguez.”292 During the Cold War 
years, fascist terrorists were favoured frequently and deployed abroad gratuitously by their CIA 
handlers as indispensable clandestine operatives.   
     The decision to work extensively with Nazis propelled a situation with significant negative 
ramifications, not only for Americans, but for people all over world. The practical application of 
knowledge gained from the symbiosis of Nazi and American intelligence varied widely. In 
Europe, fascist “stay-behind” armies employed provocateurs, sabotage, and terrorism against the 
Left during the Cold War; drugs such as LSD were used experimentally by the CIA in foreign 
and domestic capacities; and a block of fascist dictatorships were ushered into power in South 
America. Despite negative media attention related to these activities at certain points from the 
1970s to the 1990s, the story of American-Nazi collaboration is largely forgiven and forgotten. 
From a strictly pragmatic viewpoint, as a system of empire, the United States did benefit in the 
long term from experiments in Nazi-style countersubversion. German counterinsurgency 
methods left their mark throughout American institutions, from the intelligence bureaucracy, to 
universities, and police departments all over the globe. For the people living under Pinochet in 
Chile, Banzer in Bolivia, Stroessner in Paraguay, or the Generals in Argentina, the sanctioned 
employment of Nazis by the CIA was not a benign matter; for millions, this arrangement resulted 
in immense suffering.         
     Certainly, the practice of harbouring Nazis and using their talents in the fight against 
communist subversion fit into the overall matrix of American intelligence operations during the 
Cold War. Collaboration between the CIA and Nazis also reflects an ongoing centuries-long 
process of the apolitical and amoral development of counterinsurgency tactics by the United 
                                                            




States. At the dawn of the Kennedy-era, America already had in place vast and intricate 
programs of torture, interrogation, and mind control; the weaponization of cultures, drugs, and 
other toxins was administered under a large, self-propelling bureaucracy; a widespread 
international fascist terrorist network was deployed regularly as a countersubversive tool; and a 
far-reaching global police training program had created dozens of “nativized” imperial proxies. 
The infiltration of counterinsurgency into academic institutions, corporations, intelligence 
agencies, and police departments occurred long before the Camelot era. Through his own interest 
and devotion, John F. Kennedy would only bolster, and not define, the growth and momentum of 
the American counterinsurgency institution. 
     This section has covered the importance of militarized police as the primary instrument of 
American counterinsurgency implementation, both at home, and abroad. Tracing the roots of 
American policing to the plantation slave patrols of the South, there develops a continuity of 
policy: from the conquest of colonies in the Pacific and Caribbean, to the destruction of the 
radical working class at home.  
     The next section will bring a focus to counterinsurgency in the Camelot era. Histories of 
Kennedy-era foreign policy initiatives are traditionally dominated by studies of Cuba, Vietnam, 
and Laos. Diverging from this repetitive conversation, the final section will explore some rarely 
discussed sites of foreign intrusion during JFK’s presidency: Guatemala, Peru, Brazil, Guyana, 
and Thailand. As we will see, President Kennedy’s counterinsurgency imprint of intervention, 
expansion, and provocation is prevalent in all the case studies. As a result, the American 
counterinsurgency blueprint had an undeniable impact and long-term ramifications for all the 





U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Practice – Innovations in Global Terrorism 
 
JFK Redux: Fires Before the Phoenix 
 
Observing the apparent failure of Kennedy-era counterinsurgency policy, author John Newman 
wrote “the Special Group’s charter was so broad that it was almost impossible to achieve…the 
military did not take counterinsurgency seriously and the administration’s effort in Vietnam was 
anything but unified.”293 In analyzing this policy by judging the outcome of the war in Vietnam 
in terms of decisive military victory, Newman missed the significance of the experimental nature 
of U.S. counterinsurgency in this period. The global ideological struggle required laboratories for 
observing and improving upon a constantly adaptive and evolving doctrine of counterrevolution. 
Vietnam, though of central importance, was but one of many imperial testing grounds. 
     Kennedy’s counterinsurgency doctrine is widely perceived as a failure because of the Bay of 
Pigs invasion and Ed Lansdale’s various and ridiculous assassination plots against Fidel Castro. 
Often, the Strategic Hamlet Program in South Vietnam, and the clandestine wars in Laos, are 
also prominently situated in a dialogue related to JFK’s misguided foray into the world of covert 
action as civic action. When compared to the success of CIA victories in Iran and Guatemala 
during the Eisenhower administration, on the surface, Kennedy mismanaged the implementation 
of an already high-functioning counterinsurgency infrastructure. These assumptions are based on 
a perspective which focuses on conventional notions of resolute, clear-cut political and military 
dominance. As the result of this oversimplified analysis, the CIA’s contemporaneous activities in 
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Brazil, Peru, Guyana, Guatemala, and Thailand are often overlooked as being significant 
counterinsurgency operations. The importance of these American interventions, while 
historically obscured from recognition, is that they conform to a distinctive, emerging pattern, 
and exhibit the predilection of a future direction for American counterrevolutionary activity. 
     As Americans attempted to move beyond memories of Vietnam in the 1980s and 1990s, 
public sentiments of regret and repentance often prevailed. Kennedy’s former Secretary of 
Defense, Robert McNamara, was at the forefront of this call to exorcise the demons of a 
genocidal war. On the other side of the spectrum, Walt Rostow forever maintained that the war 
in Vietnam was a just cause and a victory for the United States. He pointed to the capitalist 
nations of Asia, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as proof 
that modernization had won out over communism.294 According to this logic, millions of deaths 
were justified for the ends of an American foreign policy of endless military expansion and 
corporate penetration. Yet, despite his popular appeal, McNamara’s disingenuous apologies in no 
way negate the validity of Rostow’s perspective. As for the continued application of American 
counterinsurgency doctrine to the present time, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency 
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Though generally underacknowledged, Kennedy’s sponsorship of counterinsurgency programs 
in Central and South America ran parallel to those found in Southeast Asia. American interest 
and involvement in Guatemala continued long after the Eisenhower-era CIA intervention against 
the regime of social-democrat and Guatemalan nationalist Jacobo Arbenz in June of 1954. As 
Kennedy came to office, there were fears that either Arbenz or his popular predecessor, Juan 
Arevalo (1945-1951), would regain political power. Arevalo, a professor of philosophy in 
Argentina and self-proclaimed “spiritual socialist,” was the first freely elected president in 
Guatemala’s history. The entrenched landowning elite saw him as a threat and branded him a 
communist. “Arevalo had not been in power one month before he faced his first revolt,” writes 
historian Richard Immerman, “and by the time he ended his six-year term as president he had 
successfully survived over twenty-five attempted coups.”296 Both Arevalo and Arbenz were 
despised by the Guatemalan elite and American business interests for their focus on land 
redistribution policies and social welfare programs. 
     As described by Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs under 
Kennedy, “I was made aware of the fragile political structure in Guatemala and of the heavy 
shadow hanging over it of Juan Jose Arevalo…he was in exile next door in Mexico and we 
believed he wanted to become President again at the elections scheduled for the fall of 1963.” 
Reinforcing the Eisenhower policy of intervention, for the Kennedy administration “our concern 
was that he had opened the door for the election as his successor of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, 
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another former president who was so friendly to the local communists that the military had 
ousted him in 1954 with U.S. encouragement.”297 Challenging Martin’s heavily sanitized official 
viewpoint, Immerman argues that “had the CIA-sponsored ‘blitzkrieg’ not accomplished the 
desired psychological effect, and had the Guatemalans not fallen for the Voice of Liberation’s 
[propaganda] ruse, Arbenz’s government undoubtedly would have survived.”298  
     For Kennedy, there was more to this strategy than simply keeping Arevalo or Arbenz from 
power, propping up the ladino owning class, and appeasing American corporate interests. Like 
Panama before it, Guatemala became an important training ground for the jungle warfare being 
fought during counterinsurgencies in Latin America and the Caribbean. As Colombian diplomat 
Clara Nieto details, “the Kennedy administration’s strategy of counterinsurgency was tried out 
principally in Guatemala. In 1962 the United States installed a secret training base for the army 
in Guatemala, and for the first time set into motion the civil-military actions of this strategy.”299  
     The “beans and bullets” campaign of pacification was also a clever cover for mounting 
counterinsurgency operations against the revolutionary government in Cuba. The grand 
strategists under JFK prized Guatemala as a launchpad for attacks against Castro’s regime. 
“President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes permitted the CIA’s secret contracting of Guatemalan 
officers at high salaries to train Cuban troops at the Campo Trax,” wrote Jennifer Schirmer. 
These soldiers were the supposed shock-troops “for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion.”300 
Professor of history Jesus Arboleya described the American preparations for the Bay of Pigs 
invasion in Guatemala: 
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The 2506th Brigade was the paramilitary group entrusted with carrying out the invasion. The CIA 
organized the paramilitary arm independently…and established direct channels to communicate 
with and supply the internal clandestine groups…the training of the 2506th Brigade took place 
primarily in Guatemala. A force initially numbering 300 intended for guerrilla operations was in 
the end made up of 1,200 officers and men trained for regular combat as amphibious forces.”301 
 
A large contingent of Guatemalan officers, who were loyalists of the Arevalo and Arbenz era, 
and who had varying degrees of respect and admiration for Fidel Castro, would not tolerate the 
continued American abuse of their sovereignty. “When the Guatemalan government agreed to 
support US actions against Cuba,” recounts historian Marc Drouin, “almost a third of the military 
revolted in November 1960. The effort failed to overthrow the regime and a handful of rebels 
sought refuge in the mountains of eastern Guatemala, firing the opening rounds of a 36-year 
internal armed conflict.302 
     Kennedy’s civic action programs in Guatemala quickly became guided more by “bullets” than 
“beans.” American counterinsurgency operations devolved into increased United States support 
for the Guatemalan military and their ladino landowning elite benefactors in their push to 
exterminate the insurgent Mayan peasant population. Anthropologist Lesley Gill writes that 
“racist, anti-indigenous reasoning provided much of the basis for the Guatemalan military’s 
genocidal campaign.”303 Yet, the civil war was not fueled entirely by racism, and this 
explanation alone does not suffice. “The naturalization of political violence into a cultural fact 
was produced, in part, through the creation and promotion of a language or pattern of political 
violence that – while it generated terror – at the same time obfuscated the political economy of 
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its own production,” writes Gabriela Torres. 304 In her study of the Guatemalan military, 
Schirmer came to similar conclusions: 
Without a structural analysis of violence as intrinsic to the logic of counterinsurgency, a regime 
that violates human rights seems to occur simply because of uncontrollable, bloodlusting 
commanders or poorly disciplined peasant recruits who need to be given a code of conduct – a 
view that ironically serves as an essentialist rationale by militaries for why they cannot control 
their own forces. Rather than being irrational and out of control, many of these Latin American 
militaries are precisely in control and acting in their own best interests.305 
 
In the case of Guatemala, the “best interests” of the military and landowning elite were 
determined by the “best interests” of the United States government and American corporations. 
“In Guatemala over the course of the civil war, the increasingly complex documentation and 
resulting bureaucratization of violence made possible the development of counterinsurgency 
policy aimed not at eliminating a small guerrilla movement but rather directed at controlling the 
general population.” Torres maintains that “establishing control of the population secured an 
advantageous political and economic position for the country’s military elite – the Guatemalan 
armed forces – and its political allies.”306 
     The beneficiaries of this violence, not surprisingly, were often Guatemalan military officers 
trained at the School of the Americas, who were the continuing recipients of U.S. support and 
funding. “Their wealth” says professor Gill: 
Is often less the product of sound business investments than the outcome of decades of plunder 
and state-sponsored violence. That some members of the [Guatemalan] armed forces utilized their 
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access to state power to enrich themselves, their families, and their friends and to dispossess 
others through corruption and brutal forms of primitive accumulation is an established fact.307 
 
     However, the financial status of the Guatemalan military elite, while a motivating factor for 
the “nativized” American proxies, was not the reason the United States had invested so heavily 
in building a counterinsurgency warfare apparatus in the country. By the mid-1960s “the U.S. 
model of special warfare and pacification taken directly from Vietnam was established in 
Guatemala during the civilian regime of President Mendez Montenegro [1966-1970].” 
According to professor Schirmer, “government death squads inflicted massive repression in the 
city and in the countryside. A brutal pacification program in Zacapa and Chiquimula directed by 
an estimated 1000 Green Berets, took the lives of between 5000 and 10,000 peasants.”308 In 
another parallel to the counterinsurgency experimentation in Vietnam, the Guatemalan military 
also attempted to corral peasants into strategic hamlets.309  
     The revolving-door of American counterinsurgency personnel who were so crucial to 
operations in Southeast Asia also found an abundance of employment opportunities in 
Guatemala. Historian Greg Grandin tells the story of John Longan, a former police officer in 
Oklahoma and Texas, who “arrived in Guatemala in 1957 as part of the first wave of advisors 
sent by the United States to foreign countries, a police corps to train local police forces.” Moving 
through Brazil, Venezuela, Thailand, and the Dominican Republic in the same capacity, Longan 
returned to Guatemala in 1965 “to set up a rapid-response security unit.” Grandin explains 
further: 
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Within three months this squad, working under the name Operacion Limpieza (Operation 
Cleanup), had conducted over eighty raids and multiple extrajudicial assassinations, including an 
action that during four days in March captured, tortured, and executed more than thirty prominent 
left opposition leaders. The military dumped their bodies into the sea while the government 
denied any knowledge of their whereabouts…among those murdered…[were] the respective 
leaders of Guatemala’s labor and peasant federations during Arbenz’s tenure.310 
 
Typical of the psychology of the counterinsurgent, Longan, by his logic, clouds his own role in 
genocide by attributing the violence in Guatemala to a natural predisposition of the people, 
where, to use the words of Longan, “it is inbred in them” and “they hate pretty deeply.” 311   
     The genocidal counterinsurgency campaign of the U.S.-supported Guatemalan military 
dictatorship would reach a crescendo in 1982, under president Reagan’s favoured leader, the 
particularly sadistic General Rios Montt. According to Drouin, “the monthly death toll in 
Guatemala rose significantly at the time, from 800 under Lucas Garcia, to over 6,000 under 
General Rios Montt.”312 The American puppet regimes in Guatemala would go on to murder 
over 200,000 people. Despite the scale of human atrocity and historic injustice, events in 
Guatemala during the Reagan administration would be overshadowed by other American 
counterinsurgency campaigns in El Salvador and Nicaragua.     
     In typical fashion, former CIA Chief of Station for Laos, Douglas Blaufarb, deflected 
American culpability in the Guatemalan atrocities, despite undeniable involvement. According to 
Blaufarb, because of “urban supporters of guerrillas resorting to assassinations,” the U.S. 
sponsored Guatemalan government retaliated “by sponsoring vigilante-style terrorism. In the 
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midst of this reign of terror and counter-terror the principles of enlightened counterinsurgency 
were overwhelmed and forgotten.”313 Of course, denial of culpability requires denying that 
counterinsurgency intentionally and systematically imposes regimes of terror in order to 
effectively control targeted populations. The opinion of a CIA officer like Blaufarb is 
predictable, but grossly inaccurate; the historical record of American intervention in Guatemala 

















                                                            






To the south, the socio-economic and political realities of Peru were similar in many ways to 
those found in Guatemala. A small landowning elite continually ignored demands from landless 
Indigenous peasants for agrarian reform - and relied upon right-wing dictatorships to maintain 
the status quo. “In the late 1950s,” writes professor Gerardo Renique, “months before the victory 
of the Cuban Revolution, a massive peasant movement rocked the foundations of the Peruvian 
state and society, ushering in a crisis in legitimacy and hegemony that has remained unresolved 
until this day.”314 Kennedy’s Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin 
Martin, proclaimed “orderly social change was essential but resisted by the wealthy oligarchy 
backed by the Catholic church and the military…1% of the rural population owned 60% of the 
cultivated land. Half the population were poor and illiterate Indians.” According to Martin, this 
situation “provided one of the best illustrations of a ‘potential for social revolution.’”315 Gabriel 
Kolko describes a peasant population that “was as miserable as any on the continent, and over 
them ruled an aristocratic rural elite with immense economic and political power, deeply 
involved in export agriculture and allied to foreign interests, but also dominant in banking, real 
estate, and mining.” Kolko adds “U.S. investment was concentrated in mining, smelting, and 
petroleum,” as International Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil, had a “four-
hundred-thousand-acre concession” from the Peruvian government.316  
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     The United States had been providing military training and assistance to the Peruvian 
government since the 1940s.317 During the same period that Americans were organizing the 
Peruvian military, the people of Peru organized themselves. By 1960, explains Clara Nieto, “the 
nation was at the boiling point. The people had fought for twenty years for a political opening 
and the democratization of the country.” Nieto continues, “the rightist military dictatorships had 
ended, and the country was undergoing a transformation. Students, the people, and an 
impoverished lower middle class were becoming radicalized, and a powerful people’s, union, 
student, and campesino movement, which demanded change, was gaining strength.”318 While 
some members of this movement committed their energies to the traditional leftist political party, 
the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA); many others found APRA too reformist 
and accommodationist, and founded decidedly more militant groups of their own, most notably, 
the Movemiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR: Movement of the Revolutionary Left), and 
Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN: National Liberation Army). 
     By 1960, at a moment when the people’s movement in Peru was gaining significant 
momentum, the Peruvian military had prepared and was already well-adapted for an internal war 
against dissent. In the 1950s “President Odria’s anticommunism was rewarded with a substantial 
increase in U.S. military assistance, from a meager $100,000 in 1950 to over $9 million in 
1956.” Continuing, professor Renique adds:  
Between 1950 and 1966 almost four thousand Peruvian military personnel were trained either in 
the United States or in the Panama Canal Zone…between 1949 and 1969 more than eight 
hundred officers received additional specialized training in the infamous School of the 
Americas…drawing upon this experience, the Peruvian army established a specialized 
counterinsurgency unit whose training included study of the Vietnam War. Peru’s own 
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counterinsurgency campaign ran parallel to the escalation of the U.S. war in Southeast Asia…the 
U.S. experience in Vietnam inspired and strengthened the Peruvian military resolve.319       
 
     It was at this time, in the early days of the Kennedy administration, when former CIA agent 
Victor Marchetti described a scenario where “Green Berets participated…in what was the CIA’s 
single large-scale Latin American intervention of the post-Bay of Pigs era.” Marchetti claims 
“the agency secretly came to the aid of the Peruvian government, then plagued by guerrilla 
troubles in its remote eastern regions” where covertly, “the agency financed the construction of 
what one experienced observer described as ‘a miniature Fort Bragg,’” a facility with “mess 
halls, classrooms, barracks, administrative buildings, parachute jump towers, amphibious landing 
facilities…helicopters were furnished under cover of official military aid programs.” Marchetti 
also admits, “the CIA flew in arms and other combat equipment. Training was provided by the 
agency’s Special Operations Division personnel and by Green Beret instructors on loan from the 
Army.”320 
     Journalist Gustavo Gorriti describes a similar counterinsurgency build-up in Peru by the 
Kennedy administration in the wake of the Bay of Pigs. “This effort reached its height in Peru 
with the formation of the Sinchi counterinsurgency battalion in the then remote jungle settlement 
of Mazamari. Having foreseen the spread of pro-Castro guerrillas,” explains Gorriti: 
American counterinsurgency functionaries concentrated on setting up and training a special 
forces unit, modeled on their American counterparts, to confront and defeat guerrillas in their 
own element. Mazamari was built as a self-sufficient jungle base for the training and housing of 
special forces. Training was given by the Green Berets and trainers from the CIA’s Special 
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Operations Division. All equipment, from uniforms to parachutes, was financed by the United 
States government.321 
      
     A particularly vicious counterinsurgency campaign was conducted by Peruvian forces 
throughout the 1960s, under both civilian and military governments. The Peruvians adopted 
techniques being used in the Vietnam War, including “massive carpet bombings, creation of 
‘strategic hamlets,’ targeting of civilian population, and large-scale population relocations.” 
Professor Renique also writes of how the army engaged in “mass rape, torture, summary 
executions, disappearances, and dropping individuals from planes or helicopters,” and adds, “the 
air force carried out massive napalm bombing raids in the areas surrounding…guerrilla bases.322 
     With the assistance of the CIA and Special Forces, counterinsurgency became entrenched and 
overshadowed true reform. This directly contradicts Edwin Martin’s claim that during his time in 
the Kennedy administration, they “questioned the amounts [Peru] spent on their military with 
development needs so great.”323 A brief hiatus of military rule, in part an attempt to placate the 
simmering rebellion, failed to eliminate the insurgency, as “the civilian government from 1963 to 
1968 had been a reformist one…[and] the 1968 military coup occurred primarily because the 
civilian government had failed to carry out fully reform initiatives.” Now with years of 
counterinsurgency experience, the new Peruvian military government would attempt to embark 
upon “a vigorous army-led civic action program.”324 Dubbed the “Nasserites,” after Egyptian 
President Gamal Adbel Nasser, “the military officers of the revolutionary government were 
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progressive, nationalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-oligarchy.”325 Yet this posturing amounted to 
nothing but another attempted appeasement of the rising tide of insurgency. As David Palmer 
commented “once in power, the military called itself revolutionary but practiced reform…the 
military’s policies were not based on redistributing the existing pie.”326    
     Despite outward proclamations of non-alignment in the Cold War, the Peruvian military 
government, while courting Soviet assistance, maintained and exceeded earlier trends in military 
cooperation and support from the United States. The “Peruvian government” reports professor 
Lesley Gill “increased annual defense expenditures from 7.2 percent between 1970 and 1974 to 
22 percent between 1974 and 1977.” In addition, specialized counterinsurgency training was 
rapidly expanded, as “1,820 Peruvians trained at the SOA [School of the Americas] between 
1970 and 1975.”327 In power from 1968 to 1980, the supposed “leftist” leanings of the Peruvian 
military government were obviously a propaganda coup. “Peru apparently joined the Condor 
Group in 1978” at the same time as Ecuador.328 Joining their fascist neighbours from Brazil, 
Argentina, and Chile, Peru reinforced the CIA’s continent-wide counterinsurgency network. Of 
course, the military government’s true purpose had always been to serve a protracted, and 
distracting, counterinsurgency function. As Renique observed, “the military needed to step in 
and impose a solution to the crisis of the oligarchic state, one that fused together national 
development and security objectives in a way that closely corresponded with John F. Kennedy’s 
hemispheric prescription for the containment of Cuba’s revolutionary contagion.”329          
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     Over time, the Kennedy-inspired origins of Peru’s counterinsurgency apparatus were 
forgotten with the emergence of the Sendero Luminosa (Shining Path) Maoist insurgency in the 
1980s, and the U.S.-inspired War on Drugs in the 1990s. The brutal nature of the conflict that 
characterized the Peruvian civil war in the 1980s “offered an expedient formula through which 
responsibility for the extreme violence of the war could be attributed to the authoritarianism of 
the Sendero, as a force that was imagined to have developed independently of the equally lethal 
strategies and counterinsurgency doctrines embraced by the Peruvian military.” According to 
Gerardo Renique, the popular narrative of Sendero as the engine of violence in Peru 
“minimize[s] the pivotal role played by the counterinsurgency in creating a situation in which the 
state used fear to normalize and further its own violence.”330 Echoing this claim, Nelson 
Manrique wrote: 
The military implemented a counterinsurgency strategy based on the indiscriminate use of terror 
against the peasantry.  This merciless campaign of repression, guided by the North American 
counterinsurgency doctrine absorbed by Peruvian military personnel in the schools of Fort Gulick 
and Panama, tried to isolate Shining Path by demonstrating that the army could exert even greater 
terror than the guerrillas.331 
 
     As the war against the Sendero insurgency continued, the United States found other angles for 
penetration of counterinsurgency objectives into Peru’s bureaucracy, and a terrific source of 
plausible denial, in the allocation of funds for the War on Drugs. “The U.S. presence in Peru in 
relation to the drug war dates from the time…[of] the construction of the largest U.S. base in 
Latin America, the Santa Lucia, in 1988.” According to Abderrahman Beggar, “in the view of 
both the U.S. and Peruvian governments, the drug war made cooperation with the massive 
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militarization of Peruvian society necessary. It was also used as an excuse to eliminate all the 
forces considered ‘subversive’ and ‘revolutionary.’”332 Jonathan Marshall concurs, writing “the 
U.S. push for narcotics enforcement in Peru…has evolved into a counterinsurgency campaign. 
The main targets in this case are the fanatical Maoist guerrillas of Sendero Luminosa.”333 
Constantly adapting to different environments and political situations, the American 
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The continuation of U.S. support for police-state dictatorships found an especially convenient 
home in Brazil. Of all American covert operations in South America during the Kennedy 
administration, Brazil was an especially important base-of-operations for the continent-wide 
campaign to eliminate internal threats of subversion. Signaling the trend toward fascist 
totalitarian dictatorships in the Southern Cone, “formal democracy broke down and was replaced 
by military rule in a domino effect that originated in Brazil in 1964,” comments professor of 
political sociology Luis Roniger, “where it signaled the defeat of the legacy of populist 
mobilization and radicalization.”334  
     Brazil’s descent into a fascist police-state had a direct lineage to American influence in the 
post-World War II era. As welcoming recipients of Nazis during Operation Paperclip, the 
Brazilian government was equally enthusiastic when offered massive amounts of foreign 
assistance from the Kennedy administration, which happened to be earmarked by OPS for police 
training. Beginning in 1957 and continuing with Kennedy and the OPS, as professor Alfred 
McCoy stated, the United States trained over 100,000 Brazilian police officers through the 
auspices of the Office of Public Safety funding schema.335 Under JFK, Latin American countries 
were showered with military hardware, new training facilities, and intelligence advisers - all 
contained within aid packages dispersed under the banner of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. 
Brazil is instructive in this regard and exemplifies the strong American commitment to creating 
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militarized proxy police forces tasked with counterinsurgency, which in South America 
eventually devolved into the systematic anti-civilian terror of Operation Condor.  
     Fascist dictatorship was not inevitable in Brazil. The Kennedy administration irrevocably 
altered the course of Brazilian politics and encouraged and set-in-motion the police-state. When 
Joao Goulart assumed the Brazilian presidency in 1961, “he set out an agenda of land reform, 
restrictions on the annual profits that could be taken out of the country, and the extension of 
democratic rights and the legalization of the Communist Party.” According to historian David 
Schmitz, “American officials treated his coming to power as a crisis. The embassy defended the 
military’s efforts to prevent Goulart from taking office.” Favouring the police-military 
bureaucracy they had been helping to build, “Kennedy agreed with the advice of the American 
embassy in Rio that the United States refrain from issuing a statement supporting constitutional 
process versus a military solution.”336 Professor Schmitz recounts that by December of 1962, “to 
counter Goulart, contacts with the military were increased and planning begun for the overthrow 
of the government.” In blatant disregard of the Alliance for Progress narrative of civic action and 
economic assistance as a non-violent, non-revolutionary pathway to democracy, “military aid 
and the shipment of military supplies were increased throughout 1962 and 1963, but all other 
assistance to the central government was ended.”337 
     A military coup in 1964, led by General Castelo Branco, ushered in a tortuous twenty-one-
year dictatorship. As president, Branco immediately removed many democratic guarantees and 
centralized and amalgamated military and police powers. He also unleashed a brutal 
counterinsurgency campaign, Operacao Limpeza [Cleanup], against the people of Brazil:  
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In the streets, where police and military dragnets carried out the cleanup, there were broad 
searches and seizures and mass arrests. By the end of the first week after the military coup, more 
than 7,000 people had been taken into custody in Brazil. After another three months, as many as 
50,000 people had been arrested.338 
 
In a “countrywide purge to eliminate ‘subversives’ from Brazil’s political and administrative 
systems,” Operation Cleanup, “moved like a tidal wave across Brazil,” wrote professor Martha 
Huggins. With the success of Branco’s purge, “10,000 civil servants were banished from office, 
122 military officers forced to retire, and 378 political and intellectual leaders stripped of 
citizenship rights.” Throughout the purge, “OPS police advisors worked closely with special 
military and police inquiry committees, the notorious ‘IPMS [Inquerito Policial Militar] of 
subversion,’” which was established “to process Operation Cleanup arrests.” According to 
Huggins “this gave U.S. advisors, especially in Brazil’s most important cities, a chance to obtain 
intelligence from police operations.”339 These initial displays of repression by Brazil’s military 
dictatorship, with complete approval from the United States, would be the foundation for several 
decades of protracted counterinsurgency operations spanning the entire South American 
continent. 
     As individual rights were whittled away in stages by a series of Institutional Acts enacted by 
the military government, the Brazilian authorities moved further to centralize the police-state for 
more efficient population control. “Operacao Bandeirantes (OBAN) was secretly established in 
Sao Paulo city on July 2, 1969, to be applied nationally in 1970 as a new internal security 
organization” explains Huggins. “Because of the way OBAN was structured and operated, it has 
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been described as a pilot Vietnam-style Phoenix program for Latin America.” Bandeirantes 
would closely follow Phoenix, which “carried out its mission through interrogation, intimidation, 
torture, disappearances, and murder.” Learning from the mistakes of Phoenix, OBAN staff 
maneuvered to distance the program from the culpability of operating on OPS funds. 
Bandeirantes “was extraofficial and privatized, financed through local businessmen and national 
and multinational corporations, among them Ford and General Motors.”340    
     Despite clever attempts to protect the true source of their political power, the military 
dictatorship in Brazil continued to be trained, guided and coordinated by American advisers, year 
after year. According to professor Jeremy Kuzmarov, as an anchor of U.S. interests in the region, 
the Office of Public Safety in Brazil: 
Was headed by ‘Jack’ Goin, a forensics expert with long experience in Southeast Asia; Frank 
Jessup, a counterintelligence specialist who had trained internal security forces on five continents; 
and Theodore Brown, who had helped run the Phoenix program in Vietnam…other advisers 
included Yale graduate Norman Rosner and Indiana state trooper Albert Bryant, both Vietnam 
veterans; Fred Zumwalt of the Phoenix Police Department; and Robert L. Barnes, a U.S. Border 
Patrol agent and police legal affairs officer during the occupation of Japan.341 
 
According to Kuzmarov, these men “epitomize the continuity in OPS programs and the way 
novel techniques were being refined in one place and then redeployed elsewhere in the world.” 
Because of their contributions, “collectively they helped to set up Brazil’s intelligence service 
and oversaw Operation Bandeirantes, a model for the Phoenix program [in South Vietnam] in its 
strategy of dismantling the leftist opposition through skilled intelligence work and selective 
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assassination.”342 In Brazil as in countless other nations in the Third World, the continuity of 
American counterinsurgency personnel and doctrine over time is undeniable. 
     A result of their position relative to America’s counterinsurgency strategy, the twenty-year 
dictatorship in Brazil was marked by extremes of psychological warfare and terror, with the 
civilian population under constant threat of abduction, interrogation, torture, and extrajudicial 
execution at the hands of police, paramilitaries and death squads. A 1972 Amnesty International 
report contends the “ruling Brazilian groups seem to have accepted the physical elimination of 
criminals (marginais) and of political adversaries considered dangerous.” The report adds “they 
have thus apparently allowed the creation of death squads and torture centers.”343  
     Psywar, or psyops, a foundational aspect of American counterinsurgency doctrine, was a key 
aspect of this program. Amnesty International outlines the “reasons for torture,” as the Brazilian 
government, through the arm of the police, “employ torture as a means of intimidation, in order 
to control the thoughts and will of people. Many are defeated by the fear of torture and accept 
situations which are offensive to their human dignity.” Those in power “can then ignore all laws 
and rights with confidence that the public will not dare to register any protest.”344 In the final 
remarks of the report, Amnesty International concludes, “in Brazil, torture is not the expression 
of a passing crisis or a single scandalous phenomenon, but is an integral part of the political 
system which affects a growing proportion of the population.” Where, it is said, in urban areas 
“approximately one family in three has been affected by repression: disappearance or 
imprisonment of a member of the family, blackmail, pressure, persecution of all sorts.”345 
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     Incubated in Brazil, the model of the fascist police-state dictatorship would export itself 
through military coups, militarized police, and cross-continental intelligence coordination. 
American intelligence would ensure collaboration between Brazilian counterinsurgency experts 
and partners in neighbouring Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia. Brazil became a 
center for intelligence coordination, police training, and extrajudicial operations for the entire 
South American continent. Later subsumed under the rubric of the CIA’s Operation Condor, 
these fascist governments, whose power was based on perpetual counterinsurgency warfare, 
were collectively responsible for some of the most depraved and horrific crimes of the 20th 
century. “The Brazilian military junta that seized power in 1964,” explains professor Patrice 
McSherry, “created a secret intelligence apparatus, assisted by the CIA, called the Servico 
Nacional de Informacoes. This powerful intelligence organ and its associated paramilitary groups 
were exceptional in the region because they became semiautonomous and occasionally acted to 
derail the political program of the military government itself through acts of terror.”346 Because 
the South American intelligence networks and their associated goons were directly overseen by 
the CIA, the United States, of course, had privy to information which the fascist puppet regimes 
in their service did not possess. Using Brazil as a conduit, the CIA would spread this formula of 
control and clandestine governance to other Latin American nations. 
     In her study of Operation Condor, professor McSherry found that “Brazil became a major 
counterrevolutionary force and U.S. ally in South America. Brazil offered training in repressive 
methods, including torture, to other militaries in the 1960s.” Furthermore, “intelligence officers 
from other Latin American countries came to three Brazilian bases for training in 
counterguerrilla warfare, ‘interrogation techniques,’ and methods of repression.”347 With the 
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direction, assistance, and encouragement of the United States, counterinsurgency was taught in 
this manner to the various intelligence agencies and counterinsurgency forces of Argentina, 
Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia and Paraguay. 
     In Paraguay, the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner, which ruled from 1954 to 1989, “became 
a center of political repression even before Condor.” In their essay on the Latin American 
interstate intelligence network, Cecilia Mejivar and Nestor Rodriguez wrote: 
No method was too vile for Stroessner to manage his political functionaries or to punish his 
enemies. Receiving U.S. support for his anticommunism…and Brazilian training in 
counterinsurgency for his military officers and police agents, Stroessner wiped out political 
opposition…with Stroessner’s strong-arm control, Paraguay became an ideal center for 
transnational operations to detain, torture, and eliminate political targets.348 
      
     To the south in Uruguay, the indoctrination of military and police forces by American and 
Brazilian instructors prepared yet another counterinsurgency regime in the service of the CIA’s 
Operation Condor. “While the money and materiel provided by the United States was certainly 
important, most observers point to the foreign training received by the Uruguayan security forces 
as the most significant external determinant of their transformation from a democratic to a 
dictatorial orientation” commented professor of political science Jeffrey Ryan. “The vast 
majority of this training was carried out by the United States, although Brazilian and Argentinian 
personnel were thought to have provided some of the more nefarious instruction, particularly in 
torture techniques.”349  
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     This certainly wasn’t true in the case of Dan Mitrione, a CIA agent who trained the 
Uruguayan police in the finer points of torture. After Mitrione was captured and executed by 
Tupamaros guerrillas, the sordid details of this “family man” began to emerge. For his training 
exercises, Mitrione abducted homeless people to demonstrate torture techniques to his 
Uruguayan students. According to one of his apprentices, Cuban Manuel Hevia Cosculluela, 
“Mitrione had tortured four beggars to death with electric shocks at a 1970 seminar to 
demonstrate his techniques for Uruguayan police trainees.”350 Philip Agee famously resigned 
from “the Agency” and subsequently wrote his expose, Inside the Company, after his revulsion 
to CIA torture-training in Uruguay.351 
     Operation Condor was an innovation in international counterinsurgency policing. The 
experience gained in Southeast Asia would guide U.S. policymakers in Latin America, as they 
did not abandon the practices of programs like South Vietnam’s Operation Phoenix, but instead, 
simply modified their clandestine function. This would lead Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger 
to feel confident in their denial of involvement in the ousting of freely-elected Marxist Salvador 
Allende of Chile in September 1973. Again, the intelligence network of Condor, with Brazil as 
the anchor nation, would carry out the transition to General Augusto Pinochet’s military regime. 
“The CIA station chief used his contacts with the SNI [Brazilian intelligence] to enlist Brazilian 
collaboration in the formation and training of DINA [Chilean intelligence].” Patrice McSherry 
shows that “Brazilian intelligence officers trained DINA personnel in communications, 
organization, interrogation, and torture to the express request of the CIA, and DINA used SNI as 
an organizational model.”352 The international character of the Condor program was 
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demonstrated during the coup against Allende. Once again, Brazil functioned as an injection of 
counterinsurgency expertise. “Brazilian officers took part in the seizure of Brazilian exiles living 
in Santiago at the time of the coup and carried out interrogation and torture in the stadium where 
thousands of Chileans and exiles were rounded up.” McSherry reports that “other Brazilian 
exiles reported later that they were interrogated and tortured by Brazilians after the coups in 
Bolivia (1971), Chile (1973), and Argentina (1976).”353 
     Through the lens of American propaganda, the so-called “Brazilian miracle” was touted as a 
positive example of Latin American modernity, economic expansion, and prosperity. In truth, 
Brazil was the foundational nation in the CIA’s widely repressive, continent-wide Condor 
counterinsurgency force. For most Brazilians, their miracle would not come until 1985, with the 












                                                            






In Peru, as in Guatemala, racial tensions between landowners of European and of mixed-racial 
descent, and peasants of Indigenous background, were manipulated by colonizing powers to 
contribute to conflict and bloodshed. The United States, becoming more experienced at divide-
and-rule tactics and the weaponization of culture, found an opportune theater for these schemes 
in Guyana, or formerly, British Guiana. “Racial difference was central to the colony’s 
construction and existence,” writes Colin Palmer, “and white supremacy stood at its ideological 
core.”354 Racial animosity between people of East Indian and African descent had been 
strategically manufactured by the British, and, from 1961-1963, the Kennedy administration 
would use this same imperial architecture for its own purposes.  
     Prime Minister Winston Churchill was not pleased when, in 1953, Cheddi Jagan of the 
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) came to power as the first freely-elected Chief Minister of 
British Guiana. The language of the PPP platform and manifesto were interpreted as “Marxist” 
by Churchill and the Tory government. Immediately, the newly formed Jagan government was 
suspended, as was the constitution of British Guiana. Many members of the PPP, including 
Cheddi Jagan and his American wife, Janet, were arrested and detained. “For the next three 
years,” explains historian Barry Sukhram, “British Guiana was ruled under emergency powers by 
the British governor and appointed officials, and the Jagans were kept under house arrest and 
strict surveillance.”355 Notably, Jagan’s Minister of Education and Britain’s favoured Afro-
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Guyanese political figure, Forbes Burnham, was not arrested or detained. Sukhram notes, “when 
Jagan was restricted, Burnham was not, and when later the latter was placed under restriction and 
refused to report to the police as he was ordered to do, the police failed to prosecute him.”356  
     In 1964, Jessie Forbes cautioned “beware, I say, my Brother Forbes. His motto is, the 
personal ends to power justify any means used to achieve them. His bible is The Prince by 
Machiavelli. And we the people, should he come to power, will be only pawns in his endless 
game of self-advancement.”357 As the Churchill government fostered a split in the PPP, it chose 
Forbes Burnham “to lead the PPP into safe and respectable channels.”358 With encouragement 
from powerful allies, Burnham broke away from the PPP to form the People’s National Congress 
(PNC), thus initiating the racialization of politics in Guyana. The remains of the British Empire 
had once again employed divide-and-rule as an effective strategy of control.   
     Cheddi Jagan would not pander to these tactics, and said in 1966, “race has never been a 
serious problem. Indians and Negroes for many years have played, worked and lived together 
amicably.” Jagan was centered out for neutralization precisely because, unlike Forbes, he refused 
to operate for power within the imperial paradigm. “The fact is that race and religion have been 
used by the colonialists to divide and rule and to blur the basic issues,” said Jagan. “The main 
issues in British Guiana are the struggle for national liberation from colonialism and imperialism 
and the struggle of the workers and farmers for freedom from exploitation by the capitalists and 
landlords.”359 Unfortunately, Jagan’s uncompromising ethics, and the language he used to 
express them, led to a situation where, “by the 1960s, Britain’s spies worried that the Jagans 
                                                            
356 Sukhram, Divide and Conquer, 55. 
357 Cheddi Jagan, The West on Trial: My Fight for Guyana’s Freedom (Kent: Michael Joseph, 1966), 441. 
358 Sukhram, Divide and Conquer, 56. 
359 Jagan, The West on Trial, 334. 
148 
 
would turn to newly communist Cuba, possibly making the country a base for Latin American 
revolutionaries.”360   
     Jagan was elected again as premier of British Guiana in 1961. The Kennedy administration, 
while initiating a much larger role in British Guiana, was highly skeptical of Jagan’s integrity 
and motivations. Following the British, the Americans immediately classified Jagan as a Marxist 
fit for extralegal removal from office. Much like the British, Kennedy and his foreign policy 
advisers were driven by racist sensibilities and a worldview informed by a hierarchy of race. 
Historian Stephen Rabe explains that “by implication, Cheddi Jagan and his countrymen lacked 
the drive and insight of whites,” because “U.S. officials perceived Indians as failing to meet 
Western standards of manliness.” This was part of a general notion that “Indian men were not 
Cold Warriors because they were passive, emotional, and lacked heterosexual energy.” Professor 
Rabe reports “U.S. officials did indeed refer to the Indians of Guyana as being ‘timid’ and 
‘docile’. Unlike ‘aggressive’ blacks, they allegedly lacked the physical stamina to be police 
officers.”361 Inspired by notions of a racial hierarchy, Jagan, of Indian decent, was perceived by 
Kennedy acolytes as weak, naïve, and unable to withstand communist subversion. 362  
     There were yet other dimensions to Kennedy’s intrigues, as Colin Palmer commented on a 
“Machiavellianism that had characterized America’s attitude toward Cheddi Jagan and its policy 
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in British Guiana since 1961, when it began to take an active interest in the affairs of the 
colony.”363 It was no mistake that the Kennedy administration’s heightened interest in British 
Guiana coincided with the election of Jagan. Once again, like the British before them, the United 
States chose Forbes Burnham, a demagogic, violent-prone black nationalist, as a replacement.  
     In Washington in May of 1962, “Forbes Burnham met with thirteen U.S. officials at their 
invitation.” Palmer wrote that to ingratiate himself with his American hosts, Burham “said he 
knew ‘from personal experience’ that the PPP received ‘instructions via the international 
communist movement’ up to 1955, when he left the party.” He also informed them “that there 
were several communists in the leadership of the PPP and that these individuals had close ties 
with Cuba.” Never one to neglect an opportunity to advance himself, “Burnham assured the 
Americans that the PNC supported free enterprise.”364  
     The CIA would advance the political career of Forbes Burnham through a dual strategy of 
inflaming racial tensions and fomenting labour strife, which was manifested in a series of riots 
from 1961 to 1963 aimed at destabilizing and discrediting the Jagan government. “Covert 
activities by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had helped to stimulate the unrest” 
explains Palmer, “by exploiting racial sentiment for political gain, the Guianese leaders were 
crudely manipulating their followers.”365 Taking a page from both the Marshall Plan and the 
overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran, the CIA also deployed it’s conduit for the international 
sabotage of the labour movement, the AFL-CIO, in an effort to disrupt the Guyanese economy. 
Professor Rabe wrote “the [pro-Burnham] Afro-Guyanese strikers were sustained by a massive 
strike fund, estimated to be over $1 million, provided by the CIA through the AFL-CIO. Union 
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president George Meany surreptitiously deposited funds in the Royal Bank of Canada.”366 
Palmer agrees that “the strike that paralyzed the colony in 1963 was abetted by the AFL-CIO, 
which served as the organization through which the CIA funneled money to the Guianese 
unions,” the CIA, via the AFL-CIO, “were providing $125,000 weekly for strike relief in 
1963.”367 Using “soft” counterinsurgency tactics, these efforts were incredibly successful in 
weakening and delegitimizing the Jagan government.  
     Inflated by his American backers, during the twilight of Jagan’s time in office, “Burnham 
repeatedly boasted that he controlled the levers of power in Georgetown.” Rabe describes how 
Burnham “organized huge mobs, made incendiary statements to the mobs, and then declined to 
stop their rampages…the Jagan government could not control the mobs, because the police force 
did not respond to his commands.” This was because “virtually all police officers were Afro-
Guyanese.” Burnham would not have gained power without the backing of the United States, as 
“the CIA aided and abetted the rioters. The Kennedy administration had decided to generate 
chaos in the colony.”368 Conforming to the pattern of other American counterinsurgency 
experiments, the Guyanese police under Forbes Burnham rapidly became the fearsome and 
lawless arm of his U.S.-sponsored puppet-regime.  
     The further polarization of Guyanese politics along racial lines was continually fomented and 
enabled by the United States. The Burnham dictatorship consolidated itself around a huge 
investment in the growth of Guyana as a modernized “security” state, or, in other words, a 
police-state. This was exactly what Burnham’s American benefactors desired. During his twenty-
one-year rule, from 1964 to 1985, Forbes Burnham:           
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Relied on security forces and the civil service to preserve his dictatorship. After 1964, Burnham 
rapidly expanded the size of the security forces in Guyana. In 1964, British Guiana had 
approximately 2,000 police and soldiers. By 1980, the number of armed personnel exceeded 
20,000, with 4,500 in the police force and 7,500 in the Guyana Defense Force. Another 8,000 
belonged to paramilitary groups…[who were] especially vicious, inflicting a reign of terror on 
Indians. Known in Guyana as “kick-down-the-door gangs,” these armed units employed 
commando tactics in invading Indian homes. The gangs robbed family members, assaulted the 
males, and raped women and young girls.369  
 
     The rise of the police-state in Guyana followed a pattern established earlier in Brazil, the 
largest American-backed regime in Latin America. Yet, these police were not assigned to fight 
crime, instead, they would assist paramilitaries and thugs in terrorizing, assaulting, and robbing 
the Guyanese people. Despite the influx of police during Burham’s dictatorship, by 1980, 
Guyana had the second highest rate of crime in the world, surpassed only by Lebanon.370  
     The Guyanese police, like all counterinsurgency police forces, indiscriminately targeted the 
civilian population in its entirety. Under Burnham, the police were also tasked with eliminating 
anyone who challenged the established political order. When Rastafarian-Marxist scholar Walter 
Rodney, of Afro-Guyanese descent, returned from Tanzania preaching cross-racial harmony and 
class solidarity, “he was assassinated by a young agent who was paid to gain his confidence.”371 
In June of 1980, a bomb planted inside a walkie-talkie cut Rodney’s life short. In death, 
Burnham feared Rodney’s unifying power as a martyr of the working class and the Rastafari; in 
July of 1980, “like the slave masters who banned the use of the drum” writes professor Horace 
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Campbell, “the Guyanese government banned reggae music from the airwaves.”372 Rodney, a 
disciple of C.L.R. James, and a highly respected political figure in Africa and the Caribbean, 
made the mistake of directly challenging the rule of Forbes Burnham. Despite being continually 
harassed and arrested while doing political work throughout the country in 1979-1980, “Rodney 
felt compelled to confront the Burnham regime in the same way that he was calling on the 
working people to do.”373 
     Ex-State Department official William Blum noted “when it was time, in 1994, for the US 
government to declassify its British Guiana documents under the 30-year rule, the State 
Department and CIA refused to do so,” perhaps because, Blum adds “one of the better-off 
countries in the region 30 years ago, Guyana in 1994 was among the poorest. Its principle export 
was people.”374 While insignificant in a geostrategic sense, Guyana was still important enough to 
warrant the attention of U.S. policymakers. Outside of the normal boundaries of global attention, 
Guyana was a perfect opportunity for the CIA to practice “soft” techniques of counterinsurgency, 
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Of the endless number of studies covering various aspects of the American war in Vietnam, few 
acknowledge to any extent the involvement and importance of Thailand to the United States. As 
the main U.S. ally in Southeast Asia, Thailand is often overshadowed in the historical record by 
the secret war in Laos and the internecine purges in Cambodia. In fact, Thailand was an integral 
strategic outpost for America during the Vietnam War era. As a friendly and openly receptive 
partner, Thailand was the main base and staging-ground for a host of U.S. counterinsurgency 
initiatives. 
     The secret war in Laos, revealed to the public by The Pentagon Papers, should be rightfully 
remembered as the secret war in Thailand and Laos. Author Zalin Grant stated correctly “the key 
to keeping the operation secret was found not in Laos but in Thailand.”375 As former CIA Chief 
of Station for Laos, Douglas Blaufarb, points out “Thailand was placed on the first list of 
countries whose situations were to be followed by the Special Group (C.I.) and from this initial 
decision there stemmed a regular flow of reporting and program activity.” Blaufarb 
acknowledges the subversive threat in Thailand was, at best, minimal, as “at the time, no overt 
violence was evident” and “the Thai Communists were considered to be a tiny handful” who 
“had no capability to effect the somnolent political life of Bangkok.” Regardless of these factors, 
“the insurgency in Thailand was signaled and the signals were noted in the embryonic stage. 
Actions considered suitable to the threat were rapidly launched, well ahead of any serious crisis.” 
An overexaggerated response and the significant increase of U.S. military assistance and training 
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was justified because, according to Blaufarb, “Thailand was a place where a test was possible of 
the view that early prophylactic action is the secret of successful counterinsurgency.”376 
     This “early prophylactic action,” as Blaufarb calls it, began at a much earlier date than the 
Kennedy administration’s clandestine forays into Laos. “William Donovan, the former head of 
the OSS, had served as ambassador to Thailand in the early nineteen fifties,” wrote Grant, “and 
the CIA had developed warm relations with the Thais.” Grant found “the CIA had been 
particularly effective at helping the Thais create a strong border police,” which, in turn, were 
used “to enter Laos secretly and serve as radio operators, training cadre, and support troops for 
Vang Pao’s” CIA procured Hmong army.377  
     Blaufarb’s replacement in Laos, Ted Shackley, also heavily endorsed Thailand as a base of 
operations for counterinsurgency activities throughout all Southeast Asia. Washington “had hit 
on the idea that if the secret war worked so well, then add more money and people and it will do 
that much better.” Biographer David Corn wrote that “Shackley ordered the construction in 
Udorn of a million-dollar, two-story concrete headquarters with state-of-the-art communications” 
and that “Shackley poured people into the Udorn base.”378 The airbase at Udorn was a multi-use 
facility which served as a communications hub, and a center for the coordination and training of 
“nativized” mercenary counterinsurgency units, specifically Vang Pao’s Hmong army. Udorn, 
used by CIA-proprietary airlines Civil Air Transport and Air America, was also the epicenter of 
the CIA-Hmong opium traffic that funded a large portion of the secret war.     
     In addition to the opium trade, the United States government also found ways to fund the Thai 
military, police, and their surrogates without revealing their role in Laos. Kennedy’s civic action 
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programs came to the fore in a pronounced way. Alexander Caldwell noticed that “aid increased 
much more rapidly than normal AID procedures would have permitted, to the extent that the 
absorptive capacities of recipient agencies were seriously strained.” Caldwell proposed it was 
“somewhat unlikely that American concern for insurgency in Thailand would have been the sole, 
or even the primary, reason” for the massive increase in U.S. foreign assistance.379 Robert 
Muscat concurs with this view, writing “the U.S. aid program in Thailand was marked by a sharp 
rise in the level of economic and military resources the United States provided to Thailand.” 
Muscat explains the increase in aid represented “the highest levels of resource transfer reached at 
any time in the program’s history before or since.” Despite the professed civic-action orientation 
of AID programs in this period, “the security-oriented projects got the lion’s share of the funds 
during this period,” and “security in one form or another had been a, if not the, basic rationale 
and justification to the Congress since the start of the program.”380   
     With crucial guidance and contributions from the United States, the Thai military and police 
were built into one of the most well-trained, equipped, and technologically advanced 
counterinsurgency forces in the world. Ralph McGehee, a CIA officer who was assigned to work 
with the hill-tribes of the northern Thai highlands in the early 1960s, recalls that: 
In Thailand in the 1960s the Agency continued its involvement with the Police Aerial 
Reconnaissance Unit and the Border Patrol Police. Those counterinsurgency forces then supplied 
much of the manpower for the secret war in Laos. The CIA also developed a series of internal 
security and counterinsurgency programs jointly with Thai security forces.381 
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Ted Shackley, CIA Chief of Station for Laos and then Saigon, concurs with McGehee. Speaking 
of the CIA’s secret Hmong army, Shackley stated that by March 1961: 
This force had expanded to 4,000 men, Understandably the CIA wanted to keep a low profile in 
Laos, so arrangements were made for members of an elite police unit from neighboring Thailand 
to help train the Meo [Hmong]. The Thai instructors taught the Meo map reading, tactics, 
demolitions, and the use of their American-supplied weapons. These irregular warfare experts 
were later enlarged by Royal Thai Army personnel. Without these instructors, Meo resistance, 
which started with 4,000 men and grew to over 25,000, would never have become a reality.382 
 
As a key component of the American clandestine war in Laos against the insurgent Pathet Lao, 
the Thai police and military were also instrumental in wider U.S. operations in Burma, 
Cambodia and Vietnam. The Thai Border Patrol Police (BPP) and the Police Aerial 
Reconnaissance Unit (PARU) would be relied upon repeatedly as the most proficient “nativized” 
U.S. counterinsurgency force in Southeast Asia.383 
     The Thai Border Patrol Police were integral to the formulation of the “civic-action as 
counterinsurgency” model. The building of roads, schools, and other public works by the BPP 
were a cover for an anti-subversive agenda. “The primary goal of this kind of BPP activity was 
not economical or social development,” states Caldwell, “rather, it was specifically the gathering 
of information” where, “the intent was to set up a network of village informers.” Construction of 
schools in rural areas had “important implications for long-term nation-building in the sense of 
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spreading the symbols of Thai nationhood to minority groups,” but more importantly, it provided 
seemingly benign methods “to facilitating tactical intelligence gathering.” Above all, the AID 
programs had “emphasized particularly heavily the augmentation of the number of policemen 
actually on duty.” This meant that Thai National Police recruitment increased from 1,600 in 1965 
to 12,500 in 1969; the number of police stations rose from 150 in 1965 to 1,004 in 1970; and 
overall Thai National Police manpower grew from 50,000 in 1964 to 74,000 in 1970.384   
     Perhaps most important, Thai police counterinsurgency units played an integral function in 
the CIA’s opium trafficking supply-chain. Initiated by French counterinsurgent Roger Trinquier, 
the intelligence-opium networks of Southeast Asia were a huge source of financing for the CIA’s 
secret war in Laos. Upon discovering “Operation X” in 1953, Edward Lansdale protested 
Trinquier’s role in the opium traffic. However, “the CIA’s director, Allen Dulles, was mightily 
impressed by Trinquier’s operation and, looking ahead to the time when the US would take over 
from the French in the region, began funneling money, guns, and CIA advisers to Trinquier’s 
Hmong army.”385  
     Later, under Kennedy and Johnson, “the CIA used its opium-and-arms smuggling front Sea 
Supply Corp.” historian Jonathan Marshall explains, “to train the paramilitary Thai Border Patrol 
Police [BPP] under Gen. Phao Sriyanon. The CIA aimed to mould the BPP into a 
counterinsurgency asset beholden to Washington rather than the Thai government.” Interestingly, 
but certainly not by coincidence:  
Phao was also the most notorious Thai drug smuggler of his era. The contacts he established 
through the CIA’s Sea Supply Corp. with the KMT [Kuomintang] opium traffickers allowed him 
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to sew up a near-monopoly on Burmese opium exports. His border police escorted drug caravans 
from the frontier through to Bangkok.386 
 
The CIA’s cultivation of powerful drug lords as partners in American counterinsurgency efforts 
was by no means limited to the endorsement of Phao Sriyanon. As professor Clarence Lusane 
describes: 
During the Vietnam War, the CIA and the U.S. Army supported Vang Pao in Laos. Vang Pao was 
one of the largest opium dealers in Southeast Asia and a key financier of the 30,000 Hmong 
tribesmen who were used by the CIA for political and military operations. In 1968, Vang Pao met 
with U.S. organized crime figure Santo Trafficante, Jr., who was to become the largest importer 
and distributor of China White heroin in the United States.387 
 
Strongly endorsing America’s support for drug cartels as counterinsurgency assets, Ted Shackley 
expressed the agency’s view that a “January 1961 contact by American personnel with a Meo 
[Hmong] leader, Vang Pao” which initialized his partnership with the CIA, is “a classic example 
of how foreign instructors can help build an effective fighting force.”388 
     Indeed, the United States went to extraordinary lengths to facilitate the activities of large-
scale international drug trafficking-as-counterinsurgency operations. CIA agent Victor Marchetti, 
in describing the main CIA-proprietary front airline involved in opium and arms trafficking, said: 
Air America has trained pilots for the Thai national police…[they] regularly cross national 
boundaries in Southeast Asia, and its flights are almost never inspected by customs authorities. It 
has its own separate passenger and freight terminals at airports in South Vietnam, Laos, and 
Thailand. At Udorn, in Thailand, Air America maintains a large base which is hidden within an 
even larger U.S. Air Force facility…the Udorn base is used to support virtually all of the “secret” 
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war in Laos, and it also houses a “secret” maintenance facility for the planes of the Thai, 
Cambodian, and Laotian air forces.389          
 
Tried and tested on the battlegrounds of Southeast Asia, clandestine drug and arms trafficking 
would become a staple of American counterinsurgency funding in the coming decades in Latin 
America, Central Asia, and the Balkans. Thailand was a critical staging-ground for the initial 
trial-run of this indispensable aspect of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. 
     Other foundational aspects of U.S. counterinsurgency were adapted from the original CIA 
proxies in Thailand. The Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) of Operation Phoenix, the 
CIA’s notorious program of abduction, torture, and assassination in South Vietnam, were 
patterned on the Thai Border Patrol Police and Police Aerial Reconnaissance Units. It is by no 
accident that CIA Chief of Station for Laos and then Saigon, Ted Shackley, left his imprint on 
both the Thai BPP and PARU, and then also the PRUs in South Vietnam.  
     Once again representing the continuity of tactics and personnel within CIA-endorsed 
counterinsurgency operations, Felix Rodriguez, working for Ted Shackley, immersed himself in 
the Southeast Asian secret wars as a pilot for the Phoenix program. After training military units 
in Ecuador and Peru, Rodriguez “volunteered for Vietnam, where he was assigned to be deputy 
field adviser to Shackley’s PRUs.” Long before flying drugs for Pablo Escobar during the Contra 
Wars, Rodriguez was a pilot for the death squads of Operation Phoenix. “In Bien Hoa, Rodriguez 
developed a specialty – using helicopters in tandem with PRUs” wrote Shackley biographer 
David Corn.390 Orrin DeForest, a CIA interrogator for the Phoenix program, told of how “Felix 
Rodriguez, our lead pilot, would mark the houses…the other chopper pilots would set down 
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immediately and dump the PRU. They’d round up the people; get them out of the houses and 
scoop them up.”391 These people, of course, were being “scooped up” and taken to the various 
Provincial Interrogation Centers scattered across South Vietnam to be interrogated, tortured, and 
quite possibly, summarily executed. Constantly field-testing methods of warfare on civilian 
populations of various nations, Felix Rodriguez and Ted Shackley embody how 
counterinsurgency doctrine developed and grew in unseen peripheries like Thailand during the 
Vietnam War era.  
     Coming full circle via both personnel and strategy, Thailand during the American war in 
Vietnam was an important laboratory for counterinsurgency experimentation. For the United 
States, and especially the CIA, Thailand was an ideal space for testing proxy police, psywar, 
civic action, and clandestine funding schemes - mostly because of the openly receptive Thai 
government, and the relative lack of international observation and scrutiny. Despite the non-
existence of any recognizable threat from an Indigenous insurgency, or perhaps because of it, 
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The Legacy of Kennedy’s Counterinsurgency Ambition 
 
Without question, the American military-intelligence bureaucracy was well-educated in 
counterinsurgency warfare long before the Camelot era. In the post-World War II years, the CIA 
developed sophisticated methods of indexing human populations with the intention of control. 
This provided the underpinning logic which governed a counterinsurgency doctrine that came to 
rely increasingly on psywar, or psyops. The CIA provoked the assassination of Lumumba, and 
Kennedy would propose similar actions against Castro, Trujillo, Diem, and Duvalier. The heavy 
endorsement of these practices by the president and the American propaganda machine would 
serve to accelerate a form of counterinsurgency that had been incubating for some time.  
     Most significant to this period was the CIA weaponization of culture, the ensuing deployment 
of psychological warfare on a massive scale to control undesirable forms of human behaviour, 
and the use of militarized thought-police to regulate those who resisted accelerated pacification. 
Integral to the operation of the clandestine model was the example established in Laos and 
Thailand, where the illegal procedures of the counterinsurgent para-state structure were hidden 
by secret funding networks and alliances with drug-lords and the criminal underworld. 
     Under Kennedy, it is arguable that many aspects of counterinsurgency became further 
entrenched within a compartmentalized and technical government bureaucracy. As a bizarre and 
twisted rendition of Vollmer’s cop-as-social worker, U.S.-trained police around the world 
performed a comparable function as social engineers. Their primary duty to capital, property, and 
those who owned it would inevitably direct the police of various nations to build up intelligence 
networks, catalogue civilians, and root out those who threatened the imperial status quo of “open 
shop” economies and American domination. Counterinsurgency doctrine under Kennedy took on 
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a distinct character that focused on sowing division amongst cultures being colonized, and, 
relatedly, psywar aimed at stoking internal conflict as a premise to purge targeted subversives.      
     Because the main target in this war was civilian and not military, militarized political police 
were promoted as the most effective tool used to implement counterinsurgency policy “on the 
ground.” For these police, countering subversives devolved into extensive and habitual reliance 
upon kidnappings, incarceration, torture, and assassination. Operation Phoenix and Operation 
Condor were the natural extensions of these policies.  
     The seeds of counterinsurgency were planted firmly within U.S. government, intelligence 
agencies, military and academic institutions, the police, and through Kennedy’s preeminent 
focus, even into human cultures worldwide. The new American counterinsurgency doctrine, 
propelled by the intense interest and devotion of Camelot-era modernists, would have 
widespread and long-term ramifications for years and decades following the somewhat ironic 
assassination of JFK. 
     However, American counterinsurgency was not the sole creation or result of the personal 
interests of President Kennedy. As we have seen, counterinsurgency had been ingrained into the 
fabric of American military and police operations long before the Cold War, Kennedy, Castro, or 
the war in Vietnam. Counterinsurgency was used for centuries against the Indigenous population 
of America, it was also commonly used to control African slaves and European indentured 
servants, and eventually, all those perceived to be amongst what Frank Donner called the 
“dangerous classes.” As continental westward expansion terminated at the Pacific coast, 
counterinsurgency was focused on the growing power of the working class at home, and 
additionally, the working masses living in countries that would become part of the American 
colonial system. Arguably, the most pronounced period in the expansion of United States 
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counterinsurgency doctrine occurred at the turn of the 20th century, as tactics developed during 
war with the Indigenous tribes of North America were exported for other intrigues. At the same 
time as police forces and national guardsmen violently crushed strikes at home, their Marine 
counterparts used terror and violence to control colonial populations in Latin America and Asia. 
     Expanding the dialogue and narrative surrounding America’s use of counterinsurgency is 
important to our current understanding of U.S. Empire. When counterinsurgency is classified as 
something unique to the Kennedy-era, and by judging JFK’s counterinsurgency as a policy of 
failure, there is a collapse in logic which casts an obstructionist shadow over the nature and 
intent of American imperialism. Kennedy was carrying on a tradition passed to him by Jackson, 
Sherman, McKinley, Roosevelt and Wilson. The implementation of JFK’s counterinsurgency 
doctrine, while highly experimental, conformed to past policy, and led to a greater expansion and 
refinement of American counterinsurgency capabilities. This culminated in the CIA’s Operation 
Condor, which was constructed intentionally by Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon as a 
counterinsurgency operation which obscured U.S. involvement or culpability in the rise of the 
fascist dictatorships of the Southern Cone. These clandestine tactics were carried forward to the 
illegal wars in Central America during the Reagan-era. The invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Syria in the 21st century resulted in a popular revival of these ancient techniques, one which has 
not abated up until the present time.  
     Certainly, a more honest and rational examination of these practices will be necessary if we 
wish for a future with less, and not more, counterinsurgency warfare, and the immeasurable 
civilian suffering which is the intended and desired outcome of these operations. As complex 
issues related to environmental changes, ecological collapse, and overpopulation face the coming 
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